

Reflective Analysis: A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigation

by

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Dedicated to
the memory of Dorion Cairns
from whom so much has been learned
including—above all—the duty to
examine, correct, and extend
the reflective analyses received from others,
our teachers included.

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Preface for Instructors

Many who call themselves “phenomenologists” have forgotten (if they ever knew it) that what is fundamental to the phenomenological approach is something that may simply be called “reflective analysis.” The present text is devoted to presenting this approach, but it seems well here at the outset to object to two vices that *soi-disant* phenomenologists are prone to. The first vice can be called “scholarship” (scholarship being one species of research, while “investigation” is another). To be sure, scholarly study of what has already been written is an enormously valuable preparation for phenomenological investigation, because it yields not only results that can be examined, corrected, and refined, but also concepts and words that—once clarified—can be used to express and discuss such results. Like exercise, however, that which helps performance is not the same as performance itself.

The second vice seems best called “argumentation.” By and large, arguers rant, while phenomenologists ponder and express themselves tentatively. This is not to say that the best phenomenologists never offer arguments, but they do so rarely and usually for negative purposes, i.e., against positions they consider mistaken. This too is complementary to, but not the same as, reflective analytic investigation of the matters themselves. Nevertheless, many self-identified “phenomenologists” devote most if not all of their efforts to constructing arguments for and against theses rather as is done in the analytical philosophies, where many cannot comprehend that other approaches than argumentation even exist. In contrast, genuine phenomenologists do not as a rule produce arguments. Rather, they produce “analyses.” What this signifies will be shown and described in this text.

Not so much a vice as a widespread prejudice is the tendency tacitly to assume that phenomenology is exclusively a tradition in the modern discipline of philosophy, i.e., philosophy

conceived as one specialty alongside others. This is a mistake. There has been a phenomenological tendency in psychiatry since before World War I, and it has recently proven easy to identify phenomenological tendencies in over a score of other non-philosophical disciplines during phenomenology's first century.¹ Accordingly, while one might think that this is a text for those in the field of philosophy, and while probably more philosophers than others will be interested in it, the hope is that colleagues in non-philosophical disciplines will also see benefits in it. Although this text has been designed for teaching college students, it is not inconceivable that colleagues without immediate pedagogical purposes might also enjoy reading it whether they are already phenomenologists or not. My purposes in this preface are to comment on some aspects of this text, to suggest how it might be used in teaching, and to acknowledge my sources in one place.

Colleagues well informed about phenomenology will soon and often recognize places where the analyses in this text could have been carried much further. Thus while appearances are brought up, little is said about them and the space and time peculiar to them because they have been the source of a much argumentation over centuries and argumentation is being avoided here. Moreover, only a few pages are devoted to synthesis, which is of importance within phenomenology second only to intentionality or intentiveness, but would take us deeper than is needed in a first introduction. Note also that the great emphasis is placed on operational (“*aktiv*”) and then on habitual/traditional (“*sekondar passiv*”) processes, and there is hardly an allusion to automatic (“*primar passiv*”) ones. Nothing, furthermore, is said about objectivity and its intersubjective constitution, which would also require an additional chapter of much deeper analysis than the others contain. The same can be said about the procedure of transcendental epoche and reduction and the purification of the being-in-the world of minds. As for Being and

¹ Cf. Lester Embree, *et al.*, *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).

its regions, which have drawn so much attention in the phenomenological tradition, such metaphysical considerations would not only have taken the analysis deeper, but would also have invited argumentation. In addition, much phenomenology has been concerned over the years with the special sciences and, for that matter, with forms of technology. But except for some light shed on the differences between the formal and the contentual sciences, and also between the naturalistic and cultural sciences, this too is not pursued. Incidentally, the emphasis here is on what may be called “basic culture,” in which non-humans may share, rather than on the “high culture” of cultivation in the appreciation of fine art, literature, music, etc.—or, for that matter, on the “popular culture” of those with less in the way of elite pretensions.

There is, however, a somewhat philosophical analysis of critique or, better, of the “examination” and the justification of believing, valuing, and willing in the final chapter. This is to show that the approach described in the rest of the text can lead to interesting results. But efforts at justification are hardly confined to philosophy as a special discipline. Rather, justification hearkens back to a notion of philosophy as something general that is still found exemplified in many specialties. Students impatient with all the descriptive analysis in earlier chapters might be referred to the analysis of the examination of attitudes in this final chapter for some concrete examples of greater significance.

With most deep issues excluded from this little text, it has been easier here to attempt to redress some imbalances in most previous phenomenological work. For example, many in phenomenology seem to have taken it for granted that phenomenology is about humans and have thus neglected the non-human animals. Similarly, most have previously focused on individuals, while the groups—i.e., “intersubjectivities”—from which individuals are abstracted are at least as important. Along with this unfortunate focus on the individual, there has been an emphasis on

the affinities between phenomenological philosophy and various types of psychology that are akin to it, whereas if intersubjectivities are appreciated, the social and even the historical sciences, archaeology included, are at least equally important. Then again, what is here called “indirect experiencing,” especially its non-linguistic varieties, has rarely been investigated to the extent that their prominence in the encountering of objects requires (after all, this is how we experience other minds). Furthermore, while most prior phenomenology has been focused on cognition and thus pertains to epistemology (and thereby to ontology as well), comparable attention is due to valuation and volition, which prepares the ways for the theory of value and for the theory of action. The attempt to redress such imbalances in this text is in no way to be taken as an objection to specialization, for the field of all that can be approached phenomenologically is so vast that specialization is indeed necessary, but responsible specialization presupposes an awareness of the whole field.

Thus decisions have been made about what to include and what to omit from this text. Perhaps the result resembles an early stage of an archaeological investigation where only the top layer of the entire site is excavated. Where to dig deeper can then be decided. If the instructor wishes to go beyond this text into deeper issues, nobody will be made happier than the present writer. The hope, in other words, is that surface work will better prepare the way for deeper digging.

Only the indispensable minimum of technical terminology is used here, and it is introduced gradually, clearly, and distinctly. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of such terminology and, given how remarkably various are the terminologies of the major figures in the century-old tradition of phenomenology (and their translators!), it has seemed permissible and best to introduce a number of fresh expressions. Presumably the student will not already be

involved with another phenomenological jargon. If she continues in phenomenology, she will of course have to struggle with many other jargons. But above all, she will need the habit of examining her own usages regularly, and some guidance is also offered here by example in that respect. Often words will have to be used before being discussed, but the attempt has also been made to discuss all key terminology. In some cases—e.g., with “object as encountered” and “object as it presents itself”—synonyms do occur. Other words, e.g., “intentionive,” will initially seem artificial, but can then come to seem natural. As used here, “things,” “objects,” and “matters” are often close to if not overlapping in signification.

Examples from everyday life have been chosen to foster eidetic evidencing, and generic and specific concepts are often conveyed in diagrams and charts as well as discursively. There is then a great emphasis on classification or taxonomy in this text—which is suitable for an introduction, because the more clear and distinct concepts we have at our disposal, the more able we are to grapple with difficult and complex matters. The accounts presented here are simpler in the beginning, but become more and more complex chapter by chapter.

The practical innovation of this text within phenomenology is the inclusion of exercises at the ends of the chapters. Even the introduction has some that might be worked through in class at the start of the course to show students how to prepare them. After that, the students might be asked not only to study the chapters outside the class session but also to come to class prepared to present their exercises. Class time can then be devoted chiefly to discussing these exercises, especially those requiring reflective analysis. The instructor is hereby warned not to underestimate the time needed for these discussions. It might also be wise for the instructor not only to prepare her own versions of the exercises, but also to be prepared to recognize novel insights coming from students. In addition, the present writer would not be surprised if the

instructor found exercises of her own devising more effective than those offered here. This approach using exercises may in part encourage students to study the short chapters more carefully, but more important is the goal of leading them to use the conceptual apparatus, to seek out and analyze relevant phenomena reflectively, and even to engage in phenomenological investigations of their own on phenomena beyond those thematized in the text and the exercises.

If students learn to use reflective analysis to examine the claims advanced here, and thus learn to get beyond merely reading and memorizing what they read and are told, this text will have fulfilled its greatest hopes. How fast the text ought to be worked through will depend on the students and on how much classroom interaction can be generated. Which other texts to teach will need to be the instructor's decision, but they ought to be texts *in* rather than texts *on* phenomenology.

Most of the reflective analytical thought expressed here comes from my examination of work of others to whom I am grateful. Among the dead are Henri Bergson, William James, Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Alfred Schutz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and my teachers Edward G. Ballard, Dorion Cairns, and Aron Gurwitsch, as well as my colleagues Maurice Natanson and Elisabeth Ströker. Among the living are Betsy Behnke, Tim Casey, John Drummond, José Huertas-Jourda, Fred Kersten, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William McKenna, J. N. Mohanty, John Scanlon, Thomas Seebohm, Robert Sokolowski, and Richard Zaner. Behnke, Casey, Kersten, McKenna, Mohanty, Scanlon, and Seebohm and also Kirk Bessmer, Harold I. Brown, Steven Chassan, and Jenny Teichman, are also thanked for comments on earlier drafts. And Behnke is thanked for copy-editing the MS.

So much in this text comes from others that I am reluctant to claim credit for more than some of the technical terminology, examples, diagrams, and other aspects of the exposition—a

disclaimer that does not make others responsible for what is asserted here, for having confirmed it phenomenologically, I am responsible for recommending it to others. But it may help excuse the omission of detailed credit in footnotes. Colleagues may appreciate my pleasure in using the textbook form and thereby omitting scholarly apparatus. Had that apparatus been included, the book would have been at least twice as long, but would have served its purpose less well. Let me request, finally, that readers send me any suggestions for improvement that occur to them in using this text. I will gladly acknowledge the help in later editions.

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Delray Beach
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Introduction


This text is an introduction to something called phenomenology. “Phenomenology” most strictly names the thought of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and his closer followers within the phenomenological tradition, but there is much to learn from other phenomenologists as well. Although phenomenology is most recognized in philosophy, it has also gained considerable recognition in psychology, psychiatry, and sociology, and has furthermore been employed in many other cultural disciplines. There has been some emphasis on epistemology and ontology within phenomenological philosophy, especially in connection with the philosophy of science, but impressive work has also been done in value theory (including aesthetics) and moral philosophy (including ethics).

This is not an introduction to phenomenology as a body of results to be understood and memorized, but rather to phenomenology as an approach or a method to become more skilled in. (“Approach” is the better expression because it is less suggestive of something reducible to rules to be followed in cookbook fashion, but “method” and also “procedure” will be used on occasion.) Following the phenomenological approach chiefly requires two things: (1) adopting a suitable attitude, which is fundamentally reflective and theoretical, and (2) engaging in what can be called analysis. What “analysis” more fully signifies should be clear by the end of Chapter 6.

Much of the research that calls itself phenomenological today is actually “scholarship” practiced on texts that genuine phenomenologists have produced. Since these texts are difficult to comprehend, this scholarship is quite valuable. It ought not to be, however, an end in itself. Instead, it ought to facilitate phenomenological investigations. In “investigations” we do not interpret texts, but seek knowledge about things, whether or not earlier texts have investigated the same or similar things. In this respect, it is like naturalistic science: astronomers certainly

read articles produced by other astronomers, but do so fundamentally as a means to their investigations of stars and other things in the sky. The word “research” can thus be comprehended to refer to something with two species. These species are different even though frequently confused within as well as outside of phenomenology.

(Figure 0.1)



In Figure 0.1, the single-tailed arrows represent research activities of two different sorts, the things they are practiced on are denominated “texts” and “matters,” and the double-tailed diagonal arrow represents how what is expressed in texts is about, refers to, or signifies matters. (Speeches are like texts and are best reduced to them.) This diagram could be expanded to show how investigation produces texts about matters and scholarship produces texts about texts. People who are phenomenologists may often engage in scholarship, but are not phenomenologists when they do so (and if they confuse their investigative results with their scholarly results, it is nearly as bad). Being a genuine phenomenologist, in other words, requires getting beyond texts and addressing the things themselves. Just what the things or matters are that phenomenologists investigate, and whether or not they include texts, should become clear eventually.

Phenomenologists do, however, produce new texts on the basis of their phenomenological investigations of things. And texts pertaining to a discipline naturally require

technical terminology. The present text includes not a little technical terminology as well as explicit discussions of most of this terminology. It is not always convenient, however, to pause and discuss an unusual word the first time it is used. Comments on terminology have the purpose of making important concepts clearer and, in many cases, establishing new expressions for them. If the student becomes a phenomenologist, she will find herself frequently reflecting on words, those of others as well as her own. Something about how this can be done can now be shown.

If asked to name with one word what phenomenology is about, most who are well informed would reply either “consciousness” or “intentionality.” These words refer to the same matter in related ways. However, there are problems with both expressions. First of all, the word “consciousness” connotes being awake as opposed to sleeping, being knocked out after a punch, being in a coma, and so on. Moreover, it often connotes attentiveness as opposed to distractedness, and frequently connotes self-awareness as well. But the matter in question—i.e., what phenomenology most generally is about—is not merely awareness or experiencing, for it also concretely includes the major components of believing, valuing, and willing. Second, “consciousness” may tend to connote contemplation, whereas the thing at issue is originally practical: it is fundamentally a doing, whether it is sometimes a looking at or watching. Third, the matter in question is a process that originally goes on in an un-self-aware or unreflective manner, so that the connotation of self-awareness is doubly derivative.

If there were no alternative, one could try to learn to use “consciousness” in a technical way, as many phenomenologists have, and this signifies seeking not to be misled by the connotations just mentioned. Some phenomenologists have used “existence” instead of “consciousness,” and this is an improvement insofar as it is easier to comprehend “existence” as denominating something that is originally unreflective and practical, i.e., something more

involved with helping friends than engaging in science. Another word, “life,” is a more natural expression, particularly if the biological connotations can be avoided (which might be accomplished with a qualifier) and if a cognate qualifier form existed. But the biological connotation is strong and the qualifier “vital” is not cognate.

“Intentionality” is the other often used most general name for the theme of phenomenology. It refers to how the processes that go on in subjectivity are “intentional,” i.e., are directed at objects. To the beginner, this usage might seem to be derived from the way our actions are directed or aimed at their purposes, which we often call “intending,” as in, for example, “I intend to finish reading this chapter today.” And it is good to begin from something original. But it is necessary to generalize beyond this ordinary usage so that we can recognize that our processes of remembering are also directed at their objects, which are in the past rather than in the future; that our loving is a loving of a beloved person; that our believing is a believing of a statement or in some thing; and so on. It is true that phenomenologists may occasionally lapse into using “intentionality” in the way that non-phenomenologists do, i.e., merely for its practical species in a way that seems oblivious to the generic signification. But intentionality is much more than purposiveness. This is akin to the way some are led by the literalistic translation of Husserl’s *Einfühlung* as “empathy” to think of something emotional when what is intended is the type of observation of which other minds are the objects. Language can mislead.

The generalization of the concept technically expressed with the word “intentionality” seems easier than habitually using “consciousness” properly, but the concept in question is so remarkable (because the thing grasped with it is so remarkable) that a somewhat artificial expression not burdened with misleading connotations is preferable—namely—“intentiveness.” With that to express the generic concept, parallel specific expressions can readily be formed,

such as “perceptual intentiveness,” “recollective intentiveness,” “affective intentiveness,” and “volitional intentiveness.” “Wakeful intentiveness” can also be formed, but if “attentive intentiveness” seems too odd, “focal intentiveness” can be used. Moreover, rather than using “intending” and speaking of processes being “intentional of ...”—which would once again require generalizing beyond specifically practical connotations—one can simply speak of processes as “intentional to” their objects, which objects can include other intentional processes in the same or another stream of “intentional processes.” (A “mind,” incidentally, is a stream of intentional processes—which can also be called an intentional stream—plus an “I” or I’s who might be engaged or able to engage in it.) And, incidentally, the intentional stream is the same as what many call the “stream of consciousness.”

On the basis of these considerations and recognizing that language is conventional, one might now be tempted to say that phenomenology is about intentional processes. This is true but incomplete. It is incomplete because those who use the approach of reflective analysis also necessarily investigate the objects of intentiveness as they are intended to in intentional processes. One of the slogans of phenomenology is “All consciousness is consciousness of ...,” but it needs also to be remembered that in phenomenology “All objects are objects of ...” Phenomenologists are thus concerned not only with believing, but also with objects as believed in; not only with valuing but with objects as valued; not only with willing, but also with objects as willed; and so on.

The believing, valuing, and willing components in every concrete intentional process are different from the components of what seems best called “experiencing,” such as perceiving and remembering. In a parallel way, the naturalistic properties and relations of things as they are experienced—e.g., color and shape—are, as such, different from the cultural characteristics that

such determinations always already have, which can be called “belief characters,” “values,” and “functions” or, better, “uses.” In one form or another, these are all to be found in objects as intended to in intentive processes. Now, finally, it can be asserted that phenomenology is about intentive processes and objects as intended to. “Objects as they present themselves” will often be used in this text as a synonym not only for “objects as intended to,” but also for “objects as encountered.”

In case the foregoing terminological discussion is too abstract to be enlightening, another approach can be ventured. First, it should be easy to accept that we humans have many attitudes; indeed, we can find that we have attitudes toward practically everything. Second, if we seek to classify our attitudes, there is a threefold classification that appears to work well. It is based on asking which of the three “positional components” (an expression to be discussed later) of believing, valuing, or willing predominates in an attitude: there can accordingly be cognitive, valuational, and volitional attitudes. One type features loving or merely liking, hating or disliking, and being apathetic or indifferent; another includes striving to create, foster, or preserve, striving to destroy, impede, or prevent, or adopting an attitude of non-intervention; and the third can include thinking, but is essentially positive, negative, or neutral believing, the latter also sometimes called “suspending judgment.” Correlatively, the objects of attitudes of these three kinds include positive, negative, and neutral volitional, valuational, and cognitive characteristics that can be discerned in them when we reflect on how they present themselves.

This alternative approach is weak where the experiencing component in the intentive processes is concerned in various ways, e.g., with regard to the way attitudes include perceiving, remembering, expecting, etc. In the original form of experiencing, the thing intended to present itself directly, but there can also be a component of indirect experiencing, e.g., in reading a story,

looking at photographs, listening to the radio, etc. The object ultimately intended to over television does not present itself directly. If there were a word that initially connoted direct experiencing but could be generalized to include indirect experiencing, and could also be combined readily with the adjectives “cognitive,” “valuational,” and “volitional,” it could serve as an alternative to the possibly cumbersome pair of expressions, “intentional process” and “object as intended to.” Perhaps forms of the verb “to encounter” can be used in this connection. Then phenomenology could be said to be about the encountering of objects and objects as encountered.

Two more discussions may help the reader comprehend ways in which errors can not only be made but also corrected in phenomenology. The first concerns something that is almost too familiar, i.e., pain. Even phenomenologists have been observed to proceed argumentatively more or less as follows. What is pain? Where is it? How is it caused? There is probably a commonsense agreement about what pain is, at least to begin with, and likewise with what causes pain. If one asks whether the pains one can feel are located somewhere in one’s surrounding world like colors and shapes, it is true that the latter can change like pains can and indeed come to be and pass away. But no pain is a quality of an object in the surrounding world, even when we take obviously changing qualities into consideration—e.g., the way a cube of ice is quite cold and cubical (and rigid), but eventually warms up a bit and becomes a puddle that can flow and finally evaporate.

So far, so good, but then the mistake begins. One can reason that if pains are not “out there” like the coldness and rigidity of an ice cube, they must be in the mind, i.e., part of the stream of intentional processes. Then pains are on a par with liking and disliking, hoping, and reminiscing. But not only is that not the only alternative, it cannot be supported through

reflective analysis. What is on a par with liking, disliking, etc., is the “feeling of pain,” and it is an intensive process in which disliking predominates. Now we can ask about the pain as intended to—as felt or encountered, and as including negative value. The answer is that pains are in one’s own body or, more precisely, in parts or areas of one’s body, yet there are not there as visible anatomical structures; rather, they are there as things directly experienced in an originally private way that can be referred to by saying that they are “felt from within.”

If one pinches the back of one of one’s hands hard with the finger and thumb of the other hand, there is pain and one may say, “It hurts,” referring to the place pinched. If one waves the hurt hand about, the pain moves with it. Others may see the pinching take place and even cringe in sympathy, but they do not directly experience the pain. They can see the affected area pinched but do not feel it from within. There are further interesting questions concerning how a privately experienced pain felt from within can come to be something public, visible to all. For now, however, it will suffice to say that the pain is located in the extra-mental world, but not in the extra-somatic surrounding part of that world.

An answer can now be ventured in response to the question of what a pain is. First of all, it is a highly changeable sensuous quality felt from within. Next, the feeling of one’s own body from within is akin to the kind of experiencing involved in seeing a tree, hearing the wind move its leaves, and touching its bark, which is tantamount to saying that it is a sensuous perceiving. But then it may be added that this is not the same kind of direct experiencing one has of the intensive processes in one’s own stream of such processes, nor is it the same as the indirect experiencing of other such streams, or even the direct experiencing of ideal objects that are not directly located in space and time. The pain as directly felt is nevertheless different from the tree as directly seen, heard, and touched, precisely because it is felt in a different way: as has already

been pointed out, it is felt from within. Furthermore, the roughness of the bark of the tree is indeed changeable, i.e., it can and will eventually rot away, but it is not highly changeable. In contrast, the color of the skin of the hand where the pinch happened can be seen by oneself and by others (for it is public) as somewhat pink and/or white but that quickly fades. Except that it is felt from within, this pain per se is highly changeable, just like the change in the color of the skin where it is pinched, although there is not always a perfect match between what can be observed from without and what can be felt and observed from within.

One can plainly go further and perhaps classify pains according to whether they are long lasting rather than short lasting, whether they are on the surface or deeper in one's own body, whether joints and muscles are involved, or whether they occur in sense organs, such as when a bright flash hurts one's eyes. But enough has been said in a first approximation about what as well as where pains are. What causes them? One cause is obviously pinching, but other causes can be recognized for other pains, such as the long-lasting headache that follows drinking too much alcohol, or the pain in the back that comes from trying to lift something that is too heavy. Perhaps the most general distinction is between extra-somatic and intra-somatic causes, but at least most ordinary pains seem to have causes that are easy to discern. Most important to recognize phenomenologically is that, where pain is concerned, is a difference between the pain as felt or, better, encountered, and the feeling or, better, encountering that is an intensive process intensive to it. It is also important to observe reflectively rather than argue in commonsense terms. When the pain is intense, reflecting at the same time can be difficult. We can nevertheless look back later and recognize the difference between the pain as felt and the feeling of it.

Recourse to classifications will have been noted above. Generic and specific concepts can be related to one another through discussions of the genera (or kinds) and species (or sorts) they

belong to, and in this book the results of such discussions will sometimes be conveyed with diagrams. Again, a concrete case will help to show this. Humans more or less explicitly recognize from birth (and maybe before) that there are others besides their own selves. Figure 0.2 summarizes one way in which others may be classified. It is based on at least five distinctions: (1) self/other, (2) strange/familiar, (3) individual/group, (4) familiars toward whom

Figure 0.2

	individuals	groups
strangers-----		
enemies-----		
familiars-----acquaintances-		
\ friends-----		

one has strong feelings vs. those toward whom one has fairly weak feelings, and (5) familiars toward whom one has strong negative feelings vs. those toward whom one has strong positive feelings. By no means is it contended that that these distinctions exhaust how others can be classified. In particular, it does not address the distinction between human and non-human animals.

The exercise of finding cases to fit the eight species of others within the grid in Figure 0.2 might accomplish three things. (1) It can not only make the classification clearer, but also show its universality: is it clear that for any person in any society and during any historical period, all others belong to one of these eight bi-determinate classes? Where would the ancient Egyptians fit into the grid?

(2) It may show the need to investigate for oneself, i.e., to examine what is offered in something like this chart, for (a) this diagram seems to imply that only others we are familiar

with can be intended to with strong feelings. But is this correct—or are strange individuals and groups also feared, and is not fear a strong feeling? We may also wonder if “feeling” is used here in the same or different significations as before, i.e., in the discussion of the feeling of pain. And (b), while the diagram does interestingly include groups of others as well as individual others, it at least as interestingly omits mention of a self’s own group—or at least leaves it indeterminate whether others are encountered by an individual or a group. In short, a classification can be deficient, and the student must be cautious about what she can accept—even in a textbook—without reflecting for herself.

(3) The classification expressed in Figure 0.2 also shows the value of exercises. The first six chapters of this text all include them in one way or another. They are there to help the student learn reflective analysis through practice either in attempting to produce new analyses or in reproducing analyses that are offered. Whether they recognize it or not, all normal adults already engage from time to time in reflective analysis. The hope of this book is that through study, preparation of the exercises, and discussion of one’s findings along with others the student’s skill at reflective analysis will become stronger and the reflective analyses more effectively performed.

Why should anyone want to become a phenomenologist? Simply put, greater skill at reflective analysis of encounterings and objects as encountered helps us more effectively and responsibly know, value, and act. But this will probably not be clear until we have worked our way through this text, preparing the exercises offered in it (and also any that the instructor provides) and discussing them with others not merely in order to confirm analysis offered here by means of our own investigations of the pertinent matters, but also in order to correct and otherwise to refine them through investigating these and further things on our own. Most areas in

the field of phenomenology are not yet well investigated even after a century. The matters are complex; the technical language developed thus far is rarely adequate; the applications have only begun; and disciplined effort is required to get to an appropriate standpoint from which to observe, analyze, and describe.

Exercises

Most of the following exercises can be completed after study of the preceding pages, but it is recommended that the student read the chapter again after drafting her responses. Furthermore, the student is warned that some exercises will wholly or partly require her to go beyond what has been written above.

1. Others and hence the social world have been classified into (1) the predecessors who have died before one was born, (2) the successors who will be born after one will die, and (3) all others alive at the same time as oneself. #3 can be subdivided into (a) those who are being directly encountered by oneself at a given time and (b) all others who are indirectly experienced. Diagram this.

2. Catalogue (make a list with some structure) and illustrate (give an example of) the types of intensive process and objects as intended to mentioned in this introduction.

3. Research can be characterized to some extent by the things it is practiced upon. What are the two sorts of research contrasted above, how do they differ, and what is research in general? And can a text be an object and, if so, how is it different when investigated from when it is studied?

4. Some deficiencies in Figure 0.2 were mentioned. Devise a better classificatory diagram. Can you say that your result is a reflective analysis and tell why it is?

5. Are all texts about objects? Must what a text is about exist? What are works of fiction about? What does “to exist” signify in your response?

6. Can one feel another’s pain? How?

7. What might it signify to say that intentionality is originally unreflective and practical?

How else might it be? Can valuations be reflective?

Chapter 1

Observing

The phenomenological approach fundamentally consists of an activity that seems best called “observation” or “observing.” Other activities also pertain to this approach, but they are secondary. On the other hand, there is more than one sort or species in the kind of activity here called observing, and not every sort is phenomenological. Just what observation is will take some effort to clarify. We begin here with the non-phenomenological sort that can be called “unreflective observation”—or, if that has unfortunate negative connotations, “straightforward observation”—and will later concentrate on what is best called “reflective observation.”

Not everything important that can be said about observation in general will be said in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is expected that the reader will be able to find things of the sort that are described and observe whether or not they are as alleged here. In other words, a “descriptive account” will be offered for the student’s observational verification. Such an account will, at the outset, be in commonsense terms, although technical expressions will be developed as the need arises. This is the most natural way of proceeding, but both the reader and the writer of descriptions must struggle to keep the matters described in view, and hence not merely rehash what we already routinely believe.

All normal adults are already somewhat skilled in observing. Thus we are not now attempting now to learn something entirely new. The problem is rather to increase our skill at observing not only through reflecting on how and to what purpose it is done, but above all through practice. If the student has learned to see through a microscope, then she has already lived through a similar improvement in observational skill. We begin with a familiar case and

will analyze it far enough that the student may come to observe some aspects better than she did previously.

Section 1.—**The Example of Eating Together**

Our first example will be a meal. The student will probably eat at least one meal between studying this chapter and discussing it in class. As she reads what is written here, she will have a vague awareness of such a familiar thing, but she can also engage in observing an actual case the next time she dines. People can eat alone or they can eat together. Here the focus will be on group meals. Most of us usually prefer them, and they are more complex. We have all been together with others many times in order to eat breakfast, lunch, supper, a snack, or some other regularly scheduled or randomly occurring meal. We can be participants in such an event, seated at a table, around a picnic basket, etc., interacting with our fellow diners and feeding. But we can also observe a meal. As participants we are aware of or “experience” vaguely what is going on, but to know about it we need to engage in observing properly so called.

To observe a meal involves first of all not participating, either actively or passively. We sit or stand back and instead of being involved or interacting, we watch or contemplate what goes on. In terms of our main purpose, our efforts change from trying to have a good time to trying to know rather thoroughly what is happening. Observing is slightly unusual behavior, although “people watching” actually happens to a great extent. It may be disapproved of in our society to be caught watching strangers—say, across the room in a restaurant—especially if we do it too long, do it too steadily, do it when it does not lie within our role to do so, etc. Even our families might not approve of our doing it at meals in our homes. Nevertheless, it is clearly as easy to observe a group of people eating together as it is to watch birds.


What do we observe when we observe a group of people eating together? Certainly we could simply look and listen, but if our observation is for cognitive purposes, then more than that is involved. We need to differentiate components within things, i.e., objects, relations, and properties. But which ones ought we to differentiate? We could go on for a long time if not forever in looking at tiny details, such as buttons on shirts and how the gleam on them changes as the wearer of the shirt moves during breathing, or the movements of all of the joints and fingers in a hand during a minor effort such as laying down a fork. This way, however, we would not only miss the forest for the trees, but also miss the trees for the leaves. A better strategy is to look for features of the whole of the thing and of its main parts.

Often we do not focus on the overall thing—in our case, the entire meal that is going on before us—but rather take it for granted as a background while we concentrate on something in the foreground, such as a person who is speaking. The phenomenologist, however, is sensitive to backgrounds, and suspects, furthermore, that things that are taken for granted in everyday and ordinary as well as specialized situations need explication.

Concerning the meal that we observe, then, considered as a whole, it is a complex thing that involves both “animate” and “inanimate” components. Thus the people participating in the meal we are using as our example belong to one kind of thing, and the chairs, table, food, floor, lights, etc., belong to another kind. It is not necessary that all the animate components be human, for there might be a dog who regularly participates in a family’s meal by begging more or less subtly or insistently and being fed overtly or covertly or denied food in various ways, but if not all then at least most of the animate components in the type of group meal considered here are human. Of course, other types of group meals might have no human participants at all, e.g., prides of lions dining on zebra. Then again, ants and flies and other pests may be present at a

picnic without being invited by the human picnickers. (Is “pest” the opposite of “pet”? If so, this would help make calling a misbehaving pet or human a pest more significant.) These basic distinctions can be brought together in a chart, which goes a bit beyond what has been said thus far (see Figure 1.1).

(1.1)



Because meals and their components are rather familiar to us, we do not need to go to great lengths to define the words we use to name them. What has been asserted is readily comprehended. Ordinary names, the technique of referring to everything other than certain privileged things in a class by using the prefixes “non-,” “in-,” etc., and the technique of forming a slightly artificial term like “meal components” work fairly well in such a simple case, and more complex cases can be dealt with after sufficient terminology has been built up. But perhaps there are already some aspects that the student has not yet pondered.

While the focus of activities in a meal might seem to be on eating, much more is usually going on that might generally be called “socializing,” which is often the higher purpose of getting together for food and drink—after all, one can always eat alone. Perhaps a business deal is being negotiated or celebrated; perhaps family solidarity is being maintained, developed, or restored and, in a different signification of the word “socializing,” children are being socialized, i.e., taught to interact politely. More than one social purpose can clearly be served at the same time. Perhaps the diners are on a date and getting to know one another initially or more deeply,

etc. In its social aspect (in yet another signification of the word “social”), a meal is often somewhat ritualistic, i.e., something for which one dresses suitably and in which there is a code of conduct (“table manners”), and in which sharing food and drink is a profoundly friendly or even a loving act. A meal is much more than alimentation, the taking of nourishment from its environment by an organism, which even vegetables do.

Turning from the human to the non-human animals, there are various ways in which to classify non-humans. We can distinguish bugs, fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals in a somewhat naturalistic way. Then again, in a way that is less naturalistic, we can distinguish “tame” or domesticated non-humans from “wild” ones, which is a distinction that cross-cuts that among bugs, fish, reptiles, etc. This distinction would catch the difference between the insistently begging dog and the busy ants at the meal we are observing, who are likely to be considered pests in both cases, although in slightly different significations of the word “pest.”

In contrast, the animate/inanimate distinction may not be as easy to clarify as it may seem at first glance. We do tend to believe that animals are alive or dead. Are vegetables not also alive at some point? How do we know whether a vegetable is dead? If vegetables can be alive, are we not eating living things more often than we thought? What is it to be alive? Even if we cannot answer such questions yet, it is progress just to ask them.

What makes human food be food? Pretty clearly the main thing is whether humans eat it. Being food does not seem to be equivalent to being nutritious for humans. On the one hand, there are some things that are tasty, such as mushrooms that provide practically no nutrition—yet they are eaten and considered food. On the other hand, there is much that is nutritious but is not eaten in many societies, e.g., bugs. Whether something is food seems to be like whether something is a

pest: what it is depends on the humans dealing with it. Later we will be able to say that food is a cultural thing.


As mentioned, in classifying” the components of things we observe, it is often convenient to use modifiers such as “non-”; “a-” does the same job. There are non-food components among the non-animal components of the meal. These would include the table, chairs, lights, walls, floor, ceiling, etc., if the meal went on indoors, and would include the picnic area, the picnic cloth and basket, the shade tree, perhaps even the sun and sky, etc., if it were one sort of meal eaten out of doors (eating with one’s hands at a stand on the sidewalk is not a picnic). Then again, there are inanimate non-food components, such as knives, forks, spoons, plates, glasses, etc., that came into play whether a meal is eaten indoors or out.

This extremely elementary observation-based descriptive analysis can obviously be carried quite a bit further. Many things can be described in a similar way. It is offered to show, initially, what can be done even with highly familiar things. Actually to become phenomenologists, we need to go much further, but we need to remember how things are intended to on this commonsense level as well, for this is like the surface on which we stand when we begin to dig.

Section 2.—**Some Types of Determinations**

Not all distinctions are equally important. While we may readily distinguish between pets and non-pets among domesticated non-humans and pests and non-pests among wild ones, these distinctions do not seem momentous. At least a case has to be made for their importance. The distinctions made (or at least worked on) in the present section are, in contrast, very important

(Figure 1.2)



for understanding what “nature” and “world” signify, which are obviously important for philosophy. There are two intersecting distinctions involved in this (See Figure 1.2).

“Determinations” are properties and relations. In other words, there are two sorts or species of determinations. How they differ can be shown with examples taken from the observed meal. The table is “flat” and “circular.” The meat may be “red” and “warm.” The rice is “white” and “granular.” These determinations are properties. Objects have them quite apart from any relations to other objects that they may also have. Clearly it is possible to distinguish “shape properties” and “color properties,” which are both “visible properties,” and “tangible properties,” the last mentioned being further distinguishable into “thermal properties,” “pressure properties,” etc. (Actually, of course, shape is a tangible as well as a visible property; is it also an audible property in some vague way? Can we tell whether the unseen staircase is a spiral staircase simply by hearing somebody walk down it?)

In contrast with the species of determinations called “properties,” it is also observable that the table is “in” the room, that food is “on” the table, and that some people and furniture are “near to” and others “far from” the table. Relations require at least two things between which they hold. More classification can be done here as well. “Spatial relations” also include “over,” “under,” “between,” “among,” “around,” “inside,” “outside,” etc. Then there are “temporal relations” that include “before,” “after,” “simultaneous with,” “concurrent with,” etc. The things

related, sometimes called “relata,” can be related immediately or mediatedly, e.g., before or after one another. Beyond the question of the difference between these two species of determinations, both this paragraph and the preceding paragraph have again shown how examples can help us to grasp distinctions, and to do so more clearly than before.

It is curious that properties tend to be emphasized over relations in scientific, philosophical, and commonsense accounts. Differently put, objects obviously always have properties, but is it obvious that they also always have relations? After attempting to observe how relations are quite essential parts of a complex thing like a meal, we can speculate about why relations might nevertheless come to be underemphasized, if not overlooked, in our accounts if not also in our observation.

Suppose that there is a basket of bread on the table. It now has the spatial relation of being “on” the table, and let us add that it is “at the center” of the round table. These are spatial relations. Temporally, we know about and perhaps even observe an earlier time when the basket was not on the table but rather in the kitchen, and when the bread was not in the basket but in the oven. During the meal, the basket of bread can be passed around the table and pieces of bread taken out of it. Eventually, all of the bread will be out of the basket and into the bodies of the diners where, before long, it will no longer be bread. And we easily expect that the time will come when the basket itself will be “on” the trash heap and then rot or be burned until it is not a basket any more.

Several points are clear. (1) Spatial relations do observably occur, at least for objects like baskets in meals (whether they hold either within minds or between minds and spatial objects is another question), as do temporal relations; (2) relations hold between one object, e.g., the basket, and other objects, e.g., chairs and hands; (3) relations can and often do change; (4)

relations are part and parcel of the whole observed thing, i.e., the meal going on before us; and (5) an observed thing like this can never lack such relations. In other words, there could not be a meal without spatial and also temporal relations among many of the components.

Because the different components making up the whole thing under observation, e.g., a meal, are thus essentially related to one another in observable ways, there is merit in calling them “components” rather than objects. The former word can then connote more interdependence than independence among parts of the whole. The point here is not that the bread basket is a bread basket only in relation to the meal and diners, which may also be true, but rather that all things in space have sheerly spatial relations with other such things and that temporal things have sheerly temporal relations with other temporal things. (Many real things are spatial as well as temporal; are all of them?)

As for the question of why relations (in contrast to properties) have tended to be underappreciated, it appears that this has something to do with properties being relatively more permanent than relations. To be sure, the properties of shape and color, for example, can be modified, but for most relatively small everyday things, such as baskets of bread, spatial relations change far more easily. When the bread is passed around the table, the experienceable spatial relations of the basket with the people, dishes, furniture, etc., are altered in numerous conspicuous and subtle ways, e.g., what is out of somebody’s reach comes into her actual reach, probably moves out of the actual reach of another person into the potential reach of someone who is not interested in it just now, and so on.

Perhaps, however, a tendency to believe that properties are less changeable than relations is a mistake. Or at least it depends on the thing. A thing of ordinarily enormous interest for us is the human face. We do not have to experience many faces for very long to recognize that even in

such a routine situation as a meal faces change so frequently, pervasively, and subtly that we can wonder whether they are ever of precisely the same shape twice. But to observe in this way, we need to focus on the facial shape itself, and thus suspend our usual concern with the other mind indicated by it (the happy person is more than a smile). One of the indications of illness, unconsciousness, or even death is the alteration, diminishment, or cessation of change in the visage. The same can be said about posture and movements, including gestures and gaits.

The above analysis emphasizes what can be called “physical determinations.” These include the spatial and temporal relations and properties that both animate and inanimate things have. Yet some of the components in the meal example—namely, the animate ones—have “psychic” as well as physical parts or subcomponents. Where “psychic things” are concerned, some of the diners may be happy and others sad. Thus they have what can be called “moods.” These are different from physical things insofar as the mood relates to something, e.g., being happy the mood relates to what the person is happy about. This will be discussed in more detail later. Clearly, however, it pertains to the difference between the psychic and the physical. The foregoing can be related to a chart expanding on the previous chart (see Figure 1.3).

(Figure 1.3)

		properties	relations
naturalistic	/	psychic	
	\	physical	

There can be further sorts of relations between animals, e.g., humans, whereby some are friends and others enemies, some are parents and others their children, etc. These are not spatial

relations. Instead, because they relate to others, they can be called “social relations.” (They can also be called “cultural,” as will be seen below.) For example, the relationship of brotherhood (or sisterhood and, generally, siblinghood) is not only a biologically natural relation (when biological parents are shared), but also a social one. There are many varieties of social relations and many of these are also quite changeable, as are some of the psychic things.

Psychic and physical properties and relations can be collectively referred to as “naturalistic determinations.” Color and shape and spatial and temporal relations belong to this genus or kind of determination as do attentiveness and motivation within and between minds. Without implying that all the types of determinations that have been mentioned in this book are involved, we can now define something of great interest at least for philosophers. *Nature is one vast system of animate and inanimate objects with physical and social relations among them.* If cultural characteristics are ignored, and simply the resultant naturalistic things are observed, it will be convenient to call the type of observing “naturalistic observing.” In contrast, there is what can be called “cultural observing” and, where there is emphasis on animals (be they human or non-human animals or both in interaction), “sociocultural observing.” These different types of observing are relied on in different kinds of science. But what is it to be cultural?

Section 3.—**Cultural Determinations**

In contrast with naturalistic determinations, there are those that it is best to call “cultural determinations.” These are the naturalistic properties and relations of the sorts already discussed, but with their cultural characteristics no longer ignored, and these characteristics are at least as essential to the observed thing in our case as the naturalistic determinations. A bread basket is not merely a concave physical thing; it is an implement in the human ritual of eating together. Moreover, brotherhood and sisterhood can be highly valued relations for the humans inside and

also outside these relations, and the value of the relationship here is not something merely biological. Indeed, that value may be ambivalent, or even negative and not obviously adaptive for the individuals in it.

Many Modern thinkers nevertheless tend to disregard cultural determinations and hence habitually engage in naturalistic observing. (On the other hand, it appears that Ancient and Medieval thinkers often did not distinguish the naturalistic from the cultural determinations of things.) In part this may be because moods and social relations—or at least most of them that come to our attention—are, in contrast with some naturalistic determinations, relatively changeable. More fundamentally, however, this disregard appears fundamental to the widespread Modern tendency called “naturalism,” which is a focusing on naturalistic things and their determinations, a focusing carried out originally in the naturalistic sciences and in the technologies based on them, but now affecting everyday life as well. This is done by disregarding the cultural characteristics that objects always already have. The use of the word “naturalistic” rather than “natural” in this text is to serve as a reminder that something has been disregarded in order to attain “nature,” so that the so-called natural sciences are actually not natural, but are the product of a cultural abstraction in a double signification: an abstraction from the cultural to begin with, and an abstraction carried out and/or accepted by members of a certain tradition.

Naturalism is so widespread—at least Western thought today—that it is widely taken for granted as obvious by most philosophers and scientists. It is best countered through appreciation of cultural things and their determinations. Worse than naturalism is “physicalism,” which contends that all that can be known is what physical science can investigate; hence psyches and, for that matter, bodies or somas encountered as embodying them, do not truly exist, which the

broader position, naturalism, does not deny. Behaviorism would be a species of physicalism. It is also a physicalism to consider social relations to be merely spatial, temporal, and causal, i.e., physical.

The easiest cultural determinations to focus on initially seem to be valuational. Let us suppose that during the meal we are observing, a minor conflict breaks out between a mother who wants her child to eat his broccoli and the child who does not want to do so. Listening to the verbal exchange, including noticing tones of voice, facial expressions, etc., we can observe that the vegetable has negative value for the child. In doing so, we would be practicing sociocultural observation. For the child, then, the broccoli is bad; he encounters it culturally, which signifies that the cultural characteristics—and values are cultural characteristics—are not abstracted from.

The mother too may dislike how the vegetable smells and tastes. Nevertheless, it has an overriding positive value for her because she believes it contains vitamins and minerals conducive to health. This exemplifies how values can be “intrinsic” and “extrinsic,” a very important distinction regarding values. The broccoli has values of both sorts for the mother. For her it is intrinsically bad but extrinsically good. It is valued negatively for its own sake and valued positively for the sake of something else that is valued positively for its own sake, i.e., health. A cross-classification can now be conveyed with a chart.

(Figure 1.4)

	value	
	/	\
	intrinsic	extrinsic
positive		
negative		

A brief analysis might be taken further. While a thing can have positive or negative and intrinsic or extrinsic values as properties of a non-naturalistic or, positively speaking, cultural kind, the valued thing is also often valued as “better than,” “worse than,” or “just as good as” (or “as bad as”) some other thing. Thus there are “value relations” between things as well as “value properties” of things. This line of inquiry will be carried further in later chapters, not merely with respect to values and valuing, but also with respect to the properties of things that are correlative to willing and best called “uses” generically, as well as with respect to the properties correlative to believing that are best called “belief characters.” At this point, where the expository purpose is to show what cultural determinations are in general, it will suffice to show that things have value for participants in the meal we are observing.

Things have values for humans and other animals who encounter them culturally. This is true whether or not any particular values are shared by all participants in a given situation. Values and indeed all cultural characteristics can change. It is possible for the broccoli to have negative value, be bad, for the child on first looking at it and smelling it, and then for that value to change to positive when he eats it and finds that he actually likes the vegetable for its texture and taste. This would be a change in its intrinsic value. Extrinsic value can change similarly, as it would if scientists were to announce that broccoli caused cancer—something the present writer has emphatically *not* heard!

In addition, while the broccoli is an inanimate component in the meal (assuming that cut plants are dead), the animate components also have values for the participants. Pests have negative value, pets have positive value, as have beloved offspring, and then there are siblings who can detest one another. Also, at least the human participants each have value for themselves, i.e., we each also encounter ourselves culturally—for example, we are ashamed or proud of

ourselves. The entire meal would have value for the observer if she were a participant, but part of her detachment involves striving neither to like nor dislike the thing observed, except perhaps as a good example of a meal, which is extrinsic “theoretical value” with respect to her investigative purposes. More closely considered, the meal does have an intrinsic theoretical value for the detached observer at the same time that it has “practical value” and perhaps also “aesthetic value” for the participants (the child does not dislike the vegetable because it is bad for him but because of its look and smell). Interestingly, though, this theoretical value is intrinsically neither positive nor negative but neutral. Perhaps Figure 1.4 needs to be expanded to include another line, but this issue can be considered later.

While the valuational determinations, i.e., the properties and relations that have value, seem the easiest to recognize, it deserves mention again that “uses” are another kind of cultural determination. Here, for example, when one participant in the meal asks another to pass the salt, the fellow participant as well as the salt shaker is used as a “means” to the “end” of the first participant’s food getting salted. Thus humans not only have values for one another (as well as for themselves), but also uses. They help, hinder, or let one another be. If the meal took place in a restaurant, then for the diners the waiter there would probably be defined entirely by his function or use, by the job that he is there to do. A watchdog is similarly defined. Perhaps a pet is too.

For some reason, it seems easier to recognize how the inanimate components of the meal are defined by their uses and “use relations,” or, in general, by their “practical characteristics.” We can ask what a table is and quickly recognize that it is that which is used to hold up the food and utensils and, more subtly, to locate people neither too close nor too far from one another; we can ask what chairs are and recognize that they are what are used to hold up the people who sit

on them; we can ask about the bread basket and recognize its uses to hold bread and allow it conveniently to be passed around the table; we can ask about the lighting and recognize that it is what allows the participants in the meal to see their food and one another in some way or another; and so on.

A good generic name for all of this is “equipment,” although “practical thing” has its virtues. One sort in this kind might be called “utensils” and include knives, forks, spoons, dishes, and drinking glasses. These utensils are what they are not only in relation to the users of them but also in relation to one another, i.e., knives and forks for cutting and lifting food onto plates and from plates to mouths. Thus there are “practical relations.” There are also “practical properties,” i.e., the uses that the fork has as a means and, in relation to that, the purpose it is used to serve. In other words, “means uses” and “end uses” are related practical properties. Besides being the end for fork-using, eating may be a means to staying alive, which ought itself to have a purpose. In any event, cultural determinations of the practical sort are different from value determinations.

If nature is the totality of things naturalistically considered—things with their naturalistic properties and relations, but with their cultural characteristics ignored or abstracted from, i.e., things as naturalistically observable—then we need another name for the whole system of cultural things with their values and uses, their cultural properties and also their cultural relations, which we culturally observe. The best expression here is “world,” or with a valuable redundancy, “cultural world.” Whether there are many cultural worlds but one nature or whether there are as many natures as there are cultural worlds that they are abstracted from need not be discussed here.

Section 4.—**Observation and Analysis**

The foregoing sections have been intended to make several points plausible. One is that even with extremely familiar things, such as meals, observing can disclose determinations that have not received much attention previously. In this respect there is a need to struggle against taking things for granted as “obvious.” Even so, this analysis has not penetrated very deeply.

Another point concerns how observing is not simply a matter of gazing at things. Rather, when we observe, naturalistically or culturally, we peer, ponder, and seek in some degree to analyze. “To analyze” signifies to seek out the articulations, the structure, the components, i.e., the properties, relations, and positional characteristics within a total thing. One technique for analysis is *to ask a question and then observe the thing and its determinations that are asked about in order to answer the question*. For example, are there any other physical relations on a par with spatial and temporal relations? Do not “causal relations” also belong here? The two questions just asked have among their purposes the illustration of the technique of asking questions to guide analysis. More questions will be asked in this text.

Another technique consists in *proceeding from the more to the less general*, i.e., starting with the main kinds of components and seeking the sorts that belong under them, but perhaps not pursuing every possible further subspecification. For example, differentiating between the hairy and bald among the animals present at the meal may be irrelevant to the purpose of describing the meal. On the other hand, sociocultural differences between meal participants who are family members and those who are not might be important if the meal description were to be undertaken in the course of an investigation concerned with the distinction between familiars and strangers.

What are the results of observational analysis? First of all, certain determinations of things (e.g., a value of something for someone) that might not have been noticed before are now

recognized. On the basis of such recognitions, something best called an “account” can be produced. The next chapter will dwell on what accounts are at length, but at this point it is appropriate to characterize accounts in terms of the technique of asking questions: In phenomenology, questions are most fundamentally answered with “descriptions” or “descriptive accounts.” As we shall see eventually, descriptions may well be of the typical rather than the particular and unique; any meal will fit the description offered above. If we proceed from general to specific and keep our questions in mind, we will more seldom end up dwelling on trivia.

In generally and specifically descriptive accounts, furthermore, there are prominent places for “distinctions,” “classifications,” and “cross-classifications,” which charts and diagrams can help us to comprehend distinctly. Moreover, we do not get too deeply into the things at issue before we begin to find ambiguities and obscurities of expression and feel the need to improve the words in which they are expressed. Recognition of these problems and this method of their solution become habitual in the phenomenologist.

Finally, the general purpose of observing as practiced in this text sometimes naturalistically and sometimes culturally may now be called “theoretical.” As such, it is detached and dispassionate or neutral in valuational and volitional ways regarding things, and contrasts with a function that experiencing of the same sort can play within our practical efforts. For example, if we put food in our mouth and become aware that it needs salt, we can look for the salt and, seeing it, seek directly or with the help of somebody else to get the salt shaker and then use it to sprinkle our food with salt. The visual perceiving in such a case (seeing where the salt shaker is) prompts and guides action (getting hold of it), and thus helps to change the world in this extremely slight way. The visual perceiving involved in the practical situation may in fact be

quite similar to that involved in theoretical observation; the difference lies in what it is combined with concretely—namely, an effort to get tastier food rather than to get knowledge.

Then again, the sort of experiencing we have been employing under the title of observing can also be found in listening to music, focusing on the melody, the tempo, etc. But here the hearing is for pleasure or enjoyment, not for a practical purpose such as getting the salt onto our food and into our mouths (although the latter may indeed improve our enjoyment of the food). In other words, the same sort of experiencing can be found in cognitive or theoretical cases, practical cases, and aesthetic, valuational, or, better, axiomatic cases. The difference appears to lie in what the experiencing—the perceiving or observing—is then a means to, and thus, in a way, it is a practical difference, even if our attitude is not always practical.

What makes experiencing or observing cognitive or theoretical, then, is that it is done for the sake of cognition or knowledge. This is its immediate purpose. To be sure, what comes to be known about meals on the basis of such observation can then be used—for designing restaurants—but this use of theoretical results for practical purposes is something over and above the observational cognition attained.

It is not a bad redundancy if we sometimes speak of “theoretical observation” in order to emphasize its difference from the same experiencing used for immediate practical or axiomatic purposes. We might then be tempted to speak of “cognitive” rather than theoretical purposes. But the traditional expression is quite satisfactory, and there is reason to reserve the expression “cognition” and its derivatives for a component analogous to valuation and volition that occurs in all three of the theoretical, axiomatic, and practical attitudes.

Exercises

1. As presented in this chapter, observing is perceptual, i.e., the observed thing is going on at the same time as the observing of it. What difficulties, if any, would there be if remembering (where the thing remembered is in the past of the remembering of it) were considered a type of observing? Provide some examples.

2. Two sorts of the kind of thing called “research” were distinguished previously. How, if at all, can observing function in each of them?

3. When we actively engage in doing something—we are active—and the activity we are engaged in is intentive to things. We can also be passive, yet the processes of undergoing then engaged in are also intentive; perhaps we can speak of “passivities” as well as “activities.” Is observing active or passive, or in some way both? Can observing be a matter of habit, or must one actively engage in it or, again, somehow both? And if observing is not merely a staring at things, why not?

4. Between naturalistic and cultural observing, which is original, and how might the other be derived from it? Or can each be derivative from the other, but in different ways? If so, how?

5. Why is it better to proceed in analysis from determinations of a whole thing to determinations of parts or components of it rather than vice versa?

6. Concerning the temporal relation of “during,” e.g., the relation referred to in an expression of the form, “X occurs during Y,” it seems that one of the two items related lasts longer than the other. Would that be X or Y? How are you able to answer this question?

7. Construct a cross-classification that includes wild and tame non-human animals and also those that are liked and disliked. Supply an example for each of the four cells in your grid.

Are the non-humans you have classified naturalistic objects or cultural objects? Are all naturalistic objects also cultural objects?

8. Compose sentences descriptive of features of a particular meal that include the expressions in the early paragraphs of Section 2 above that refer to relations.

9. What alternatives might there be to beginning in commonsense terms and shaping technical terms as needed when one produces and expresses a descriptive account?

10. To a large extent, if not always, figurative expressions—e.g., metaphors—can be replaced by literal expressions, and the effort to do so often increases intelligibility. Please attempt to do this with the metaphor of digging at the end of Section 1.

11. Is there anything to observe other than properties and relations? What are relations between? What have properties? How do the answers to these three questions differ?

12. Is it true that a mood, e.g., sadness, is a relation rather than a property? If it is a property, what is it a property of? If it is a relation, what is it a relation between? If neither, then what is it?

13. Can the same thing have one value for one individual or group and another value for another individual or group? If so, how might it be a problem, and how might the problem be solved?

14. Can there be an opposite to naturalism, possibly called “culturalism”? If so, what would that be, and what might its deficiencies be?

15. What is the difference between a naturalistic object and a cultural object? That is, what does the one have that the other does not have? Which one is the most complex

16. How does observing prevent description from being merely a restatement of what is habitually believed and conveyed in the commonsensical terms of ordinary language? Must it always show the habitual to be mistaken?

17. Things that have functions or uses can in general be called “equipment.” Classify the types of equipment involved in a meal.

18. Using examples, describe the differences between and similarities of extrinsic values, on the one hand, and end uses and means uses, on the other hand.

19. In some cities classical music is being used to drive drug dealers and addicts out of public parks at night. Analyze this practice in terms of the intrinsic and extrinsic positive and negative values and uses of such music for the agents and patients of this activity.

20. Besides observing performed for cognitive purposes, there can be other sorts of observing. Finding fresh examples, briefly compare and contrast what might be called (a) axiomatic (having to do with value) and (b) practical sorts of observing with (c) theoretical observing.

21. Another way to display three (or more) distinctions is with a branching “root” system like that used in Figure 1.1. Please construct such a system merely of letters and numbers in which first I and then II, then A, B, C, and D, and then 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and finally a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, and p are distinguished, with sixteen items labeled “IA1a,” “IA1b,” etc. along the bottom.

22. Is the “nature” of nature lovers—e.g., people who hike, sail, and watch dawns and sunsets, flowers, and wild non-human animals—naturalistic or cultural? Has the distinction between “artificial” (=made by humans) and “natural” (=not made by humans) anything to do with these things?

23. Observe and describe, in general terms, the setting, participants, and interactions in a class session (preferably not the class in which this text is used), and compare and contrast your analysis with that of a meal sketched above.

Chapter 2

Accounting

Like Chapter 1, this chapter is chiefly focused on “straightforward” or “unreflective” intentiveness; in other words, it relies on the observing of outwardly transcendent things. The objects or things intended to may be naturalistic or cultural and, for that matter, animate or inanimate, human or non-human. The product of observation can be a description. We can observe before we express, but when we listen to or read a description, we can also turn to observation in order to ascertain whether or not that which is expressed and comprehended is true.

We will engage here in some naturalistic observation of the naturalistic property of sound and then focus on what a description is, which will be shown in contrast to two of the at least four sorts of explanatory accounts. If there are explanatory as well as descriptive accounts, then “accounting” is correlatively a kind of activity of which “explaining,” with its subspecies, and “describing” are both species. This will eventually be expressed with a diagram, but more needs to be said about observation first.

Section 1.—**Some Significations of “Observation”**

Accounts are used for the purposes of recording and communication. An account is expressed either verbally with sounds or in writing (“lexically”) with marks so that, either way, it can be comprehended. Comprehending an expressed account is sometimes done by one or more other persons, but it can also be done by the same person who performed the original expressing. The latter is what happens when we read our own notes, hear ourselves speak on tape, or, less reliably, remember what we ourselves originally said or wrote.

After reading the sketchy descriptive analysis of the meal in the previous chapter, the student probably did not rush out immediately to watch a meal in order to test whether that account was true. Certainly, she could have, but more probably she relied on the vague recollection and familiarity with such things that she already had. When she performed her exercises at the end of the chapter, however, she more likely did observe relevant things and also remembered others, perhaps even feigning a few things or at least parts of them. So long as one is careful and thorough—and insofar as the concern is with what is possible, with what can happen, and not with what is actually happening—this is quite reasonable.

It may be useful at this point to recognize several significations of the word “observation.” The narrow or strict signification is the one chiefly used in Chapter 1. Observation in the narrow signification is first of all “serious” and not fictive; we do not imagine the thing intended to. In yet other words, if done conscientiously, the observing would be of a meal actually going on right there in view before us as it itself, and with the various components in it and the various determinations of it given in person. Observation in the narrow signification is included within observation in the broad signification, which goes beyond seriously perceiving what it there before us. For example, perceiving can be supplemented with “remembering.” Remembering is part of observation when, at a later stage in the course of events, we look back not at what is happening, which is now and perceived, but at what happened earlier, which was perceived then and is remembered now.

Besides often being unclear, remembering may also conflict with perceiving with both of them being equally clear. For example, suppose we clearly remember five people at the table when we started observing, recall no departures, and now, an hour later, perceive four people there. The current perceiving in such a case would outweigh the remembering, and we would

believe that we did not perceive well before and/or that we do not remember well. Observing is readily capable of such adjustments when it includes recollecting as well as perceiving within it. But observing in the narrow signification and remembering differ from the vague experiencing of familiar things that accompanies the comprehending of statements. (It is usually awkward to say “observation in the strict or narrow signification” or “observation in the broad signification,” and hence it is fortunate that the linguistic context can often be relied on to specify what is expressed. Thus the sentence before this parenthesis could have “in the narrow signification” deleted and still be readily comprehended correctly.)

To assert that feigning could be a type of observing goes beyond including remembering and might be more difficult for the student to accept, at least until she studies Chapter 6. But it would be more disconcerting for the word simply to be used that way without comment. To begin with, the word “feigning” is not as commonly used as its synonym “imagining.” The latter word ought to be avoided in phenomenology because it can suggest that an image is necessarily involved in fictive experiencing. Does feigning or “pretending” to perceive or recollect always involve images? To attempt to answer this question, let us feign two objects: (a) a bird and (b) a photograph of a bird. The latter is an image or representation because it stands for or represents or, some say, “images” something else, i.e., the depicted bird. (Whether or not the bird as depicted must also be feigned is an interesting question.) The feigned photograph is flat, although there could be a statue of the bird or a hologram. The feigned bird, however, is different simply because it does not necessarily stand for something else, although it might possibly be used as a symbol for wilderness, for peace, or something else. A genuine photograph stands for that of which it is taken. And, it can be added, many and perhaps most photographs are not feigned, but seriously perceived.

“Feigning” is certainly a better expression for the usual case than something like “imageless imagination.” It also has related and useful linguistic forms, e.g., “feigned,” “fictive,” “fiction,” and even “fictional” (although specifically literary connotations are best set aside). And rather than something like “imageful imagination,” we can speak of fictive representation or indirect fictive experiencing for the occasions when we feign an image or representation, e.g., a photograph of a chicken.

To learn to use “feigning” instead of “imagining” in the specialized discussions of phenomenology may take considerable effort. This effort is itself instructive. It not only shows how difficult it is to use a different word where we have deeply established verbal habits, but also shows how we think about things, which is something that deserves much pondering. What if everything we thought (not to speak of observe) was completely controlled by the language we spoke? Another example of possibly misleading language may also be mentioned here. The word “signification” is regularly used in the present text. It is a synonym for “meaning” in the strict signification, which is used in the phrase “the meaning of a word.” “Signification” is preferred to “meaning” because even in phenomenology many things other than words are held to have meaning that is not signification, e.g., “the meaning of life,” which is different from “the meaning of ‘life.’”

Although more will be said about feigning later, it can still be asked at this point whether the fictive is confined to experiencing in the strict signification to be clarified later, or whether there can be fictive positionality, e.g., pretending to like something or someone or to perform a fictive action (cf. Chapter 4).

These semantic questions aside, the substantive issue of how feigning might be part of observing requires an answer. We know that theoretical observation is aimed at cognition—and

indeed, propositional cognition or knowledge, i.e., knowledge expressed in language. Is not feigning the source of much error and falsehood? This is indeed the case when feigning is used in attempts to establish what actually happened. For that purpose, observing in the strict signification, and even recollecting, are more reliable.

Feigning is useful, however, in the quest for cognition of that which is possible and impossible, categories that are different from what is actual. For example, if four people are seen eating together and we ourselves ask whether it is possible for six people to eat simultaneously at the same table, we can try to feign the four moved to make room for another two. If that is successful, then the possibility is established. If it is unsuccessful, then the impossibility is also established. We resort to feigning to a great extent. The vast bulk of the contents of this text rely on observing in the broad signification that includes feigning. What is said here is not about this or that actual case of intentiveness and objects as they present themselves, but refers to what is possible. In contrast, it can be contended that experiencing what is possible is necessary for observing actual things, now or past, which, incidentally, can be called “facts.”

Observing, in sum, is not merely staring at things, but involves efforts to focus upon and discriminate constituents in the thing observed. Moreover, it can be expanded to include recollecting and even feigning, which can become so intimately involved in it that they can be considered parts of observing in the broad signification.

Two more points about observation. First, although it will be discussed at some length later, it deserves mention now that intensitive processes or encounterings can also be directly observed, but via reflective rather than unreflective observation. Second, where observation in general is concerned, we may wonder whether the experiencing in which we “see” what phenomenologists call “ideal objects”—for example, when we “see” that to which “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”

refers—is not observation as well. It is like the observing previously discussed in that such “seeing” contrasts with the vague if not blind experiencing we often have when we simply memorize formulae. But there is a difference in that the things here are ideal. This signifies that they are not located in time, something that may be difficult to accept immediately, particularly if one believes that everything is a reality (i.e., located in time and having spatial and causal relations with other realities) instead of considering realities to be just one of several kinds of existents. It is not expected to be easy for the student to comprehend “observation” in this extremely broad signification, but there is need for an expression and it seems the best candidate to groom for this job. The reader was already warned that some technical terminology is necessary in phenomenology.

Section 2.—**Sonorous Qualities**

The description of the meal in Chapter 1 was global as well as superficial. We can now focus on a relatively small and simple component of it and attempt to penetrate more deeply. This is safe to do as long as we do not forget that we have extracted the latter from the former. Let us consider what we hear when the fork of one of the diners contacts her plate. The sound that is made can be called a “tink.” This invented word is like a photograph in resembling the thing it represents. We can now shift from cultural to naturalistic observing and focus on the tink we hear, not as a signal or even a slight indication of bad manners, but simply as a sound, i.e., as a property of the plate upon being struck when the value and use of the sound has been abstracted from. It might indeed be a pretty little sound and it might be used to signal somebody about something, but in naturalistic observing the cultural characteristics of value and use are disregarded.

What the new word “tink” represents or refers to might be called a sound in ordinary language, but it seems best, at least at the start of our analysis, to call it a “sonorous quality.” Calling it a “quality” rather than a “property” even sets aside how it belongs to something, i.e., the plate. This usage is also preferable because the word “sound” seems to be too entangled in an explanation that the student has probably heard. According to that explanation, a sound is something emitted by the sound source; it moves through air, water, or some other medium; and it hits our eardrums. A bit more precisely, when something like a fork contacting a plate occurs in air or a similar surrounding medium, the contacting objects vibrate and sound waves are propagated through the surrounding medium. If the air is still, i.e., if there is no breeze blowing or draft in the room, and if there are no obstacles or interference from other sound sources, a rapid series of roughly spherical compressions and rarefactions moves outward in all directions from the vibrating sound source at a speed of about 700 miles per hour. The sound waves thus propagated weaken over distance. If they enter an ear, they cause the eardrum to vibrate; this moves a mechanism of tiny bones deep in the ear, which affects the auditory nerve, and all this causes the one with the ear to hear the tink.

The account of sound just summarized is an “explanation” in fairly informal but still physical terms of “why” we hear, and as such it is not challenged (which is not to say that it cannot be refined). Vibrating things, sound waves, eardrums, etc., all exist. The mistake, however, that is often made at this point consists in believing that the sound is identically the same as the vibrations moving through the air from the source to the ear. This is a mistake because there is something else involved and this has a prior claim on the word “sound.”

What do we actually observe? Is the tink when the fork hits the plate heard to move through the air? Airplanes move through the air and can be heard to do so. But airplanes are not

sounds in this explanation; they are at best sound sources. Is the tink that is heard located in the ear? We can wiggle a finger tip in our ear and hear the sound that is made there. Where is the tink? Here we must not be deceived by noticing that hearing does not localize its objects as precisely as seeing does for things as seen (although hearing is quite a bit better in this respect than smelling is). Is not the tink actually experienced where the plate and fork are, i.e., a distance away from the hearer's body rather than in the air or in somebody's ear? How an observation-based description that places the tink across the room relates to an explanation involving sound sources, sound waves, etc., is an interesting question. But our concern at the moment is to avoid language that leads us to think of sound waves when we hear or read the word "sound." After all, we cannot actually hear sound waves!

To substitute the expression "sonorous quality" for that of "sound" is probably easier than learning to use the word "feigning," and doing this may facilitate comparing sonorous or audible qualities with visual qualities, such as color and shape, and tangible properties, such as smoothness and hardness. How far does this comparison go? First of all, observing readily discloses that the sonorous quality of a thing is to some extent related to the shape of the thing—e.g., a bell, in contrast with a ball of solid brass of the same weight or size. Again, however, we are now concerned with the sonorous qualities themselves rather than with their conditions. Unlike most colors and shapes, most sonorous qualities appear highly variable and transitory. Nevertheless, some things do change color rapidly, e.g., some lizards, and some sonorous qualities are constant and unchanging, e.g., the hum of a machine. In this respect, some sonorous qualities are indeed akin to observable spatial relations, a parallel we may tend to overlook or at least under appreciate because sonorous qualities typically change so much. Spatial relations are

always there; could it be that things are likewise always somehow sounding, odd as that might first seem?

That is particularly important given that another factor making it easier to believe that sound is air waves rather than a sonorous quality is that sonorous qualities often seem intermittent. The bell may ring at certain hours, but in between those times there is no sound, or so we tend to believe. It might seem as though sonorous qualities are not essential to things because they are intermittent as well as variable and because we believe that only properties that are more persistent, such as color and shape, are essential. (What is the color of a thing that flashes yellow every other second but is dark for the intervening second?) As mentioned, spatial relations are always there and need merely to be focused on. But if we acknowledge an often overlooked species of sonorous quality, then we can verify that physical things as heard do always do have a sonorous quality. This sonorous quality can be called “silence.”

It may require some pondering before we go against common sense and accept that silence is a species of the kind of naturalistic property called sound or, better, sonorous quality. (And this may help us become ambivalent about common sense.) A comparison may help. Where the visual qualities called “colors” are concerned, white and black can be problematical. Green, red, blue, yellow, etc., can be called chromatic colors, i.e., colors in a narrow signification. Analogous to the explanation whereby sound is sound waves, the color white is said to be an emanation or reflection that contains all of the colors, and black is an absence of color. If these statements about “achromatic colors” are taken to be about sensuously observable things rather than about the causes of sensuous perception, they are strange statements.

Plainly, black and white are visible qualities of things. If we look at something and analyze what we see, we simply cannot see yellow, blue, etc., contained in the color of the white

thing. And if we look at a black thing, its color is indeed something that it visibly has in the same way in which things can be visibly green, blue, yellow, etc., or, for that matter, white. According to the explanation, however, a black thing ought not to be visible at all, for no photons would stream out or bounce off it into our eyes. Both in the case of “achromatic colors” and in the case of sonorous qualities, observation sometimes seems to be disregarded in favor of an explanation in terms of the physics of vision rather than vision, which may indeed be interesting, but is not the same as a descriptive account of vision itself.

Visible qualities have been brought up to make a comparison. Visible objects come in a wide variety of colors (including black and white, once we base our account on sensuously observable things rather than on the physics of vision). The hearing of silence is sometimes like the seeing of black and sometimes like seeing something white. Sound as well as color and sound are observable properties of objects. There is a difference between achromatic and chromatic colors and there is a similar difference between silence and sound. But the hearing of silence is most like the seeing of black, particularly if we consider the black that we see when illumination is removed from an enclosed space, e.g., if we pull thick blankets over our heads on a dark night. Does seeing simply stop in such a darkness? Or do we see something that has depth, height, and width, i.e., something that is vaguely voluminous, even if there seems to be no distinct shape to it? Such a seen dark volume is black, and no doubt it is caused by the blocking of light, but that is why it is, not what it is. Similarly, to say that silence is caused by the absence of sound is to offer a naturalistic explanation, not an observation-based description of the stillness, the hush, the mute presence of things, and so on.

Something is heard, then, when a thing is silent, e.g., the bell that is not ringing.

Moreover, silence often furnishes the background for other sounds, such as when footsteps in the

hall break the quiet. Figuratively speaking, sounds other than silence can be said to be “painted” on a background of silence, and this silence is a property of something, perhaps a room or a glen. Yet in such cases, closer observation shows that the silence is not absolute or pure: It is an ambient quiet against which we hear a pin drop in the room or a bird sing in glen. We could probably describe many sorts of background silence like this. Many or all might be similar in being spatially spread out, including deep, encompassing silences, so that it is the room or the glen globally that is quiet. Within a particular area the silence can then vary as well, so that there are more or less quiet places within a quiet room, e.g., it is quieter in the back left corner.

(It might occur to the student at this point that although the ambient background silence in these cases is not an absence of sound, there could still be some sort of a pure silence would be utterly lacking. Analogously, one might think that an utterly pure black object would indeed be invisible. This is an interesting thought. Unfortunately, perhaps, we do not find such pure objects in our sensuous observation. Perhaps we believed in such idealized object on some other basis, and phenomenological investigation can ascertain what that believing is, how it arises, and whether its application to vision is justified.)

It has been mentioned above that we see some things in space, i.e., “here,” “there,” “near,” “far,” “between,” “around,” “inside,” etc. Analogously to the way we can ask where a thing is, we can ask “when” it is, i.e., about its locus in time. The properties of things have various durations. In the cases of ticking clocks and people talking, there are sounds and silences of various lengths. Are the dots and dashes in Morse Code the clicks, which seem to have the same duration, or the short and long silences between them? Sounds in the narrow signification alternate with silences. Moreover, one sonorous quality can occur “during,” “before,” “after,” or “simultaneously with” another sonorous quality, silence included.

The contrast of explanation with description in the above discussion will be explicated presently. At this point it deserves repetition that the attitude that identifies sounds with air waves that go into the ear and colors with light waves or photons that go into the eye can be mistaken, depending on what “color” and “sound” signify. Indeed, it is a mistake that deserves a name. It can be considered a type of scientism, “scientism” being a habitual preferring of naturalistic scientific explanations over observation-based descriptions. This is an error that occurs more and more in the history of modern culture and is spreading from the West to the rest of the planet. (Strictly speaking, light rays or photons are the equivalent for vision of sound waves for audition, just as the eye is the equivalent of the ear, and the illuminated or radiating thing is equivalent to the source of sound.)

Observation has, in effect, been used above to oppose some scientism. To avoid misunderstandings by persons of good will, it can be emphasized that opposition to a mistake derived from naturalistic science, which is what scientism is, is not the same as opposing naturalistic science, although some of ill will may tolerate no opposition of anything at all associated with naturalistic science. In different words, to be “anti-scientistic” is not necessarily to be “anti-scientific.” The “explanation” of audition and vision using sound waves and photons, eardrums, optic nerves, etc. is, again, not challenged here. They are not, however, “descriptions”—not even of that which is naturalistically observed concerning visible and audible qualities of sensible things, which is what, incidentally, the physical explanations explain.

Section 3.—**Descriptive and Explanatory Accounts**


It should be fairly clear by now that we can express significations about what we observe. Beyond this, the reader will have noticed intimations to the effect that describing what one

observes is somehow different from explaining it. Often we say we “explain” something when we merely talk or write about it in a loose and casual way. But description and explanation can also be strict and careful. Descriptions and explanations have it in common to be expressed and to be true or false. Terminology that conveys what they share as well as where they differ is desirable.

A good general name for both descriptions and explanations would seem to be “accounts,” and “descriptive accounts” and “explanatory accounts” would seem to be good official names for the two species. But simply “description” and “explanation” can be used most of the time. Figure 2.1 includes two subspecies of explanation that will be covered in the present chapter; another, which can be called “justification,” will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Accounts in general are statements that are true or false about things or, better, “matters.” Matters are things that accounts are about; hence “account” and “matter” are correlative expressions. Calling things as accounted for “matters” is related to the practice whereby all the things that would ultimately be accounted for in a scientific discipline make up its “subject matter.” The differences between descriptions and explanations, as well as the differences between the two species of explanation, now need to be discussed or, preferably, “accounted for.”

(Figure 2.1)



Matters are referred to or signified in accounts. This does not imply that the matters signified actually exist, or are even possible. The statement,

Spherical cubes are impossible,

refers to spherical cubes, which are indeed impossible, and this statement is true. Sometimes the matters are real, such as the meal sketchily described above, and sometimes they are ideal objects, such as $2 + 2 = 5$, which is not only ideal, but false (here the word “ideal” is, of course, used technically to signify that the object is atemporal, while there are other technical and everyday significations). If we say,

Four people are sitting around the table,

the matter signified in this statement is not just a table plus four seated people, but also the spatial relation of sitting “around” the table, and if there now actually are four people sitting around the table, which we might observe, then the statement is true. If it is about an actual matter, it is also a “factual description,” whereas if it is a description about possibilities, necessities, etc., in general, e.g.,

There can be a table around which four people can sit,

then it is an “eidetic description.”

If we say, however,

Four people are sitting around the table in order to eat,

the account is more complicated. In the first place, the statement has two parts, with the first part the same as the previous factual statement. Second, the other part refers to the “purpose” of that which is referred to in the first part of the whole statement. There could plainly be different purposes, e.g., to play cards or to conclude a business deal. In one signification of the word “why,” it answers the question of why the people are where they are and doing what they are doing. Assertively put, they are at the table “because” eating is their goal. The second and longer statement is thus an explanation, and this added reference to a purpose is what makes it one.

In general, an explanation is an account in which a matter is accounted for in relation to another matter. The part of the matter that is used to explain the other part can be called a “factor.” There is rarely, if ever, only one factor for an event—with “event” naming something that happens or is happening, such as people sitting around a table and talking and eating, but often there is one main, primary, or principle factor as well as other major, secondary (tertiary, etc.), and minor factors. Factors are referred to in order to answer the question “Why?” It is because of a factor that a thing is or is not thus and so. In the example just given, the people being seated around the table is explained with reference to their common purpose. A “purpose” (or “end” or “goal”) is called a *telos* in Ancient Greek, and explanations that refer to factors of this sort are best called “teleological explanations” because of the fashion of naming important scientific and philosophical things with Ancient Greek words.

Many Ancient and Medieval thinkers believed that the entirety of the world might easily be explained teleologically. Moderns and Contemporaries have more often hesitated about accounting for physical events in this way, but it would seem another scientism to go on from there to deny that human actions are often purposive. If individual humans have purposes, it does not seem to be a great step to allow that members of a group can share a purpose or, in other words, have an aim in common, e.g., to get to know one another better over lunch as the primary purpose and to alleviate hunger as a secondary factor.

We need to be cautious about accepting teleological explanations from participants in activities because people can be mistaken, self-deceived, deceptive, or simply ignorant about their own and collective purposes. For example, a family may regularly eat together chiefly to maintain harmony, but, if asked, the participants (except for mother, who always knows better)

may assert the belief that they are just there to get nourishment. Explanations of all sorts can be mistaken and hence unable to survive examination.

Going further now, the statement,

The table was made by workers in a furniture factory,

is also an explanation (this sentence could also be put in the active voice). This time the “factor” is not a purpose but a “cause.” It is difficult to think of anything in observable nature that is not caused (nature itself as a whole is not in nature, but is the world caused by nature?). Hence realities—at least naturalistic realities—are not real in the signification whereby the term “real” signifies “existent in time,” but also by virtue of participating in causal relations. In other words, we not only ask When? and Where? about naturalistic things but also, causally, Why?

There appears to be a tendency in ordinary English to ask and answer the question Why? in terms of purposes as well as causes. This is an unfortunate equivocation that extends to other types of explanation and also to the use of “because.” (Does “explanation” similarly often, and perhaps scientifically, signify merely “causal explanation”?) It is to be hoped that context will show the difference. When it does not, the qualifiers “teleological” and “aitiological” can be used. In Ancient Greek, “*aitia*” signifies cause in such a way to include purposes, but its technical signification can be narrowed to refer to causes in the naturalistic signification. (The word “etiology,” signifying the branch of medicine dealing with the causes or origins of disease, stems from the same Greek root, but the spelling “aitiological” can readily serve to refer to all naturalistic causal relations not merely medical ones.) Part of the earlier chart (see Figure 2.1) can be expanded to show some of the equivocations that need to be overcome.

There is a great deal of aitiological explanation in cultural and naturalistic sciences as well as in everyday life. The accounts including air waves and photons discussed above are naturalistic-scientific aitiological explanations. That which is explained, which can also be

(Figure 2.2)

	Explanation	
	Teleological “purposes”	Aitiological “causes”
Forms of “why”		
Forms of “because”		

called the “explanandum” (while another name for the factor is “explanans”), is the hearing of a thing with an audible quality. A couple going on a blind date can be explained cultural-scientifically as out together “because” (aitiologically) their friends persuaded them that they would enjoy each other’s company. The persuasion by the friends is the cause. Causes precede in time the events explained by them, while purposes are in the future of what happens, at least until the event is completed and the goal attained. Getting better acquainted is the couple’s purpose; generally, the longer the time they spend together, the more acquainted they are (although in a way, they might become even better acquainted if the restaurant burns down halfway through the meal). The primary activity at the table is explainable both ways.

We tend to call accounts of all sorts explanations, while not all of them are. Perhaps this is because in technology as elsewhere in practical life, we are greatly interested in affecting the course of events, and hence we are interested in “what is caused by what” in nature, as well as in the purposes humans (and at least some other animals) pursue in the world. However, if an explanation includes a description, that descriptive account can be true or false by itself, i.e., quite apart from whether the explanation as a whole, including the claim of a purpose or cause, is

true or false. Thus descriptions can be recognized to belong to a different sort of account than explanations, and the word “explanation” can indeed be reserved for one species of the genus “account,” something the routine inclusion of the qualifiers “aitiological” and “teleological” can help.

Finally, to avoid misunderstanding, it also needs to be said in this chapter that while phenomenology is fundamentally descriptive in its accounts, it can include explanations of several sorts as well.

Exercises

1. Construct a diagram in which things are divided into the real and the ideal and then one of these divisions is subdivided to include intensive processes and whatever other things there are of that subspecies in contrast with one or more other subspecies.

2. Are descriptions the only possible accounts produced on the basis of observation? Give reasons for your answer.

3. Compose a classification scheme that includes two sorts of expressions, two sorts of comprehending or expressions, and two sorts of expressing of expressions. This can be done several ways.

4. How do the three significations of “observation” discussed in Section 1 relate? Provide examples.

5. Can you describe a case in which we would rightly accept what we remember over what we perceive?

6. Is all feigning visual? If not, give two types of non-visual feigning and tell whether they do or do not include representations.

7. How might the habitual use of the word “imagination” influence what we believe about all experiencing, including expecting and recollecting?

8. What sorts of knowledge can be established on the basis of fictive observing or feigning? This too can be done in several ways.

9. What are the similarities between the physical (or psychophysical) explanation of audition and the physical explanation of vision? In particular, what is the equivalent of a mirror for audible qualities and what is the visual equivalent of an echo?

10. Can the similarities between seeing colors and hearing audible qualities be extended to smelling, tasting, and touching? Sharks are said to sense changes in electrical potential, such as occur in wounded fish, through miles of water. Assuming this is correct, tell how this type of sensing can be included in this comparison, and also that in Exercise 9.

11. Recollecting the distinction between world and nature made in Chapter 1, how might the denial of purpose to the world be a scientism?

12. If nature is not in nature, is nature in space? In time? In causation? Is the world in the world? Is there one or more than one world?

13. Are there any reasons why causation ought not to be considered an observable relation on a par with spatial and temporal relations for naturalistic things? If you say “no,” provide several cases where this relation is observed.

14. Are causes always temporally in the past of the things explained with reference to them and purposes always in the future of the things explained with reference to them? Is it possible to cause the acceptance of purposes and to have causes among one’s purposes? If so, how? If not, why not?

15. When is a thing not a matter? Are there any things that cannot be matters? Give examples if you can.

16. How are matters accounted for in explanations? How are factors referred to in questions and answers? What sorts of factors are there? What types of questions can and cannot be asked and answered about naturalistic things?

17. If all naturalistic things have audible qualities, what do clouds sound like? How could this question be answered?

Chapter 3

Reflecting

The contents of Chapters 1 and 2 together stem from what can be called “theoretical observation,” which is observation not for immediate practical or axiomatic purposes, but for the sake of cognition if not also knowledge (knowledge requires propositions; cognition, which knowledge presupposes, does not). According to what is said above, such observation is specified as sociocultural, cultural, naturalistic, or physicalistic. The student may now be able to recognize that this is an approach that she has often taken in the past, whether or not she had a name for it. Perhaps she now understands better than before what she was previously doing, and perhaps this can contribute to improving her skill.


Besides promoting practice in unreflective theoretical observation, Chapters 1 and 2 contain descriptive statements about it. How is it possible to observe and describe observation and description themselves? The answer to this question, simply put, is that theoretical observation can be applied to itself or, somewhat more precisely, unreflective theoretical observation can be intended to in theoretical observation that is reflective. Reflective theoretical observation can even be practiced on itself. Quite a bit can then be said about reflection in general, about the different sorts of things that can be reflectively observed, and about the modes of reflection that can thereby be distinguished.

It may be noted that there is a tradition stemming from the philosophical movement of German idealism whereby “reflection” signifies a type of thinking or speculation that is not reflective in the signification clarified here, but one can learn to avoid that signification.

Section 1.—Reflection in General

Reflective theoretical observation—or, more simply, reflection—has quite a few species. The descriptive remarks in the previous chapters about unreflective observation are themselves reflective and, indeed, reflectively analytic. In the same way, the description of reflective observation in the present chapter will be reflectively analytic as well. In other words, the description here will be produced through reflective observation of reflective observation, just as earlier the description of unreflective observation was produced through reflective observation of unreflective observation. A new type of diagram may help show what is involved here. In Figure 3.1, the arrows represent intentiveness; “X” represents the thing intended to and can have other

(Figure 3.1)



letters substituted for it (e.g., “M” for meal); and the words and arrows enclosed in parentheses, brackets, vinculae ({}), and angle brackets represent what is intended to in intensive processes (note that they become more and more encompassing as that which is intended to becomes more complex).

The numbers in Figure 3.1 denote what can be called “levels.” On the first level there is the unreflective intentiveness to X, which is in parentheses, with the unreflective intentiveness represented by the straight arrow. On the second level there is reflective intentiveness,

represented by an arrow bent down 90°, which is also intensive to X as well as to the first-level intensiveness and the X intended to in it. This is why square brackets are used to enclose them both; they can indicate how this compound thing is intended to in reflection. On the third level there is reflective intensiveness to the second level's reflective intensiveness and its entire thing intended to, including the unreflective intensiveness and its thing intended to of the first level. Hence vinculae are used. The primary thing intended to, i.e., on Level 1, can be a thing as remembered, expected, perceived, loved, hated, believed in, doubted, fostered, impeded, etc. Level 4 and the angle brackets enclosing everything that is intended to here—namely, all previous levels—represent that there can be reflective observing of higher and higher levels. Level 4 is difficult to reach; fortunately, what can be observed from that level is that the intensiveness of Levels 3 and 2 are the same in structure, and thus that higher levels are not otherwise needed.

The student may have heard the method of reflective observation opposed because it leads to what logicians call an “infinite regress.” For example, suppose that it is argued that everything that exists must have a cause for its existence and hence, since the world exists, there must be a cause for the existence of the world, i.e., a creative god or goddess. In response to this claim, however, it can be said that if the divine cause exists and everything that exists has a cause, there must be a cause for that cause and, because it exists, it must have a cause, and so on and on forever. This is an infinite regress, and it is not acceptable because an ultimate explanatory factor cannot be reached.

When applied to the method of reflective observation, however, such opposition is mistaken. This can be shown in several ways. In the first place, an infinite regress is a matter of logical propositions and argumentation, whereas that is not what is represented in Figure 3.1, for

intentional processes are not propositions or arguments (and most things intended to in them are not propositions or arguments either). Second, although it is logically necessary to bring in propositions about an infinite number of causes once an infinite regress is begun, we are quite free about whether or not we reflect, reflect on reflecting, reflect on reflection on reflecting, etc.

Furthermore, there seem to be factual limits to how many levels we humans can ascend to in reflecting on lower-level intentionality and things intended to. Animals higher than humans, if they exist, might be able to reach higher levels in this respect. It seems doubtful that species lower than humans can reflect at all, much less reflect on reflection. With effort and practice, we humans might reach a fourth level. We can also feign higher levels we cannot seriously reach, and by that means we can see that nothing new would be learned at the fourth and higher levels about reflectiveness and its difference from unreflectiveness, which is what we are concerned with here. There seems to be no limit to the number of levels one can feign. Hence one might speak of an infinite “progress,” but, again, it has no logical necessity.

Is reflection worth reflecting on? After all, most science and most philosophy have been done, and are still done, in an unreflective manner, and most of everyday life proceeds unreflectively as well. There are some scientific disciplines in which reflective observation is quite inappropriate, e.g., chemistry. In other sciences, reflective observation is complementary to unreflective methods. And in yet others it is or ought to be the basic method. But it is an error to believe that the reflective type of theoretical observation is the basic method of all pursuits of cognition.

Various specific modes of observation will be distinguished and described in the following sections both for their own sakes and as means for clarifying what reflection in general is. Examples will be given for each species of reflective observation. The expectation continues

to be that the student will attempt reflectively to verify the descriptive accounts offered. This will become easier as one's skill increases, but it may not seem easier because the analyses will become more complex and the language more technical. The field of reflective observation may initially seem a jungle, but can eventually come to be a wonderful garden in which to wander.

Section 2.—**Objects as Intended to and Intentional Processes**

The foregoing characterization of reflective theoretical observation includes within the thing reflectively intended to not only intentional processes, but also the things intended to in them. Not mentioned previously, however, is that things “as” intended to are also included. Things intended to vary considerably in how they are intended to. The “how” of the thing intended to indicates something about the intending to it, but belongs to the thing that is intended to in the intentional process.

Probably the easiest type of variation in this respect is change in visual and auditory appearance. This occurs when a thing with visible and audible qualities comes closer to or moves away from our bodies (and especially our sense organs) or when we approach or back away from things. Suppose that one is standing by the side of a road and a truck is about to pass by. One can reflectively focus on the visual appearance that gets larger as the truck approaches and then smaller as the truck moves off. Does the truck itself get larger and then smaller? Then again, the truck as it approaches gets louder and then gets progressively quieter. Does the sonorous quality of the truck change? This little analysis is first of all based on reflective observation. In unreflective intentionality, one normally sees and hears a truck of a certain size and sound drive by. Second, while the thing intended to, the truck, has its size and sound, the appearances of it in audition as well as vision can change. (However, the appearances are not always changing, as can be observed if one reflectively observes them while there is no change in distance from eye

or ear.) Third, things like trucks have sides or, more generally, aspects—e.g., the front side, the left and the right side, the back side, the underside, the top side, and the inside—and these ought not to be confused with appearances.

It is interesting that we notice appearances so seldom. Reflection discloses that they are always there. We usually see through them or overlook them. Yet there are situations where we can hardly help noticing them. This occurs for visually intended to things when they are especially close or far for things of their type—e.g., people far away can look as small as bugs. Within certain ranges, however, the size of the thing is typically observed through the appearances without the appearances themselves being noticed.

Distance is not the only factor for change in appearance. The surface of a piece of wood or some other material can appear rough when we run our fingertips across it or run it across our fingertips. Then if we put on gloves and repeat the process, the board itself is no smoother, but a smoother tactual appearance is reflectively discernable. If we hold one end of a pencil between our fingers and rub the piece of wood with the other end of the pencil, a “magnification” of the appearance of the roughness can occur. Again, the board does not become rougher, but the tactual appearance does. But carpenters or other people skilled in handling wood or other materials might perceive the same surface texture whether with bare finger, gloves, or a pencil, just as people in general need no special skill to see tall people as tall whether they are fairly near or fairly far, and without noticing variation in appearance. The same can be said about sounds.

Turning our reflective focusing from the appearance dimension, probably the most conspicuous thing discernable when we reflect on sensuous perceiving is the difference among seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. These are intentive processes or, better, “intentive process components.” They correlate with different kinds of sensible qualities, e.g.,

color and sound for seeing hearing; they correlate with different sense organs, e.g., eyes and ears; and they correlate with different sorts of appearances.

Somehow, the same thing can be seen, heard, touched, etc. (some properties, most obviously shape, are “intersensorial”), and there are interesting ways in which the other modes of what can be called “sensing” are, so to speak, involved each other. For now, it will be enough to point out that something best called “sensuous perceiving” can be reflectively observed to go on. Sometimes a sensuous perceiving is more seeing than touching or hearing; sometimes it is more hearing than seeing or touching, etc. Correlatively, one type of sensible quality in the thing intended to can “predominate” over the others. But that one type of sensing and one type of sensible quality can be predominant is not sufficient to declare them independent. And plainly some of one type are not independent of others of the same type, e.g., visible color and visible shape, all visible colors being shaped and vice versa so that the sensing of color and the sensing of shape are not independent of one another.

The situation we are starting our reflection with is one in which we reflect both on things intended to—e.g., chairs, as they appear and otherwise present themselves—and on the intensive process components going on within sensuous perceiving, such as seeing, touching, and hearing. The things intended to that have the sensible qualities are not parts of the intensive stream in the way in which seeing, touching, etc., are parts or, better, components of the sensuous perceiving. They are outside or beyond the stream in a way that can be denoted by saying that they are “outwardly transcendent” and by calling them, on occasion, “outward transcendencies” as well as “outwardly transcendent things.” Since “transcendent” often signifies for philosophers “beyond experiencing” (and hence would have been replaced here with another expression, if

one were handy), it deserves comment in phenomenology, that outwardly transcendent things, e.g., chairs, are considered to be observable, and hence are not beyond the reach of experiencing.

Sensuously perceivable outward transcendencies, e.g., chairs, are not the only sorts of transcendencies intended to. Ideal objects of various sorts are also transcendent in the outward way. Furthermore, egos or, better, “I’s” are transcendent in a way that can be called “inward.” They are inward transcendencies. Inward and outward transcendencies are both reflectively observable. Transcendencies of all sorts contrast with things of another type that are “immanent.” To be immanent is to be part of the intensitive stream, e.g., a hearing (but not the bell heard) or a reflecting of the self-observational sort on that hearing (both of which are immanent).

(Figure 3.2)

	inward transcendancy	immanence	outward transcendancy
past	I	(B) ----- >	{ cake }
now	I	(A) ----- >	{ chair }
future	I	(C) ----- >	{ friend }

Another diagram may help. The inward transcendency in Figure 3.2 is called the “I.” It is doubtful that context would fail to distinguish in spoken rather than written language between the words “I” and “eye.” Phenomenologists often use the word “ego,” sometimes capitalized, but that word has so many significations that a relatively fresh and immediately comprehensible alternative will be better. The expression “I” is used here to express a technical signification. The speaker signifies herself when she says, e.g., “I am happy,” but she also refers to things of the same sort when she says “you,” “he,” “they,” etc., all of whom are, technically speaking, “I’s” as well. And she can refer to herself in contrast to them as a “me.” “I” is not used in its usual signification. The I does not engage and indeed cannot engage in all of her intensitive processes.

Moreover, this I is no more a component of any of her intentive processes than is an outwardly transcendent object, such as a tree. Much more needs to be said about the I, but what has been said may be enough for now, except it deserves mention that an I and her intentive stream together make up a “mind.”

Thus far we have been attempting to observe sensuous processes as they go on “in the now.” This has not, however, been made explicit until now. Smelling, hearing, touching, etc., as we have been describing them, are tacitly components in sensuous perceiving occurring in the present phase or “now” of the intentive stream, which signifies that they belong to a phase or stretch of the stream between the future and the past. But they also belong to sensuous processes in the other temporal phases. This can be grasped through considering cases of intentive processes in the other phases.

If yesterday we looked at a birthday cake (Case B in Figure 3.2), we can now, today, not only remember the cake seen yesterday, but also remember how it appeared to us—perhaps as we entered the kitchen yesterday and then moved closer to inspect the cake; we can furthermore remember yesterday’s seeing of the cake; and we can even remember our own I as being at that moment pleased by that sight. In this case, we are reflecting, for we are observing both a primary object (Level 1 in Figure 3.1) as it presents itself—or, more precisely, as it presented itself, especially as it appeared visually—and yesterday’s predominantly visual perceiving, as it was intentive to that object.

Yesterday’s seeing of the cake differs from the earlier case (Case A), where we reflected on seeing, hearing, and touching as they went on in the now of a sensuous perceiving. The earlier case involved reflective “perceiving” because the thing observed was simultaneous with it. The current instance of reflecting on yesterday’s cake-perceiving can be called a “reflection in

memory” or a “recollective reflecting” because the object of reflective observation, i.e., the perceiving and the thing perceived, is earlier, i.e., yesterday.


We can also expect a friend to visit us (Case C). Reflecting, we can distinguish how we expect that the friend will appear when we open the door for her tomorrow, and also how we will see, hear, and smell her then. This is again reflection because we focus on a thing intended to as it is intended to (i.e., as she “will present” herself) and upon a process in our own future stream that will be intentive to her. Since the thing intended to is not in the now with the reflecting, it is not a reflective perceiving. Instead, this is a case of what we can call “reflection in expectation” or “expectational reflecting.” Yet to do this we need first to recognize that the reflective/unreflective distinction also holds for expectation and recollection. It is one thing simply to remember the cake at yesterday’s party, and another to reflect on how the cake was intended to yesterday; it is one thing for the friend to be expected, and another to reflect upon her as she will be intended to then.

In passing, it has been asserted that “perceiving” is an intentive process, the object of which (the thing intended to) occurs at the same time or is simultaneous with the perceiving. As such, it contrasts with recollectional and expectational processes in which the objects are respectively in the past and in the future of the intentive process. Beyond this, perceiving has been qualified as “sensuous.” In contrast with what at least seems to be a sensuous perceiving of a birthday cake, there can be a recollected sensuous perceiving (one that may or may not have been reflected upon at the time). Tomorrow’s perceiving of the friend—a perceiving that we have just reflected upon in expectation—is, however, more than a merely sensuous perceiving, because a person has psychic as well as physical components, and only physical things and their components are sensuously perceived. In the case of the friend—and, indeed, for all animate

others immediately encountered as simultaneous with one's encountering of them—we can speak of “social perception.”

Upon reconsideration, however, the birthday cake is not merely a thing intended to in sensuous perceiving because it has value and use in a celebratory ritual. It is thus a cultural thing, and when the cultural thing encountered is simultaneous with the encountering of it, we may speak of “cultural perception.” For the same reason, the perception of a friend is a cultural perception as well. Sometimes, then, “sociocultural perception” will be an appropriate expression, i.e., when context does not adequately specify “social perception” as cultural, “cultural perception” as social, or merely “perception” as social and/or cultural. These two trifurcations and one bifurcation can be represented non-discursively, with perceiving, remembering, and expecting indicated by their initial letters. One can read Figure 3.3 to yield eighteen tri-determinate species of observation, from reflective cultural perception to

(Figure 3.3)



unreflective sensuous expectation. Then again, one can read it to yield eighteen tri-determinate species of things as intended to, according to whether they are perceived, remembered, or expected. And this disregards subspecifications such as sociocultural.

Finally, when we confine ourselves to observing naturalistic things—i.e., when we disregard the values and uses that all things intended to do originally have for us—we can

engage in “naturalistic” social perception if the things perceived are animate and “physicalistic” sensuous perception if they are not.

Section 3.—**Self-Observation and Reflection on Others**

Thus far we have been concerned with reflection on sensuous perception in the now, past, or future of the intentive stream that each of us calls our own. Yet we also have access to the intentive streams of others. There are problems about the extent and mode of this access, including the factor of the cooperation of the observee, but these difficulties can be temporarily set aside. Somehow social perception works well enough that we are fairly successful in basing most of our lives on it. Another individual I can be called a “thou.” Thus used technically, “thou” does not necessarily connote familiarity, intimacy, or affection. Encountering the intentive stream of a thou, we often encounter what the other, the thou, is focusing on and also whether she likes or dislikes it—and even whether she is doing or inclined toward doing something about it.

We can observe a child, for example, fascinated with a new toy, and we can observe that correlatively, the toy as intended to is wondrous for the child. In this case, we are also engaging in reflective observation, but of a new sort. It is reflection because what we are somehow observing is a thing as it presents itself to someone as well as a process intentive to it. That a doll is no longer wondrous for us adults provides a useful contrast with the way in which it is intended to by the child we observe. We observe the delight of the child.

The previously described three types of reflection, which differed according to whether the thing intended to in reflection was in the now, the past, or the future, can now be considered subspecies of a species that can be called “self-observation”; in them we each focus on our own intentive stream and what is intended to as it is intended to by the intentive processes within

these streams. If the streams focused on are all individual streams and the linguistic context does not adequately specify this expression, we can also speak technically of “me-observation.” In the contrasting species best called “reflection on others,” we focus on the intensive streams of others. When the other reflected upon is not a group but an individual, we can call it “reflection on a thou” or “thou-reflection.” Where the self reflected upon is collective, we can form parallels to “me-observation” and “thou-reflection” by speaking of “we-observation” and “reflection on a they” or “they-reflection.”

If the now/past/future and the self/other distinctions are combined (see Figure 3.4), a six-celled chart of intensive processes and things as intended to can be constructed (arrows represent intensive processes). This chart makes it easier to ask whether there can be reflection on others in the past and future.

(Figure 3.4)

	self	other
past	---- > (X)	----- > (X)
now	---- > (X)	----- > (X)
future	----- > (X)	----- > (X)

Reflection on at least some processes in the now of the intensive stream of a thou has been established as possible with the example of the child with the doll. Is it possible to reflect on the past of another’s stream? Yes, in two limited ways. In the first place, if we reflectively remember today the child’s joyous encounter with the toy that we socioculturally observed yesterday, we are accessing her past and do so regardless of whether or how she remembers it. If this is so, then another (individual or group) may likewise on occasion remember an intensive

process in our (individual or collective) intensive stream that we (individually or collectively) cannot remember.

Suppose, in the second place, that the child says, “I am remembering how happy I was yesterday when I got a doll from Santa Claus.” If there is no reason to doubt this testimony, then a species of “indirect experiencing” goes on in us that, gives us indirect access to the other’s past as it is remembered by her. Such a means can give us access to events in the intensive stream of the other that we did not ourselves witness, but that the thou in question remembers. Besides language, depictions—including photographs, audiotapes, films, and videotapes—can also give us indirect access to earlier processes in the lives of others. Indeed, the intensive streams accessed thus indirectly can be our own, and can include intensive processes that we have not previously reflected upon and might not now be able to remember, or it can correct our memory. For example, a film of a party could show us not having as good a time as we later believed we must have had. It is useful to distinguish direct from indirect observational access.

In a fairly direct way, we can also observe whether a thou is in a retrospective or a prospective attitude, as well as observing the emotional thing that is called her mood, and even how resolute or hesitant she is. Thus we can often observe another’s regret, anxiety, pride, hope, etc. This concerns the intensive process, letting us know in general whether it is retrospective or prospective and whether it is valuationally positive or negative. Still, if the other does not tell us anything and we are not highly familiar with her past, it is difficult to guess in such a case what she might be looking back on or looking forward to, i.e., the past or future things she focuses on; how they appear to her; how they are intended to by her; and her recollected or expected intensivenesses to them. Moreover, access to the other’s recollected or expected streams and things as intended to in past and future intensive processes depends on how determinate we

require a thing to be. If we are satisfied with considerable vagueness, then reflection on others is not confined to the now.

Section 4.—**Moods and Values Reflectively Observed**

Sometimes it is asserted that anxiety has no object, i.e., no thing is intended to in it. This assertion is false. It is true that anxiety and other moods, e.g., sadness and elation, often do not have definite things focused on, which is one signification of the word “object,” so that we simply worry in general about what bad thing in general the future might bring. But that thing intended to is still in the future, and it is still bad. Thus there is a vague and “global” thing intended to, even if little or nothing more can be said about it, such as whether it is within or beyond our control. A global thing can also be called an “object.” Often there are focal objects in the foreground and global things in the background of the whole that is intended to. But care is needed in the use of the word “object,” and the concepts involved can be expressed differently.

While the intentiveness of the thou to things intended to in the now is usually more observable, whether or not she tells us about them, our own past as remembered and future as expected are relatively easier for us to access reflectively in our own streams than what is happening in our nows. This is not to say that the present or now of our intensive streams is inaccessible to us and hence that reflective perceiving is impossible, but only that it is more difficult. In other words, self-observation in memory and even in expectation are easier than perceptual self-observation. As shown, the contrary, interestingly enough, seems to hold where a thou is concerned, i.e., her now is more readily accessible for us than her intended to past or future.

In our analysis thus far of a thou whose intensive stream we are reflectively observing, we have been focused not so much on sensuous intentiveness (as we did in the earlier efforts at self-

observation) as upon “emotional” or, preferably, “valuational” intentiveness. The cases given have been moods. At first glance, moods may seem more global where the things they are intensitive to are concerned, and thus less focused than sensuous intensitive processes. More closely considered, however, there is a background/foreground structure to what is intended to both valuationally and perceptually. The example of a bird singing in a glen used earlier shows this for perception. We perceive the relatively silent background as well as the melodic sonorous quality in the foreground.

There can be similar contrasts in valuation. For example, a person can be in a cheerful mood and thus her situation can have, correlatively, a valuational character for her that can also be called cheerful. (This happens through a not unusual semantic transfer from the intentiveness to the thing intended to, and the opposite transfer can also occur—e.g., when a mood is said to be blue or somebody is said to have a sunny disposition). Nevertheless, within the overall cheerful situation an overflowing ashtray may be focused upon and disliked.

While reflecting on a thing as it is intended to, we can distinguish between the value it has for the intentiveness to it on the one hand, and on the other, the core portion of the thing (including its appearances as well as some other characteristics, such as those pertaining to whether it is remembered, perceived, or expected), i.e., that which has the value. Correlatively, there is a component in the intensitive process that can be called “experiencing” and another that can be called “valuing.” For example, the tasting of Scotch whiskey is one thing, and whether we like the whiskey for its taste or not is another thing. More precisely, the experiencing of the taste and the valuing of it are both components of the intensitive process, and, correlatively, the Scotch taste and its value are both components of the thing intended to, discernable through reflection on the thing as it is intended to.

The example of the Scotch whiskey is interesting because it can also show how, with practice, we are not only able to change from disliking to liking, but can also come to be more sophisticated in experiencing subtle differences in taste, which can be the basis for different values. This is what can make us able genuinely to prefer good Scotch to ordinary Scotch. Incidentally, the word “taste” can ordinarily signify not only gustatory qualities of things, such as sour or sweet, but also a sophisticated ability to value things of many sorts, including animate ones. Perhaps there is a more original association of aesthetic valuing with eating and drinking historically than with looking at pictures and buildings, listening to music, or reading literature.

Do things always have values? That they have negative value correlative to being disliked and positive value correlative to being liked is readily observable reflectively. Beyond this, there are also the words “apathy” and “indifference” in English. If these designate valuational neutrality, if valuational neutrality is reflectively observable, and if its correlate in the thing intended to is not the utter absence of value (if such is possible), then there are neutral as well as positive and negative values. Moreover, the claim that reflection might disclose that things as intended to always have value is plausible.

Like sensuous appearances, values vary, but they do not do so in connection with the spatial relations of our bodies with other things in space. Through self-observation, on the one hand, and thou-observation, on the other hand, we often see that the same thing has one value for one person at the same time that it has a different value for another person, e.g., the doll that is wondrous for the child and is at best charming for us adults. Looking reflectively at the thing as it is intended to in the intensive process, we find that there are different valuational process components or “valuings” in different intensive streams. In this case, there are intense and mild but still positive valuings correlative to the wondrous and also charming thing.

Variations in sensuous appearance and variations in value in no way exhaust how things can be intended to. “As intended to” as used here includes “as it appears” and “as it is valued.” “As it presents itself” is a convenient synonym. Subsequent chapters will refine and extend these analyses.

Section 5.—**Other Objects of Reflection**

The field of reflective observation, i.e., the phenomenological field, is still broader. (1) I’s are not transcendent of the intensive stream in the same way that a chair or a bird are transcendent. I’s are not outwardly transcendent but inwardly transcendent. But this is only to name the difference and not to describe it. Perhaps the difference between experiencing (e.g., remembering) and valuing (e.g., disliking) and an object like a chair or a bird is clear enough to help the reader comprehend the immanent/transcendent distinction. On that basis, it can be said that an I is transcendent in a different way. And it might be added that an I can sometimes be “actively engaged in” performing operations, e.g., balancing a checkbook or reading a scientific or philosophical writing, and sometimes “passively engaged,” e.g., when caught up in and carried along by music or by what a persuasive salesman says.

In contrast with cases where an I (whether self or other) is actively or passively engaged in what can be called “operations,” there are “habitual intensive processes” for individuals and “traditions” for groups. Thus once we have learned to use a knife and fork, we can be engaged in listening to a fellow diner while our hands cut up and move food from our plates to our mouths quite skillfully and routinely. If we reflect on this in memory, we can find visual perceivings of the food, strivings to handle the knife and fork, and even how the former guide the latter; we can also note that we as I’s were not actively engaged in these processes. But we can also engage in these eating processes if we want to or need to. In contrast, there are other processes that go on in

our intensive streams that we cannot engage in, such as those whereby things that move become the somas of other psyches for us. Although this is not enough to make it fully clear not only how an I is transcendent of her intensive stream, but also how there is a correlation between the I and intensive processes as engaged in, perhaps it suffices to make it clear that the I is different from her stream.

(2) It also deserves to be reiterated that although an I and a thou are individuals, group life can be reflected upon as well. As already mentioned, “self” and “other,” in technical significations, are then differentiated into “me” and “we,” on the one hand, and “thou” and “they,” on the other hand. The minimum size for a group is two. When there is a group, the individuals who make it up are habitually intensive to each other and their behavior is influenced thereby, so that what can be called “collective behavior” occurs. This is behavior where what each group member does is influenced by intensiveness to the intensive streams of others in the group, especially expectations, including what others will think of what one is going to do.

Once it is understood what group life is, the question is not so much whether there are groups as whether there can be an individual who is not part of at least one group and, hence, whether talk about individuals is not abstract. We can be and regularly are members of many groups; we enter into and leave groups of many types rather easily; and groups themselves come into and go out of existence fairly frequently. That an individual’s groups and episodes of participation in them are highly changeable no more makes group membership less essential than the alterability of spatial relations removes physical things from space or the alterability of values renders things valueless.

Individuals in groups can share purposes as well as hates and fears, loves and hopes and much more. Reflection on group life, be it one’s own group or another group, can be difficult

because of the complexity as well as the alterability of the thing one reflects upon. Just as there is interaction between individuals, there is also interaction between and among groups. And there are relations within, between, and among groups.

(3) The above analyses, sketchy as they are, focus on humans. But if we have ever gone after game with a hunting dog, or even simply gone on a walk with any dog, we know that there can be groups or at least couples in which the participants belong to different species. Then again, perhaps the student has observed on television how African hunting dogs hunt antelope or packs of wolves hunt moose. If the actions of the individual dogs are coordinated through their mutual encountering, then this is a group and there is collective action, even if these are all non-humans, i.e., canines, whose collective intentive stream we observe indirectly via television.

Observation of other species through television is no less possible in principle than observation of humans by the same medium or through spoken or written language. That it is possible in principle does not, however, make it more reliable. But one can readily observe how the dogs perceive one another in coordinating their attack. Whether this observation is reflective depends on whether one can indirectly observe both the wild canine intentiveness to the prey and, correlatively, that which is intended to in this intentiveness: what to us humans may usually seem merely to be a charming spectacle for tourists, i.e., the antelope, is now observed by us to be intended to by the dogs as lunch. One can also reflect on house cats stalking birds, which does not, however, seem to be done in groups.

(4) The student will have gathered by now that reflective observation is largely concerned with what is often called the mind. Minds, however, come with bodies, psyches come with somas. It is preferable to say come “with” rather than “in,” for if “in” is taken naturalistically, then we might inquire, for example, whether the psyche is in the soma in the same way as the

lungs are in the chest, which is quite problematical. Suppose we are sad (just what we are sad about, if anything in particular, can be disregarded). Where is the mood called sadness? In one's stomach like food? In our shoulders in the same way as the muscles appear there when we flex them? In our heads? Many believe that our sadness is in our brains, but can we actually observe this? Could this be another scientism that confuses something with its cause and/or effect?

Anatomically, brains are in heads and parts of them may be perceived when we have headaches. But do intensive processes come over, under, near, far, or next to our brains?

If intensive processes, e.g., moods, are not located in space, are they located in time? Are there facial and postural changes that are observable at the same time that one is sad? One could also seek causal relations between somatic factors and the psyche. If one is sad but keeps one's torso erect rather than drooping, perhaps the sadness lessens. If psyches are in temporal and causal relations with somas and thereby other things, many go on to believe that there must also be spatial relations. But for such a belief to be justified in phenomenology, spatial relations need to be observed between intensive processes and other things that are obviously in space, e.g., shoulders or brains.

Fascinating as this may be, the issue of psyche-soma relations has been brought up in order to ask whether we reflect upon our own bodies, i.e., our "somas." To begin with, we can each encounter our own somas "from within" as well as "from without," e.g., one can feel a hand from within as one flexes her fingers as well as taking the other hand and feeling the first hand from the outside as it moves. What is felt from without is different from what is felt from within. Second, this somatic perceiving from within is sensuous and is globally intensive to the entire soma. For the most part, it seems to be most closely allied with tactual perception, but we can also hear our own hearts beat, our breathing, gurgles in our stomachs, etc., perhaps also

simultaneously feeling these events from within. Moreover, each of us is always at least marginally aware of our posture, gait, gestures, and visage from within. And although our general global perception of our own somas typically remains in the background, what is perceived somatically can also be focal and foregrounded, e.g., an area in pain, which is then located within the soma.

But is the observation of our own somas from within a type of reflection? So far, an observing has been considered reflective if the thing intended to in it is an intensitive process or a thing as it is intended to. The case of the observation of our own somas is curious because, while we can focus on it or not, we are always perceiving it in some way, and, of course, always remembering and expecting it. This is the case with no other particular object of sensuous perceiving (although a case could be made that this feature of functioning as a constant background can also be observed in the case of nature and the world). Furthermore, while other sensuous objects, such as rocks, can appear to us from different points of view, we cannot come closer to, move away from, or move around our somas as perceived from within, nor are there differences in appearance due to media, e.g., the carpenter's gloves, although one might consider whether some drugs have effects similar to those of illumination in vision, so that taking medication to dull a pain would be like turning down the lights in a room. Typically, we focus not on our somas from within, but on extra-somatic things, such as chairs and birds. We can unreflectively perceive, e.g., an ache in our chest, but when we consider that ache as an ache as intended to and, correlatively, the intensitive processes called "feeling from within," we are reflecting.

Incidentally, while the emphasis in the last two paragraphs has been on the soma in a tacitly naturalistic perspective, somas are like other things in originally being cultural things, i.e., things with values and uses. (Is this as true for them from within as well as from without?)

The foregoing analyses have been offered to show the breadth of the field of reflective theoretical observation and some of the ways in which it can be articulated. It is hoped that in working through it, the student has attempted to perceive, remember, or feign cases that fit the descriptions. Subsequent chapters will rely on this method, as well as of course, on reflection.

Exercises

1. The appearance of a chair grows and shrinks as we get closer to or farther from it. Do the depth as well as the height and the width of the appearance all change with the distance?

Does the chair continue to present itself to us in its own size while we focus on its appearance?

2. Find a case in which auditory appearances change because the distance between our ear and the sounding object decreases, increases, or both. Describe how the auditory appearance changes. Supplement this description with a scientific explanation of why the appearance changes.

3. Why is “seeing,” in one signification, called “predominantly visual perceiving”? What other components besides seeing (in another signification) are components of it? In the thing sensuously perceived, what correlates with seeing in the first mentioned and then the second mentioned significations?

4. What are the differences among perceiving, remembering, and expecting? Must all perceivings be sensuous?

5. Find and describe some olfactory and gustatory appearances. How do the appearances of your body as perceived from within change as you are tactually in contact with other things and surfaces?

6. Is the appearance of the chair transcendent to the intentiveness to the chair just as the chair is? Is it a component part of an intentive process the way a smelling is a component part of an intentive process?

7. Are most of the descriptions in this chapter based on naturalistic or on cultural observation, and why might they be comprehended otherwise?

8. Please supply, analyze, and describe cases in which you reflect on remembering leaving a place and in which you remember expecting to arrive at the same place.

9. If one proceeds from the most general through the more and more specific toward the particular, is there a limit to how specific an account can get? This is not an easy question.

10. Spell out the eighteen tri-determinate intentive processes and objects as they present themselves that are represented in Figure 3.3 and find an example for each.

11. We can each smell and taste our own bodies. Can this be from within as well as from without? (The insides of our mouths felt by our tongues are felt from without.) Can one gain direct access to the soma of another from within? What about indirect access?

12. Compose a chart of the modes of reflection on individual and collective self and other presented in Section 3.

13. Compose a chart in which mild and intense positive and negative moods in self and other are distinguished, and then supply examples for the eight tri-determinate cells of the cross-classification.

14. If we can indirectly observe the child's delight at receiving a toy, what do we observe when we interview people about events they witnessed in a war that ended before we were born?


15. It may seem that the past is more accessible to reflective observation than the future. If so, why? And if not, why not?

Chapter 4

Willing, Valuing, Believing

Seeing, hearing, and touching, along with remembering, expecting, and especially unreflective as well as reflective observing have been described in the preceding chapters. This has been done, in the first place, to show much of what phenomenology as an approach is and, second, to offer an opportunity for the student to refine her skill through practice in the procedures that make up the approach or method. With this preparation, we can now proceed in the next chapters to

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 (Figure 4.1)



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 consider, phenomenologically, some major doctrines. The themes of these chapters can be distinguished with a chart (see Figure 4.1). Each of the nine intensive process components ultimately distinguished in this chart is itself intensive (which is represented by the arrow stemming from each name). Correlatively, objects as they present themselves or as they are

encountered can present themselves in at least nine ways according to what is predominant in them. The correlative generic, specific, and subspecific types will be described systematically, i.e., by proceeding from general to specific, with particular examples used to facilitate grasping the common and different determinations involved.

The broadest distinction among intensive process components is between “experiencing” and “positionality.” The latter expression is more obviously technical, but consideration of its various species ought to help the student begin to see what is in common among them. Reflecting, then, we can abstractively discriminate components of two different kinds within any concrete encountering (recall that these are used as synonyms in this text). This procedure of abstract discrimination was already employed previously when we discriminated the components called “seeing” and “hearing” within sensuous perceiving. These components belong to subspecies of a species called perceiving that is coordinated with the species called expecting and remembering, which taken together make up direct experiencing (setting aside for now the experiencing of ideal objects). What other kind(s) of components are there?

On encountering a door and ceasing to focus on the experiencing by which we perceive, remember, and expect it, we can find and focus on our believing in the door or on our valuing of it in its present and actual condition, e.g., fully open, over other possible conditions, e.g., fully closed, half-closed, two-thirds open, etc. Then again, we can find and focus reflectively on a volitional tendency or inclination to leave the door open. Under different circumstances, such as when the open door allows people talking in the hall outside our room to distract us, we may value the door shut over the door open and thus be motivated to strive to close it. Believing, valuing, and striving or willing are species of the genus best called “positing.”

“Positing” is a rather technical expression that is here rendered even more technical than usual through its generalization beyond the sphere of believing, where it is typically used in philosophy, to cover valuing and willing as well. Correlative to the positings in the process intentive to its object, this object as it presents itself can be said to be posited and to have the character of “positedness.” There are types of positedness correlative with the three mentioned species of positing. They can be called “belief character” or “believedness,” “value” or “valuedness,” and “use” or “willedness.” The abstract noun “positionality” can cover both positing and positedness.

The point now, however, is that positionality is in general something different from experiencing and, correlatively, objects as they appear are different from objects as they are posited, i.e., believed in, valued, and willed. The current chapter is concerned with positionality, and thus experiencing is abstracted from as much as possible. The opposite abstraction will be practiced in the next chapter.

We will begin with matters that belong to a species best called “valuation,” which has been touched upon already. Although not well appreciated or accounted for traditionally, these are the easiest positional things to find and analyze reflectively in our own intentive streams and also in others, and in non-humans as well as humans, individually and in groups. Then we will proceed to consider belief or, more precisely, cognition, and finally volition or action.

Some terminological conventions deserve comment. Strictly speaking, “willing,” for example, is positive, while “diswilling” is negative; moreover, willing is also operational, i.e., engaged in by the I, whereas there is also habitual and traditional willing, and even automatic willing. But “willing” can nevertheless be used as an alternative to “volition” to express the

general concept under which those different species fall, with these differentiations made explicit, when necessary, with such qualifiers as “positive” or “habitual.”

Section 1.—**Valuing and Objects as Valued**

Problems concerning valuation begin when it is recognized that “valuation” and “emotion”—or, in one signification, “feeling”—are practically the same thing. Three problems seem especially critical. In the first place, we are all familiar with emotions of various sorts. Indeed, they may be so familiar and various that it may seem hopeless to try to classify them. However, if we proceed systematically, i.e., from general to specific, and hence do not get caught up in questions about minor subtleties, we can make great progress. In other words, we ought not to try to see the trees (much less the leaves) instead of the forest and its groves. Secondly, we may be hesitant about considering these things, which are often also called “affects” and “passions,” to be intensitive processes, but we can learn to do so. Finally, to like or dislike someone or something is emotional. We have probably been taught to consider the emotional irrational, i.e., something that cannot be accounted for, much less justified. However, reflective observing and analyzing can overcome this difficulty as well.

Are all emotional or affective processes intensitive? If there were a non-intensitive emotion, it would have no object. Some phenomenologists have contended that anxiety has no object. But as already mentioned in Section 4 of the previous chapter, whether this is true or not chiefly depends on how one comprehends the expression “object.” Emotions can be divided into “feelings” and “moods.” Moods may begin abruptly but last relatively long, and they rarely end abruptly. In contrast with the persistence of moods, feelings come and go rather rapidly and hence can be said to be transient. In addition, feelings are “focal,” i.e., their objects stand out

from backgrounds. Moods, on the other hand, are directed not to foregrounds but to backgrounds, and are thus globally intensitive.

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, it is possible to have a feeling that is modally the opposite of a simultaneous mood. For example, one can be at a funeral, where all is gloom, notice a well-fitted suit on somebody, and aesthetically like it at the same time that one is sad. In other words, there is then a positive feeling, for a moment, that is intensitive to a particular piece of clothing in the foreground at the same time that one's continuing negative mood is intensitive to a whole situation.

The situation that is globally intended to or encountered in a mood is often difficult to characterize precisely. This would seem in part to be because what is valued is a background in its entirety. If absolutely nothing can be described, then indeed there is no object. In the case of anxiety, however, the global object as encountered can be found upon reflection to have at least two determinations: (1) this object is in the future, i.e., we do not become anxious about the past (although we can become anxious about how the past will be remembered, which is anxiety about future remembering), and (2) this global object has negative value. We are anxious, then, about something bad that may come. Anxiety may be distressful, particularly if it cannot be stopped, but is this not what it comes down to, what it itself is? Optimism is also futural in its intentiveness, but has a positive modality, while pessimism is futurally intensitive, like anxiety. This raises the question of the difference between anxiety and pessimism. Could it be that anxiety is shaky while pessimism is firm about the value of what will come? Without pursuing this, it can be said that the point here is that anxiety has an object with at least two determinations, and is hence not objectless.

English is weak in literal expressions where affective things are concerned. Until relatively recently, the word “feeling” was confined to tactual experiencing, then it was transferred to become a generic title of a positional kind of intensive process component. Rather than worry why this is the case, there are three major and not unrelated techniques we can regularly employ to overcome this deficiency. (1) We can describe the naturalistic object that has the value, e.g., we can describe the color and shape and sound and smoothness of the ride of a beautiful automobile in order to specify the general aesthetic value, i.e., the beauty. Nevertheless, the value is a property of a different kind than the shape, color, etc., on the basis of which the object has value for us.

(2) We often take words that properly apply to the intensive process and transfer them to its object. Thus a “happy home” is so called because the dwellers are happy about it, and not because happiness, which is a mood, is something like the paint on the building (as when we say that it is a yellow house. And there can be sad homes, pitiful one, joyous ones, etc., in the same way.

(3) We often rely on metaphors. Thus elation is “up” and depression is “down” (is there a middle mood?). Many metaphors for value come from the vocabulary of color and vision, probably because humans depend so much on vision. Dark and bright futures relate to illumination, there are blue moods, there is purple prose, and we can wonder whether the phrase “golden opportunities” alludes to money or to color or to both. But other sensory modalities can also be sources—e.g., “It stinks!” can be a statement about negative value rather than olfactory quality.


By far the most useful initial move that can be made for the sake of investigating the emotional consists in calling it something else. We have been taught to be suspicious of being

emotional, and the use of words is not without its influence on us. No doubt this is because as educated people, we need to be able to be dispassionate, unemotional, and detached on specific occasions, including when we resort to reflective analysis. It does not follow, however, that we cannot dispassionately investigate passion, unemotionally investigate emotion, or investigate involvement in a detached way. The negative connotations of “emotion” can be evaded. The recommendation advocated here is to speak of “valuation” or “valuing,” which refer to process components that are intensitive to objects.

Not all of the words needed in this area can or must be changed. Thus we can say that feelings and moods are kinds of valuing. On this basis, a chart can be constructed. Besides the feeling-mood distinction made above, there is the distinction between positive, negative, and, it may be added, neutral modalities of valuing. After all, “apathy” and “indifference” are neither negative nor positive. Finally, valuative processes as intensitive to real objects, i.e., objects in time, can be classified with respect to the temporality of these objects, i.e., according to whether they are in the now, in the past, or in the future, indicated by their initials in the chart. Figure 4.2 attempts to combine that bifurcation and these two trifurcations.

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(Figure 4.2)



The result of this combination of 2 x 3 x 3 yields 18 tri-determinate subspecies of valuing (objects as valued can be classified in the same way), and the lowercase letters between parentheses from “a” through “r” can be used to identify them. A few examples may be offered here using the categories of this grid; other work with it will be reserved for the exercises. Let us consider “pride.” We may anticipate being proud of some accomplishment we have yet to accomplish, but pride itself is retrospective: it is intensive to what has already been achieved, whether it is a matter of our own accomplishments or those of others related to us in some way, e.g., our horse who has won the race. Pride is also positive in modality. The question then is whether it is a feeling or a mood, i.e., whether it is a “b” or an “e” in Figure 4.2. It is also possible that the word is used equivocally or at least specified by context. Thus being proud of one’s accomplishments in general would seem to be a mood, but there can also be a surge of pride that is focused rather than global and soon fades rather than lasts, which makes it a feeling. Perhaps “to take pride in” expresses the more focused and transitory feeling, while “being proud” aptly signifies something lasting much longer and functioning as a background, one that might make a feeling of “shame” more intense by the contrast.

What is the opposite of pride? (Asking for opposites is a powerful technique.) Let us first assume that this question is directed toward another retrospectively oriented mood, so that the difference sought would lie in the modality. In that case, the answer could be “shame,” or perhaps “sorrow” or “regret.” It is interesting that shame seems to suggest that others are involved, since we are not always ashamed if nobody else knows what we did. Is this also the case with pride, i.e., must others know of our accomplishments? Is there public and private pride and shame? We can also inquire into the opposite of pride in terms of temporality: perhaps the positive and prospective mood that is, as prospective, the opposite of pride is “confidence.” In

contrast to the way these words name moods, we can also speak of “feelings of shame,” “feelings of regret,” and “feelings of confidence,” which are also naturally occurring expressions in English. Thus we have cases that fit in categories “h” and “k.”

Usage in ordinary language is sometimes imprecise, but it can be refined in the light of the matters referred to. In this case, we might restrict “being ashamed of ...” to a type of retrospective negative feeling (rather than mood) intensive to events we are to a substantial degree responsible for, such as how we have lived our lives, and restrict “feelings of regret” or “regretting” to a type of feeling toward events that we are not responsible for. We can then include among the objects of our feelings of regret not only events for which others ought to be ashamed, but also events (e.g., earthquakes) for which nobody, at least not currently in industrialized societies, is held responsible. But we do not need to go that far now.

“Liking” may extend to inanimate objects, such as flowers and rocks, but “loving” would seem best reserved for animals, chiefly humans (and the questions of pets and gods as objects of love does not need to be pursued here). Liking is sometimes a mood (fondness?) and sometimes a feeling. These have, of course, their opposites in modality. Most people—especially parents—can report cases where they have intensely disliked somebody, at least for a short period, while at the same time, they went on loving the individual in question.

Reflecting on valuation, we may notice another feature. Moods and feelings are often habitual. We can indeed as I’s engage in listening to music, and this engagement does often seem to enhance our enjoyment. But we also learn to like what we like, whether it is the youth music appreciated under peer pressure or the adult music that is also appreciated under peer pressure. This is neither to say that all learning is produced in us by others (although a great deal is), nor is it to suggest that the fact that a valuing has been learned implies that such a valuing cannot be

justified—for if a valuing could indeed be justified, then the justified appreciation could be taught and learned. Instead, the point is that once we learn to like something, we need only to experience it and the liking commences.

It seems that most of our likes and dislikes are habitual. We learn to be solemn in church and happy at parties. Originally, we may have had to engage in keeping quiet and serious in the library originally, perhaps privately having feelings that are at odds with our outwardly visible “proper” behavior. But eventually there can be a mood that comes over us, as we say, in such a place, a mood that prominently includes serious positive valuing of books, of quiet, and of studying rather than merely pretending to value these things. It is characteristic of habitual processes that they may once have been engaged in actively or passively, but they now go on by themselves when the situation (including the attitude of our I) is suitable. And this is true for groups as well as individuals—for example, the entire congregation at a religious ceremony being solemn, each participant being in that attitude in part because everybody else is. We often underestimate the importance of habit in our lives, and doing so can lead to distorted phenomenological accounts.

Section 2.—**Cognition and Believing**

One motive for disparaging the emotional in the training of intellectuals may have to do with the vast similarity between valuing and believing. This is so great that they are species of the same genus, which can of course be called “positionality.” It seems that the differences between them can only be conveyed by discussing examples on the one hand and current linguistic usage on the other hand. This can lead us to see, reflectively, the matters referred to. Sometimes there are seeming differences of essence that show themselves, upon closer reflection, merely to be differences in emphasis instead.

Believing is fairly obviously like feeling in being positive, negative, or neutral. Actually, in ordinary English we “believe” propositions and “believe in” objects. Except to mention that believing propositions, which relates linguistically to indirect experiencing, may actually be an indirect believing in the object signified by the proposition, we shall confine ourselves here to considering the case of believing in objects.


Positively speaking, then, we believe in objects. The negative is “disbelieving in” them. The latter—and also a synonym, “doubting”—can be comprehended in broad as well as narrow significations. In the broad signification, it signifies all forms of believing other than positive believing. Neutral as well as negative believing would then be non-believing, but the neutral and the negative need to be distinguished, and we need more specific names for them. “Disbelieving in” can be an alternative to “negative believing in,” and for “neutral believing in,” “suspending judgment” can serve as an alternative. Finally, since a generic expression is needed, and since it is conventional to use the name for the positive modality to express the broadest signification as well, “belief” will be used as a title for this species as a whole. Rarely will context fail to specify whether the broad or narrow signification of believing is expressed, and in that case “belief” and “positive believing” can be used. (Whether the present writer is able to meet these linguistic ideals is something the student can judge.)

The weakness of the words “believing,” “disbelieving,” “neutral believing,” etc., is the lack of a cognate modifier. Sometimes the noun “belief” can be used as an adjective, the grammar of English being somewhat of the positional sort, e.g., “belief characters.” Hence one could also say “belief process,” “belief object,” etc., were that not so awkward. The word used in this connection by the phenomenological tradition is “*doxic*,” which also comes from ancient Greek and can be rendered artificially as “beliefish.”

The introduction of the word “doxic” can lead from a terminological to a substantive issue. There is a major tradition of thought in which belief (“*doxa*” in Ancient Greek) is contrasted with knowledge (“*episteme*”). But if cognition is considered justified believing, as it is in this text, then knowing is a species of believing in the broad signification, and what is traditionally called “doxa” amounts to unjustified believing. One way in which to remember that believing is something that can be justified is to use “cognition” as the generic name for all types of believing, just as “valuation” covers all types of valuing. Another chart can show this. In Figure 4.3 the initials “J” and “UJ” signify justified and unjustified respectively.


If believing is like valuing with respect to modality (positive, negative, or neutral), it nevertheless seems different because “certainty,” “uncertainty,” and “conjecture” or “probability” seem to designate variations specific to believing (and, for that matter, disbelieving) and/or to objects as believed in as well. We might say, “I am quite sure I left my keys on the table,” “Probably Ralph left enough fuel in the car for me to get home,” etc. Reflectively observing the intensive processes in such a case and distinguishing the components of believing, we can find a difference that can be expressed in fresh terms as between “firm” and “shaky.” Can these qualifiers be used for valuation as well as cognition?

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(Figure 4.3)



A chart can assist us in comparing valuing and believing in this respect. Since we can obviously believe in as well as value things in the now, in the past, and in the future, we can omit that dimension from the diagram. The results of cross-classifying with respect to modality are then reflected in Figure 4.4. The mathematical plus and minus signs can stand for the positive and negative modalities, respectively, and neutral modality can be signified by a zero. These are familiar, but firmness (i.e., “f”) and shakiness (i.e., “s”) may require some pondering.

(Figure 4.4)



“Firm” and “shaky” believing and disbelieving may be the easiest to find reflectively. We usually call them “certainty” and “uncertainty.” Reflecting on these more closely, we can recognize that there are degrees of uncertainty and, in general, shakiness; there is even a continuum with steadiness lying at one extreme. And there might even be circumstances under which a belief (or a disbelief) is unshakable. Thus our believing can be more or less firm as well as completely certain or firm. In different words, specific to cognition, we may accordingly assert that we are “more or less” sure that something is or is not thus and so, or we might say that we are “certain” or quite sure that it is or that it is not. But there are no degrees of neutral believing. In other words, doubting in the narrow signification does not have degrees. Neutrality is neither positive nor negative. The middle line in Figure 4.4 is arranged with positive and negative firmness at the extremes and neutrality in the center.

As Figure 4.4 is in part constructed to show, the same holds for valuing, where liking is like believing and disliking is like disbelieving, with firmness and shakiness in both, but with no degrees of apathy or indifference. Thus while it seemed that the firm-shaky distinction was peculiar to believing, it actually also holds for valuing. We can like or dislike firmly as well as in various degrees of shakiness. “Making up our minds” often refers to a process in which shaky valuing or shaky believing is replaced with firm positings.

Finally, we can wonder whether the distinction between focal and global intentiveness that was used to distinguish valuing into feelings and moods above also holds for believing and, for that matter, whether it is possible for there to be contrasting modalities simultaneously in this kind of positionality. Then there would be global and steady positive believing in the world, and neutral doubtings or more or less shaky disbelievings in focal foreground objects against that global background. And this indeed happens. Hence the need arises for generic terms under which the feeling-mood contrast and its equivalent for cognition would fall. Perhaps an “attitude”-“operation” will work in this connection. Then there would be cognitional or cognitive as well as valuational or valuative attitudes and operations.

Section 3.—**Volition, Willing, Action**

Are volitional things parallel to things of valuational and cognitional or doxic sorts, at least in the respects mentioned? In at least one respect they are not—namely, where the temporality of the object intended to in the willing, striving, or action is concerned. First of all, the immediate volitional object must be in time, while objects of belief and valuing can be either atemporal or temporal. In other words, the object of willing must be real, while objects of the other kinds of positing can be either ideal (atemporal) or real (temporal). Second, the immediate objects of willing must be in its future. In other words, we cannot will either objects in the now


or objects in the past. We can will that something perceived now be remembered at a future time, but in that case our future remembering is the immediate object of the willing and the presently perceived is only a mediated object of willing.

In many other respects, however, the parallelism holds. Before attempting to see this, we need, as usual, to get our terminology sorted out. The word “volition” may have virtue as a generic title, but “willing” and “the willed” are plainly of value for describing components of encountering and objects as encountered or as they present themselves. Since the latter words suffer from the disadvantage of lacking cognate modifier terms, we can turn to the word “volitional” to play this role. However, insofar as formations based on “volition” connote the voluntary as opposed to the involuntary—i.e., intente processes or objects willed “on purpose” as opposed to “by accident” or “under compulsion”—and also imply the engaged in as opposed to the habitual (whereas a great deal of willing is habitual), they may be misleading in some contexts. And it may be difficult to remember that the involuntary as well as the voluntary are both volitional.

Recourse to a third word, “action”—which, like “willing,” can be used to express concepts of positive and negative willing by adding “for” and “against”—may be useful; saying and “the object of action” (or “of volition”) is slightly longer than referring to “the willed,” but is clearer, and perhaps less awkward than the latter expression. “Action” tends to connote the inclusion of somatic (or bodily) movement (including becoming or remaining still, i.e., “stopping” or “staying,” among the species of movement), although not all of the volitional necessarily involves distinct somatic movements, e.g., when we strive to remember something. “Volition,” “willing,” and “action” have their advantages and disadvantages and will all be used.

The proposed answers to the terminological questions concerning both modality and firmness in volition can now be shown with a chart (See Figure 4.5).

(Figure 4.5)



The student may have little difficulty finding cases to relate to Figure 4.5, in which the willing is positive or negative and as such either firm or in some degree shaky or, to use the specifically volitional words, “resolute” or “hesitant” in each modality. The expressions “negative willing” and “positive willing” are handy, and it might be desirable to reserve them for the firm modalities of volitional positing. Another expression for volitional firmness is “decidedness,” which might be used more for operations than for attitudes. Another name for hesitancy is “indecision” or “indecisiveness,” except perhaps that the latter might better be reserved for a more lasting volitional process, attitude, or even character trait. In other words, not only can volitionally positional intensive processes be shaky in some degree or firm, whether positive or negative in modality, but they are also like moods and feelings in exemplifying the attitude-operation contrast.

The most difficult cases to find through reflective observation may pertain to neutral willing, which may also be characterized as “non-intervention” or even, if one cares for Ancient Greek words, “*aboulia*.” But suppose that we have two friends who come into conflict with one another and are each appealing to us to side with them. Bitter experience may have taught us,

however, not only that they will become friendly again later but also that the one we took sides against will be angry with us and the one we took sides with may be less than adequately appreciative. The wisest course here is then not to take either side, to act neither for nor against either of them, i.e., to remain neutral.

This case deserves closer analysis. Clearly we are willing something positive as an end in this case—namely, friendly relations with both friends later on. Neutrality is then used as a positive means, but it is nevertheless at the same time intrinsically neutral. Thus it itself is something willed, i.e., we positively will to be volitionally neutral. It is also possible to confuse the positive willing of this neutral willing with the neutral willing that is positively willed, especially since the willing of neutrality must continue for a while and thus may cease to be obviously earlier than the neutral willing that is willed. But thorough and careful reflection in memory will distinguish them.

(Figure 4.6)

	believing	valuing	willing
believing			
valuing			
willing			

The “compounding” evident in the case of the willing of willing just analyzed holds in other pure and mixed cases. Nine possibilities are given in Figure 4.6. These involve compounding only to the second degree. Valuing the willing of believing is possible (for example, some religious people do it), and it is a compounding of the third degree. There are no limits in principle to the degrees of compounding of positionality, but it rarely gets beyond three

or four degrees even when it involves more than one intensive stream. Compounding is not confined to one stream, nor to one species of animal; e.g., we can like the way our dog strives to bite intruders.

It is implied above that willing is intensive. Can willings be divided into those that are global and those that are focal, just as moods and feelings and also cognitive attitudes and operations can be? This would be clearly possible if there could be a focal willing in one modality at the same time that there is a global willing in another. Suppose, for example, that we are carpenters building a house. What we will as an end is the whole house built. While persisting in that global volition, we can will to tear down a part that did not satisfy us. The whole and positively willed object—namely, the house to be built—is in the background of the part that is focally willed against. The global willing in this case also lasts longer than the negative focal willing. That the attitude is intensive to the end and the operation is intensive to the means in this case is true, but it is irrelevant to the questions of whether the attitude-operation distinction holds for action and whether the global and the focal can occur in opposite modalities simultaneously. One clear case establishes these possibilities.

The immediate objects of willing are not only in time, but also always in the future. Now we can go further and consider whether there can be volitional intentiveness to “mutually incompatible” future objects. For example, we can deliberate whether to go to the mountains or to the shore for vacation, but we cannot seriously will to go to both places at the same time. Here we include deliberation in the volitional sphere; the claim is that contrary ends cannot be simultaneously decided upon.

Furthermore, the objects of our actions may or may not already exist. Setting aside volitional neutrality, we can qualify actions as “preventive” or “creative” with respect to objects

that are not now actual (but are believed possible) and “preservative” or “destructive” with respect to objects that are actual and are expected to go on existing. These expressions may be comprehended to signify entire objects, and expressions such as “change” and “influence” can then be reserved for cases where only parts of objects are willed positively, negatively, or both.

Another difference already alluded to is particularly evident regarding predominantly volitional processes, but holds for cognition and valuation as well. This can be expressed as a distinction among “automatic,” “habitual,” “operational” processes. These differences are most easily observed reflectively in relation to human I’s, who have hardly been more than mentioned thus far (cf. Chapter 3 above). The I is inwardly transcendent of the stream of immanence--rather like a tree is outwardly transcendent, but in a different direction, so to speak. It is not always easy to distinguish the I from her intentive stream within a mind, and some of the technical language used in phenomenology as well as in ordinary language is confused in this regard. But one’s I is observably different from the intentive processes engaged in, which can also be called “engaged processes” or, simply, “operations.” The I persists while the intentive processes she actively and passively engages in (in “doing” and “undergoing,” respectively) come and go and, indeed, her intentive stream flows by.

The easiest way in which to distinguish operational, habitual, and automatic processes is by considering them in relation to the I, but they can also be distinguished in relation to the object as encountered. In an operation, the I is engaged. She may be passively engaged or actively engaged. However, she is not engaged in either the habitual or the automatic processes. The difference between the latter is that she can never be engaged in automatic processes, which might also sometimes be called “instinctual,” whereas she can be engaged in what were habitual or routine processes before her engagement made them operations, even though, once learned,

these usually go on without necessitating any participation of an I. For example, one may habitually put one's pen away in a particular pocket after using it, but one can also engage in performing the same process as an operation. The person concerned was originally engaged in the operations through which the habit was initially established, and she can again be engaged in strengthening, weakening, or abolishing it. But unless abolished, habitual processes typically go on without engagement in them, just as automatic ones do. That an I is not involved in a habitual (or, for a group, a traditional) process is separate from how there are circumstances that motivate the routine processes.

Turning briefly to the object as encountered, there are objects as predominantly believed in, valued, or willed in a focal way (these focusings derive from the experiencing stratum, which will be reflected upon below) correlative to operations, but situations and the objects that make them up are believed in, valued, and willed in habitual and automatic ways as tacit backgrounds. In this connection, noematic reflection can explore how the objects encountered in non-engaged ways come to be operationally intended to. Suppose a book is gradually moved to the edge of one's desk as one moves other things around; there may be a vague awareness that the book is near the edge, but we are not really noticing it, caring about it, or doing anything about it. Then the book suddenly falls over the edge of one's desk. At that instant one can actively engage in a predominantly volitional operation of trying to catch it before it hits the floor and perhaps breaks its spine. And, contrariwise, we can engage in liking the neat arrangement we have made of the books on our desk, and later rely on reflection in memory to recognize how they eventually blended into the positively valued background that supports our cognitive operations of studying at our desk.

Although automatic processes are extremely important (e.g., other minds are originally encountered in this rich stratum), they can be set aside in this text as something that needs to be returned to with other texts in more advanced courses. As for habitual or routine processes, they are quite common. For example, we can drive through a familiar part of town or down the highway while engaged in conversation. Here we are actively engaged in speaking or passively engaged in hearing while at the same time the whole complex and familiar way is followed, the stop signs are stopped at, traffic kept up with, etc., all habitually. Should something unfamiliar or unexpected occur, however, such as another driver abruptly cutting in front of us, we disengage from the conversation and actively engage in operating the car.

Like most of the distinctions made in this chapter, this distinction holds not only for volition and action, but also for valuation, e.g., always preferring vanilla ice cream can be habitual, and believing—e.g., in something divine—can be as well. Another distinction, which is discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, is between “serious” and “fictive.” Can one not pretend to believe or disbelieve, pretend to value or disvalue, and pretend to act for or against as well as to do so seriously? These distinctions can be crossed with those given previously and then reflective observation employed in order to seek the multi-determinate matters thus conceived of.

One other point needs to be made at this juncture. The foregoing analyses deal with pure species of positionality, but often we refer to combinations. For example, “desire” appears, at least in ordinary English, to name an intensive process in which both valuing and willing are prominent. Or perhaps now one and now the other predominates according to the context in which the word is used. Then again, “belief” in the signification of “religious faith” is not purely cognitive in its reference, but also prominently includes valuing and at least dispositions to act.

Probably there are far more such “impure” than pure cases. While it will not be described here, it can at least be said that obtaining pure concepts involves “idealization.”

Close observation discloses that every intente process, every encountering, includes positionality of all three of the kinds that have been distinguished and analyzed above. Typically, however, one or another predominates and often lends its name to the whole. (This is analogous to the way a perceiving can be named after the type of sensing, e.g., hearing, that predominates in it, but what is predominantly, say, a seeing is also tacitly a hearing, touching, etc.) Thus our actions have evaluation and cognition in them—and indeed, beyond that, they also have experiencing of some sort or other, which is what makes them focal or global in their intentiveness. To analyze each positional component we have abstracted it from the others, just as we have abstracted positionality from experiencing in this chapter and will abstract experiencing from positionality in the next chapter, also for analytical purposes.

Section 4.—**Cultural Characteristics and Objects**

It should be clear by now that the things reflectively observed and described in phenomenology are seldom simple. Since all thoughts cannot be expressed at once, exposition requires shifts in emphasis. Most of the above description has been focused on encounterings rather than on objects as encountered. Yet for every intente process, reflection can discern a correlative object as it presents itself or as it is intended to in this process. We turn now to the correlates of positional process components. Generically, these are “positional characteristics,” but those constituted in habitual and traditional intentiveness can be called “cultural characteristics.” These are not disregarded when we practice cultural observation.

The expression “cultural characteristic” in part connotes how these characteristics are typically found as already constituted in “habitual processes.” Thus if there is a log we habitually

sit on during our afternoon walk in the woods, it becomes a seat in a resting place, for that is its established function or use for us. In everyday life and ordinary language, most objects are named in ways that refer to their cultural characteristics. As mentioned, if we want to consider an object as merely a naturalistic object and practice naturalistic observation on it, we must somehow set such characteristics aside.

Concretely, to view a diamond, for example, as merely a case of carbon in crystalline form, we need somehow to disregard the value and use it has in courtship within some historical periods in some societies and also as an indicator of social status. Objects have cultural characteristics for us at all times. Like the spatial relations that physicalistic objects always have, these characteristics too can change, sometimes rather rapidly. They vary with the individual, with gender and age, with the society and social class, with the generation and historical era, etc., of the intensive streams in which they are intended to. Perhaps this variety as well as the alterability just mentioned is another reason why they tend to be overlooked or disregarded. But all objects have cultural characteristics for us, and hence it is an error to believe that such characteristics are not essential to objects, i.e., that they are merely added on and can be taken off and forgotten.

The subtlety of cultural characteristics may also be why struggle is sometimes necessary in order to establish names for them (which is not the same question as that of the names for cultural objects themselves, the objects that have the cultural characteristics). One change that occurs for cultural characteristics is called "objectivation." For example, when we like a meal, the meal has positive value for us, but we tend to focus on the food, its smell, taste, texture, etc., and also on the company and the ambiance. Should we wish to speak about the value of this object, we might say, "This meal has positive value for me." But we more likely say, "This meal

is good.” These statements require that the value be focused on. The focusing can be called objectivating. A double set of expressions will help us distinguish the objectivated cultural characteristics from the un-objectivated ones. Thus while “value” is used in the latter case, “goodness” (and “badness”) can be used in the former case, i.e., for objectivated positive (and negative) values.

Traditionally, the word opposite to “good” is “evil.” The latter word has moral connotations. Also, to speak of a meal that we do not like because it has grown cold as evil is excessive and odd. It would be better to speak of it as “bad.” That would indicate that objectivation of the negative value has occurred. Going further, if we nominalize these adjectives, we can speak of objects with positive value as “goods” (or “good things”) and we can also speak of objects of negative valuing as “bads” or, less awkwardly, as “bad things.” What to call valuationally neutral objects when their valuational neutrality is objectivated is difficult to say (“blah things”?). Yet if they are indifferent (“indifference” being semantically transferred from the encountering to the object as it presents itself), then their “indifferentness” can be objectivated.

Objects can be believed in positively, negatively, or neutrally. The correlative characteristics seem not to have simple names in English when objectivation has not been performed. They might be called “believedness,” “character of being believed in,” or, best, “belief character.” These can be qualified as positive, negative, or neutral. With respect to valuation, when the positive value is objectivated, it is called “goodness,” its opposite is “badness,” and then there is “valuational neutrality.” Analogously, a belief character, when objectivated, is called “existence” in Husserlian phenomenology, with the opposites called “inexistence” or (“negative existence”) and “neutral existence.” Objects that “exist” or “are

existent” can be called “existences,” “existents,” “beings,” or “entities.” The last mentioned seems preferable because its opposite, “non-entity,” is also familiar. This can be taken in a narrow signification of “negative entity” to contrast with, perhaps, “neutral entity.” For agnostics, who are neither theists nor atheists, the gods are neutral entities.

Objects, finally, are positively, negatively, or neutrally willed. The analogue to “value” and “belief character” might best be called “use,” with “function” as an alternative. “Uses” are easily qualified as positive and negative in correlation with positive and negative willing. When we objectivate their uses, useful objects then have positive or negative usefulness for us and, in contrast with that, “uselessness” can denominate neutral use. The objects that are useless or positively and negatively useful might, on etymological grounds, be called “utensils” or “utilities,” which seem cognate, but they are better called in general “equipment,” which can also include “impediments” and “facilities” as well as utensils and utilities as species. And if these expressions excessively connote inanimate or at least non-human objects, social words like “foes” and “friends” or “enemies” and “allies” can be introduced. (Do “innocent bystanders” have practical neutrality?)

One other and extremely important distinction can be made that holds for all three kinds of positionality where objects as they present themselves are concerned. This is the distinction, in general terms, between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” positional or cultural characteristics. “Intrinsic” and “extrinsic” can be represented by their initial letters in Figure 4.7, which also includes the familiar distinctions among the three kinds of positionality and their positive, negative, and neutral modalities. This is a classification now of cultural characteristics, be it remembered, rather than of positional process components within encounterings.

The most familiar case here is the difference between the uses that “ends” have for us and the uses that “means” have. The “end use,” e.g., being able to read again—which is willed for its own sake in this example—can have among the means to it the ladder we climb up to replace the burnt-out and thus useless bulb with a new and positively useful one: where somebody’s death, say that of a pesky fly, is the goal—which is negative—then the flyswatter is a negative means used to that end. It is used to destroy the fly. The death of the fly, however, can also be both end

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 (Figure 4.7)

	+	-	o
volition	i/e	i/e	i/e
valuation	i/e	i/e	i/e
cognition	i/e	i/e	i/e

=====

and means in different connections, intrinsically one way and extrinsically the other (e.g., killing the fly is a means to the end of preventing the spread of disease). Lengthy chains of ends and means often occur, e.g., money is used in order to buy the flyswatter that is used to kill the non-human who happens to be searching for food near us. Neutral uses were implied in the analysis in Section 3 above concerning the two friends in conflict.

Values can also, of course, be intrinsic or extrinsic. Consider the case of a broken leg. It hurts, we experience the pain, and we do not like the pain; it has negative value, it is bad. Without anesthetic, it will hurt even more for a while as the broken ends of the bone are realigned or set. Yet the leg will hurt less later—indeed heal correctly, and “get better”—if we endure the greater pain now. Thus the greater or more intense pain will have intrinsic negative value and extrinsic positive value for us at the same time. The latter is the value it has in relation

to the leg expected to be well later on. There are negative intrinsic and extrinsic values of objects correlative to our disliking of them for their own sakes and to our disliking them for the sake of another object. Perhaps there are also positive intrinsic values, e.g., the value of the properly healed leg. (Pain, it will be remembered, is not a value but rather a sensible property, spatially extended as well as located; it is not a value, but has value, and is not a good but a bad.)

On the pattern established, we can also ask whether there is intrinsic or extrinsic “existence” to objects. For religious people who believe that the creation depends on a Creator, the Creator exists in Her own right and Her creation exists in relation to Her. Philosophers may be inclined to speak here of “absolute” and “relative existence,” but this is indeed a species of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction for objects as believed in with their belief characters objectivated. Some objects are believed in for their own sakes and other objects are believed in on the basis of believing in other objects, with the latter believed in for their own sakes. This often happens on the basis of indirect experiencing and as with ends and means, lengthy chains are possible here too.

Finally, where positionality is concerned, let us also recall the distinction between serious and fictive. We might be inclined to believe that this holds only for experiencing and perhaps even for visual perceiving, but reflective analysis shows not only that there can be fictive hearing and even touching, but also that there can be fictive believing, valuing, and willing. That is to say, one can pretend to believe in something, pretend to like somebody, and even pretend to do something, the last mentioned including what actors do when acting. Encounters of all sorts can be fictive as well as serious.

Exercises

1. In your reflections, have you noticed anything that is not either (a) experiencing of some sort, (b) positionality of some sort, or (c) both, or (d) an object, or (e) subject of encountering?
2. What are the similarities and differences between anxiety and pessimism? Pity and admiration?
3. Do we use words from the sphere of audition metaphorically to characterize the value characteristics of objects? If so, give some examples. Do we use music?
4. How would you describe “ambivalence”? Is it a shaky feeling that vacillates from negative to positive? Is it valuational neutrality?
5. Are there processes similar to ambivalence, as you described it, in the spheres of belief and volition?
6. To which temporal zone (i.e., the now, the past, or the future), if any, does the object of “fascination” belong?
7. Can you think of a case where you have simultaneously had a negative feeling toward something in a situation that was globally encountered in a positive mood? What about the opposite case?
8. Can you believe in something that you feign? Can you value something that you feign? Can you give an example of using somebody else’s fictive objects as a means to the end of influencing them?
9. How would you describe using the more technical terms of this chapter, what we usually call “not being able to make up one’s mind”?

10. Is the alleged difference between feeling and mood—and, more generally, between attitude and operation—a difference of kind, or are these ends of a continuum? If the latter, you should be able to give cases in the spheres of believing, valuing, and willing that are on the borderline between the transient and focal and the enduring and global. Can there be transient global and enduring focal cases?

11. Construct two additional charts like Figure 4.2 but for cognition and volition, and list intensive processes and objects as intended to that would fit each of the cells in your charts, possibly drawing on this chapter, but certainly also drawing on your own reflections.

12. Select three animals of different species and two inanimate objects, one artifactual and one non-artifactual and then produce two brief descriptions of each of them, one in terms emphasizing their cultural characteristics, and one in terms of their naturalistic determinations.

13. What do gladness and sadness have in common and how do they differ on your analysis?

14. Is there pain without intrinsic negative value? Is bitterness in the sphere of taste a pain?

Chapter 5

Experiencing

This chapter too is based on an abstraction. The concrete things reflectively analyzed in phenomenology are always encounterings or intente processes, I's, and objects as they are intended to, as they present themselves, or as they are encountered. Now, however, we provisionally disregard the positional components and objects as encountered positionally, which were focal in Chapter 4, in order to investigate what is in general best called "experiencing," which has several species and subspecies. Figure 4.1 at the outset of the previous chapter represents the full array of these process components and the correlative object components. The first division within experiencing is between "direct" and "indirect" experiencing.

Direct and indirect experiencing can be described separately; since indirect experiencing presupposes and includes direct experiencing, and since it appears wisest to proceed from simple to complex as well as from the founding to the founded (at least where the founded is contingent), direct experiencing will be dealt with first. Yet since in the past phenomenologists have tended to underemphasize indirect experiencing, it will here receive the relatively ample attention that it deserves.

Section 1.—**Direct Experiencing**

Having experiencing as a theme is not as difficult as one might imagine, except that the components of believing must also be set aside; it is an intentiveness rather like that of the naturalistic outlook in which, in this age of naturalism, most of us have already been schooled by the time we reach college. Similarly, it is not difficult to disregard how objects are represented and concentrate instead on how they are presented. Direct experiencing has several species easily

distinguished by reference to the objects they are intensitive to. Hence the discussion of objects of direct experiencing will precede that of the types of direct experiencing.

The first division among objects of experiencing is between “real objects” and “ideal objects.” Ideal objects are such things as numbers and the meanings or significations of words; they also include “eide,” which are discussed in Chapter 6. The direct experiencing of real objects will be quite enough for now. In contrast with ideal objects, real objects are in time. Physical objects, which are real objects (but not the only sort of real object), are “between,” “under,” “near to,” “far from,” and in other ways related to other physical objects “spatially,” as well as “at the same time as” and immediately and mediatedly “before” and “after” one another “temporally.” The error best called “physicalism” consists in believing that only physical objects exist, which is to say, among other things, that only sensuously observable objects in observable spatial, temporal, and also causal relations are justifiably believed in. Certainly such objects are not the only objects that actually or possibly exist. Are intensitive processes physical things?

Assuming we can reliably distinguish animate from inanimate real objects, we can recognize that both are at least to some extent physical, while some of them—namely, the animate ones, i.e., animals—have psychic or mental as well as physical components. The psychic components of animals include their intensitive streams and also their I’s, when they occur, which they do at least in humans. We can also speak here of “psyches.” Groups of animals, whatever the species, are best called “social groups.” This was seen in an earlier chapter.

If one is inclined toward physicalism, it will seem odd that psyches are not spatially shaped or colored, that they are not sensuously observable, and that they are not immediately located spatially. Thus while the spoon is located in the coffee that is located in the coffee cup, pride and anxiety are not observably located in one’s chest spatially. The poets who say so are

not being literal. To be sure, our beating hearts and breathing lungs are observably located there. Perhaps pride and anxiety have distinctive effects on such organs in our chests—and we do sometimes confuse events with their distinctive causes or effects—but we do not literally “see” our moods in the way as we do literally see the wall, i.e., with our eyes. In self-observation our own psychic streams are indeed directly observable, but in a non-sensuous way (reflection on others is a type of indirect experiencing discussed below in Section 2).

As observed, psychic processes are causally as well as temporally related to the physical things we call our bodies, and are also indirectly related to objects in our surroundings, as well as to one another within and between psyches. For example, when a bell rings, there are sound waves that emanate from that sound source at great speed, affect our auditory organs, and cause us to hear the bell ring. In this case, we can fairly immediately observe that the predominantly auditory perceiving, the hearing, goes on at effectively the same time as the bell’s sonorous qualities of the non-silent as well as silent sorts. The causal relations between the vibration of the bell, the condensations and rarefactions of the intervening air, movements of tiny bones inside the ear, and so on, are less immediately observable, but are nonetheless observable in principle with the appropriate scientific equipment, and some relations of this sort are even sensuously observable.

Because of the temporal and causal relations that they have with physical objects within and beyond our bodies, psyches are parts of nature. They are parts of naturalistic objects. The spatial relations that physicalism also requires cannot, however, be observed within and between our psyches or between them and somas with which they are immediately related causally. It would be a prejudice to believe that such spatial relations are nevertheless there despite being unobservable in principle. The psyche is not in the soma like the coat is in the closet. Yet being

in time is sufficient to make psyches real, i.e., parts of reality as the word “reality” is being used in this text. More specifically, they are parts of nature because of the causal as well as temporal relations they have with inanimate naturalistic objects, i.e., physical objects. A chart may now be of use (See Figure 5.1):

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(Figure 5.1)

Types of Objects	Essential Relations
I. Ideal Objects
II. Real Objects	temporal
A. Cultural
B. Naturalistic	causal & temporal
1. Psychic	“motivational” & temporal
2. Physical	spatial, temporal, & causal

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Figure 5.1 goes beyond what has been said. As mentioned, ideal objects will be considered later. Places are furthermore left on the chart for basic cultural objects. The interest here is in real objects of experiencing with their cultural characteristics left out of consideration. This is then an interest in naturalistic objects and nature or the natural world. Within the natural world, “psychic objects,” i.e., psychic processes (and also I’s) directly observable through self-observation and indirectly observable through reflection on others, are causal and temporal, as well as, of course, intente. In opposition to a notion of causation tied to mathematical naturalistic science, phenomenologists often refer to the causation reflectively observable among intente processes as “motivation.” Thus perceiving the cold draft of air can be said to have motivated the action of closing the window. But this aitiological motivation is nevertheless causation between the intente processes of perceiving and of willing analogous to the way that

fire heating the pot and the water in the pot boiling is a matter of causal relations between physical objects.

Because they are in time, realities—including the psychic as well as the physical ones—can be found in the now, the past, and the future. They can be perceived, remembered, or expected through self-observation. While perceiving our lunch, for example, we can remember our breakfast and expect our supper. Confining ourselves to perception, the food and the plates, table, etc., what we perceive are fundamentally physical objects. Also involved, as we can recognize if we reflect, are the current visual and gustatory perceiving of the food, which can be accompanied by a liking of the taste, but here the liking and the valued taste and sight are abstracted from. The food, the unreflective food-perceiving, and even the reflecting upon the perceiving as intente to the food and the food as it is perceived, can all be observed from the standpoint of reflecting upon reflecting, which was described earlier. Although they may begin at different times, once they have all begun, they can all go on at the same time, which in this case may be called “lunchtime.”

During lunch we can remember breakfast. This is breakfast as it was perceived this morning. Along with the earlier perceived breakfast was the earlier process of perceiving that also went on this morning, at breakfast, which we can now also remember and indeed reflect upon in memory. Similarly, in expecting supper we expect supper as it will be perceived by us this evening, and we can also observe the expected perceiving as expected that will go on during dinnertime. And besides the now, the past, and the future processes of perceiving and the food that is, was, or will be perceived that we can reflect on, there are also, in the three mealtimes, the somatic movements of eating in which food is, was, or will be brought to our mouths, chewed, and swallowed. (We continue to disregard the now, past, and future of liking or being indifferent

about the food, and also the willing that makes the somatic movements actions.) Much more is involved in even something so ordinary as eating, but these are some the easiest features to notice.

The remembering and expecting go on in the now and have objects that are in the past or in the future, respectively. If, for some reason, we have to skip supper when evening comes, this does not affect either the fact that an expecting of it went on during lunch or the fact that what we expected including the seeing and tasting of supper. In other words, the lunch in front of us now actually exists, our breakfast formerly existed actually, but the supper still off in the future does not yet actually exist. Nevertheless, it is something expected. Can we not remember what we expected, whether or not it became actual?

It is important now to recognize that there is no image or representation between the recollective or expectational experiencing and the remembered or expected objects. Since so many previous thinkers have gotten this wrong, it deserves close attention. We may not be able to remember clearly back to our births, but we can probably remember some fairly early childhood events. And we can expect times in our futures right up to our deaths. Some people have expectations concerning their intensive stream in a time beyond death and, for that matter, some have claimed recollections of times before their births. Whether we might experience our own psychic processes earlier and later than the duration between birth and death is a subtle problem well beyond the scope of this text. Again, the point is that remembering and expecting are direct experiencings: what we remember is our breakfast itself, not a representation of it. There are, in other words, no representations between the experiencings and their objects. If there were, reflective observation would disclose them, as we shall see in Section 2.

Perceiving the food on the plate on the table before us as we eat lunch does not involve representations either. The reflectively observed seeing goes on, its object is the food, and there is no image in between. Suppose we raise our gaze and look across the room at the wall. Suppose then we raise it even further and look out the window at the clouds in the sky. Does reflective observation disclose anything more than the seeing, the far wall, the clouds, and then the sky as objects seen? Is there anything in between these that can be seen?

Intentive processes or encounterings are remarkable things. On the one hand, they are not directly located in space and, on the other hand, they are able to be directly intentive to objects that are sometimes quite distant in space and time from our bodies. These objects are not distant from the experiencing spatially, for something cannot be near to or far from something that is not itself in space, that does not itself have spatial relations with other objects. They are indeed distant from the eye, but the eye is plainly part of the physical object we call our body or soma. If one is prone to physicalism, one might even think that perceptual processes stretch out from the eyes or ears to contact far off objects. Reflective observation, however, discloses that intentive processes are not spatially extended in such a way. They are not shaped, colored, or tangible. They cannot even be tasted or smelled. They are not physical objects of sensuous perception at all.

What is referred to when intentive processes or encounterings are said to be “intentive” is the way in which they are directed at such objects or, in different metaphoric words, aim at or point to them. These are figurative expressions that may help the student find the quality in question. The quality of intentiveness is, however, “*sui generis*,” i.e., there is nothing else like it. To recognize what it is, one needs to reflect upon intentive processes and look for what they have in common besides their temporality—i.e., the way they go on along with or during the time that

other things go on—and also besides their causal or motivational relations with other processes and events.

Something relatively new to this exposition but nowise new to the reader, except perhaps for the words, can be added at this point. Thus far, the emphasis has been on what can now be called “serious intentiveness.” “Fictive intentiveness” contrasts with serious intentiveness. That “feigning” and related words are to be preferred over “imagination” and “phantasy” in this connection was already argued in Chapter 2. The serious-fictive distinction is something that occurs in all spheres of intentiveness and thus can be analyzed better in many places than by being concentrated in one chapter or section, e.g., fictive positionality was briefly described at the end of the last chapter. Indirect fictive experiencing will be described at greater length at the end of the next sections. Here it will suffice to characterize it briefly.

Traditional thought about fictive experiencing often includes a tendency to place the ability or faculty of imagination on a par with the senses as well as with the faculties of memory, judgment (belief), emotion, and will. That this is mistaken can easily be seen through reflective observation. Thus we can feign a large green chicken standing across the room looking down at us. She is not real because there are no seriously perceivable spatial, temporal, or causal relations between her and other things in the room, e.g., her weight does not press down on the floor. The feigning, however, is real: it is in time; it comes after, along with, and before other intentive process components in our intentive stream; and it lasts for a while. Along with feigning this chicken we can indeed feign real relations, e.g., that the floor supports her. Then, however, we can stop feigning—and she is no longer an object for us, nor are there such fictive relations, but the floor and the room are still seriously perceived.

Besides fictive perceiving, we can also remember fictively—i.e., feign objects in the past as if they had been previously perceived, e.g., a date we pretend we once had with a film star. We can not only do this, but we can also “fictively expect” events to come. Interestingly, it is not fictive but serious expectation that is the more difficult intensive process of the two to observe and analyze. But if we consider how we can at once seriously perceive something—say, an automobile—and at the same time feign something on the side of the automobile that is away from us (e.g., a gold star painted on the door) and then compare this with how we often employ feigning in deciding how to modify that which was already seriously if only vaguely anticipated (e.g., the current color of the paint on the car door we do not see), then we might verify the parallelism asserted here.

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 (Figure 5.2)

	perceiving	remembering	expecting
serious			
fictive			

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Though it has been initially concerned to classify objects, this section has been chiefly concerned with how real objects, including encounterings, can be intended to in direct experiencing. The experiencing has three species, i.e., perceiving, remembering, and expecting, which can be fictive as well as serious (see Figure 5.2). Negatively speaking, direct experiencing is the experiencing in which no representation occurs.

Section 2.—**Indirect Experiencing**

A representation does occur in the indirect kind of experiencing. In other words, experiencing of this kind is representational. Humans rely on indirect experiencing to an

enormous extent, and it is possible that for some people all interesting types of experiencing are indirect. This could be the case, for example, for a child who watches television. It might be that the error best called “representationalism,” whereby all experiencing is considered indirect or representational, is the result of generalizing from one interesting type of experiencing to all experiencing. The previous section has established, however, that there is indeed experiencing that is not representational or indirect. Furthermore, it will soon be seen that indirect experiencing is founded upon direct experiencing.

Some of the matters here best called “representations” are often called “signs” and/or “symbols.” Those words convey many technical significations, while the word preferred here seems freer in this respect. Ideal and fictive as well as real objects can be represented, but we shall continue to confine ourselves to the latter. And it should be remembered that the experiencing component is here being abstracted from the full concrete encountering, which also includes components of believing, valuing, and willing.

There are three species of indirect or representational experiencing, each of which can have subspecies. Arguably the most easily understood, if not the most common, is the sort that can be called “pictorial representational experiencing” or, more concisely, “pictorial experiencing.” Here the experiencing has two layers or strata to it. In the lower layer, the *infrastratum*, there is a direct experiencing of the object that becomes a “depiction,” e.g., a photograph. The experiencing in the *infrastratum* can also be recollectional or expectational, but it is convenient to emphasize cases where it is perceptual. On the basis, then, of perceiving what becomes the depiction—e.g., a piece of paper with variously shaped and colored areas on its surface—we experience the “depicted object,” which may or may not be in view at the same time, either directly or indirectly (through another depiction).

The expression “depiction” is preferable to “picture” because as a less ordinary although readily comprehensible word, it can more easily have its signification broadened and used to cover all sorts of audio recordings of how people, orchestras, waterfalls, etc., sound. Furthermore, representations of this sort can be three-dimensional, e.g., statues, while we tend to think of pictures as flat. And of course, we can still use “picture” for flat depictions, which can occur on computer screens and in cinemas as well as in paintings, photos, and so on. Besides the type of pictorial experiencing in which the depiction is predominantly visual rather than sonorous, there can of course be audio-visual depictions in film and video. Can there be predominantly olfactory, gustatory, and tactual representations? Could the taste of some dish represent a memorable meal, perhaps on a birthday? Can the scent on a pillow bring the lover to mind? And a mimic or imposter can, through acting, make us experience another person.

That which is distinctive about specifically pictorial experiencing is the “resemblance” between the representation and the object represented, the representatum. The pillow smells like the lover. If we have a depiction of a friend—a photo, a video, a plaster face mask, an audiotape, etc.—and also a direct experiencing of the friend, we can compare the friend as represented with the friend as directly experienced. Perhaps we perceive the friend standing before us, or perhaps we remember how she looks while we simultaneously gaze at her on the basis of the depiction of her before us. Then we can ascertain how accurate the likeness is. Incidentally, pictures of pictures, pictures of pictures of pictures, etc., and also pictures of statues, are plainly possible.

While the foregoing ought to make it clear what pictorial experiencing is, the possible species of indirect experiencing are plainly not exhausted. After pictorial experiencing comes the sort of indirect or representational experiencing that seems best called “indicational experiencing.” It is like pictorial experiencing in its complexity. It has an *infrastratum* or bottom

layer that consists of the direct experiencing of something that becomes the “indicational representation”—or, simply, “indication”—and a superstratum that consists of an experiencing of what can be called the “indicated object,” the “object indicated,” or, in contexts where a more technical emphasis is of value, the “indicatum.” The difference between pictorial and indicational experiencing lies chiefly in that indications do not resemble the objects they indicate, but a secondary difference consists in the fact that indicational experiencing is more obviously learned than pictorial experiencing, which often just seems to remind us immediately of something previously experienced sheerly on the basis of the resemblance.

But of course there can be indications of objects never previously encountered. For example, if one walks down a new street in the evening and sees a house with the lights on, the lights indicate that somebody or other is inside. It is certainly possible that the lights were left on accidentally when the people who live in this house went out, or they left them on in the hope of discouraging burglary, but absent evidence of such things, we (and perhaps potential burglars) experience the house as occupied. Whether or not what is represented in this or other types of indirect experiencing actually is as represented does not affect it being represented. And people do not resemble the illuminated interiors of buildings that we have easily learned to experience as representing them.

Only objects that are similar in some respects can pictorially represent one another, but it would seem that in principle anything can come to indicate anything else. At the same time, as just mentioned, it is clearer with indications than with depictions that learning is involved, that we learn that objects of one sort represent objects of another sort. This is “learning” in the broad signification that includes but is nowise confined to the results of formal instruction. It is not difficult to believe that we learn or unlearn at least one indicational relationship a day.

For another example, seeing cars parked on both sides of a street, with all of them facing in one direction “indicates” to many that it is a one-way street, and does so whether or not any cars are seen actually moving in the direction indicated. But it does so only for people familiar with automobiles, one-way and two-way streets, parking, etc. Thus indicational experiencing is, in one signification of the word, “cultural.” The student may have just had the relation between parked cars and traffic direction pointed out to her for the first time, but it is also possible that she has already learned this type of indirect experiencing merely from past experience and without ever thinking about it.

Some indications are quite subtle and take considerable training to become indications. This would be the case with the medical doctor, the subspecies of indications called “symptoms,” and the illnesses they indicate. Some indications are deliberately established—and indeed are the subject of legislation, e.g., the colors and shapes of traffic signs. Others may be inadvertently produced, such as the coat hung by the door that indicates that its owner is home. The subspecification of indicational experiencing seems a daunting task that fortunately does not need to be carried out here (but one might begin by distinguishing indicata that are in the now, the past, and the future of the indication, or not in time). Once one begins to notice indications, one can recognize that if there were a way to count such things, they are the most numerous of the three sorts of representations, as well as the most socially, historically, and individually variable.

Before leaving indicational experiencing, it deserves mention that the experiencing of other minds, i.e., social experiencing, is representational or indirect and specifically indicational. An artifact indicates an artificer; a footprint indicates someone who has passed this way. Besides depicting the bottom of the foot, it indicates the psyche whom the foot belongs to, and neither

encountering is best called the depicted object, the object depicted, or the depictum/a. But the various species of indirect experiencing have still not all been described.

The third and last species of indirect experiencing can best be called “linguistic experiencing,” although “linguistically representational experiencing” might be useful at times. The representation here is best called the “verbal expression,” or when context sufficiently differentiates it from expressions of other sorts, such as facial expressions, it can be called merely “expression.” This word refers to words, phrases, sentences, chapters, etc., and divides along another dimension into “texts” and “speeches.” For reasons to be told presently, the represented object is best called the “signified object,” the “object referred to,” or the “significandum.” The plural of the latter would be “significanda.”

The infrastatum of linguistic experiencing is more complex than that of either pictorial or indicational experiencing. This infrastatum has two substrata within it. The lower infrastatum is a serious or fictive sensuous experiencing of sounds, marks, or other things, such as what is touched in the Braille writing used by the blind. Then there is the speech of the deaf done using their fingers, which is called “signing,” and the way in which Asians draw characters in the air or on their palms, which is also speech because there are no lasting products. In speaking and hearing, the comprehension is predominantly auditory but sometimes visual, while in reading and writing it is predominately visual or tactual. Predominantly olfactory and gustatory objects seem unable to function for linguistic purposes.

On the basis of fictive or serious direct awareness of the sound, mark, or “touch” (as it may be called)—i.e., the phoneme, grapheme, and, perhaps, “hapteme”—there can arise, due to learning, a process of “thinking;” this intentiveness has an immediate object not in time, that is not real; it produces this immediate object; and, in addition, it is not in and of itself a positing,

e.g., a valuing, although it is regularly accompanied especially by believing. It can also be called a “conceptual process.” It is an intentiveness in which a concept or “signification” is intended to. The constitution of significations in comprehension and expression is what some phenomenologists consider constitution in the narrow signification. (There is a broader signification of “constitution” that does not need to be discussed here.)

That the signification is different from the object of serious or fictive sensuous perceiving—the lower level of the *infrastratum*, which can be called the “signification carrier” or merely the “vehicle”—is shown in cases where the same signification is expressed or comprehended in different carriers. (“Expressing” or “comprehending” name species of linguistic experiencing that subsume—in all their forms—speaking and hearing, on the one hand, and writing and reading, on the other hand, and include not merely the intentiveness to the vehicle and the signification, but also the experiencing founded thereupon.) Thus the vehicles “2” and “2” are not different in shape, but they are different in place on the present page and in the different copies of this text. Yet the same signification is expressed by the author and comprehended by the readers in all cases. The same can be said in the case of “ii,” “II,” “*zwei*,” “*deux*,” “*dos*,” etc.: there is difference in the shape as well as the place of the vehicle, but the same signification is conveyed. This signification is, however, part of the linguistic representation, the expression, and not necessarily part of the representatum, unless that which is signified is another linguistic expression.

“Signification” names the same thing that “meaning” does when we say, in English, “the meaning of a word,” “the meaning of a sentence,” etc. The less used word is to be preferred for technical phenomenological purposes because of the way in which “meaning” has come to signify other matters. This is probably clearest in the phrase “the meaning of life,” which is not

about the signification of the word “life,” but probably about the purpose and/or value of living. Those aspects can obviously be named with the words “purpose” and “value,” and the word “signification” can name that which is expressed by words. The verb “to signify” can also serve in place of “to mean” in technical contexts.

In an extremely broad signification of the word “observation,” there can be observation of significations. Such observation is what we rely on when we grasp not only the same signification in various real carriers, but also when we recognize homonyms, which is where the same sound is used to express different significations. Once we experience (again in an extremely broad signification) a signification, we can ask what kind of object it is (cf. Figure 5.1). Does it have spatial relations with its carrier or with anything else? Does it have temporal relations? Is it causally related with any other objects? If these questions are answered in the negative, then a signification is not a physical object and it is also not an intensive process. It is not a real object; it is an ideal object.


There can be and usually are relations among significations. These are of interest to logicians and kindred formal scientists, grammarians included. Some of these relations are “implication,” “disjunction,” “equivalence,” and also “addition,” “multiplication,” and “equation.” Significations are not the only kind of ideal objects; “eide” will be discussed in the next chapter. The error of denying that there are significations is “nominalism” and, in effect, turns linguistic experiencing into a type of indicational experiencing with words and sentences becoming merely sensuously perceivable configurations indicating things.

While enough has probably been expressed in words, a diagram, which is itself a type of linguistic expression, will not hurt (see Figure 5.4). In this figure, the infrastratum is complex, and thus the infrastratum can be analyzed into substrata both with respect to the intensive process

components and to their objects. Perceiving the vehicle and the thinking of the signification together make up the infrastratum of linguistic experiencing as a whole; it is the basis of this

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(Figure 5.4)



intentiveness to expressions, to texts and/or speeches, that we experience what the expressions “refer to,” or “signify.” “To signify” is a species of “to represent.” (Recall that the other species are “to depict” and “to indicate.”) As with the other two species of indirect experiencing, the object linguistically represented can be anything, including impossible things—e.g., spherical cubes, which is what the expression, “spherical cubes,” signifies.

Five additional points can be made about indirect experiencing in general. (1) Relatively pure cases of the three species have been emphasized above. But there are mixed cases. In television, for example, that which is literally heard and seen includes representations that are mixed. Some of these are pictorial, including not only visible but also audible depictions, with both the sound and the sight occurring in the box that is a short distance from our bodies. What we see and hear in this piece of equipment represents people and other objects, be they serious or fictive, that are in some other place and time.

But in addition, a considerable part of video representation is linguistic and takes written as well as spoken form. There are also indications of many sorts, from the open window with the

curtains flying depicting that the suspect has escaped, to matters of visage, gait, etc., whereby actors in their actions depict the moods, etc., of the characters portrayed. For example, when we behold Hamlet played in a film, the audio-visual representation represents the actor's body, which represents his psyche, the indecisiveness of the Danish prince included. And what does music indicate in films?

(2) There are unmixed and mixed compoundings of representations. Thus one can talk about a picture of an indication or write about words that are about words. When there is just one representation, we can speak of the first degree of indirect experiencing; when there are two, we can speak of second-degree indirect experiencing; and so on. In Figure 5.5 there are nine cells for second-degree representations of nine sorts, three of which are unmixed.

(Figure 5.5)

	indications	depictions	expressions
indications			
depictions			
expressions			

(3) The foregoing analysis of indirect experiencing, just like that of direct experiencing, has been produced through reflective observation and is to be comprehended, examined, corrected, and refined through the same approach. The student ought not to forget, however, that in unproblematic indirect experiencing that which is focused on originally is the object of the founded superstratum, i.e., the represented object, the representatum; no cognizance is originally taken of *how* the represented object is a represented object. Indirect experiencing itself is thus originally unreflective, and that which reflection can disclose is originally overlooked. In other

words, represented objects are intended to just as presented objects are, and then they can be reflectively analyzed and described.

(4) The representation and the representatum can both be serious or fictive or one can be serious and the other fictive. In the case of the fictive linguistic experiencing, the vehicles can be fictively perceived through feigning either spoken or written (or, presumably, tangible) objects, which can be feigned as expressed by us or by others and as addressed to us, to others, or both. Then again, we can feign a national flag and have an indicational experiencing of the country for which it stands.

(5) Another expression to be mentioned because the position to which it refers occurs so frequently in late 20th century Western thought is “lingualism,” which occurs in relatively moderate and extreme forms. The moderate forms involve the belief that all representations involve significations and vehicles, i.e., that all representations are expressions, and that all indirect experiencing thus includes thinking or interpretation. The above analysis shows, however, that this is true only for linguistic experiencing and not for the other two sorts of indirect experiencing or for the four sorts of direct experiencing.

In the extreme form, lingualism involves the belief that direct experiencing—i.e., perceiving, remembering, expecting, and the experiencing of ideal objects—is of the same structure as linguistically representational experiencing. In that case, to see a tree is to read it! Again, the foregoing analysis makes it clear that this is not the case. Direct experiencing is not necessarily “infected with” thinking, although it can, on occasion, be “accompanied by” and even “affected by” thinking. Thorough and careful reflective observation and analysis of intentiveness shows that both forms of lingualism are as mistaken as representationalism and, for that matter, as physicalism and scientism are.

Exercises

1. For some reason, many thinkers find physicalism attractive. What is it? What is the case made against it here? How is this case phenomenological?
2. What is representationalism? Why is it attractive? What is the phenomenological case against it offered here?
3. What is lingualism, what are its forms, and what is the case against it?
4. Describe particular cases of intensive processes and objects as intended to that you are familiar with and that fit the nine cells in Figure 5.5.
5. With reference to this chapter (and the reflectively observable matters themselves!), what are (a) ideal objects and (b) psychic objects, i.e., intensive processes, and how are they similar as well as different?
6. Construct a nine-celled chart in which perception, recollection, and expectation are cross-classified with expectation, perception, and recollection, and then describe cases familiar to you that fit each cell, e.g., a recollection of an expectation.
7. Construct another chart of nine cells, this time cross-classifying the three species of direct experiencing with the three species of indirect experiencing, and supply nine bi-determinate cases of intensiveness and objects as they present themselves.
8. A depiction can be created that precisely resembles nothing existent. Describe the depicted object in such a case.
9. Something has been said above about how an expression signifies its significandum. Can the signification carrier indicate both objects and intensive processes at the same time? Provide three cases.

10. Distinctions were made between the verbal and lexical expressing and comprehending of expressions. After locating and naming these in a four-celled grid, consider what combinations are possible where the signification is identical.

11. Can a cause indicate its effect and vice versa? How might such an indicating arise for us?

12. According to this text, what, precisely, is nature (cf. Chapter 1)?

13. How is a photograph (a) like and (b) unlike a mirror image?

14. What might motivate us to believe that there is a representation between our gaze and the stars we gaze at?

15. Can cultural objects be represented? Can representations be cultural objects? Would examples support your answer?

16. What are three other important questions you believe ought to have been asked about the contents of this chapter?

Chapter 6

Analyzing

It should now be quite clear that phenomenology is not an approach in which we gape at things and then say whatever comes to mind. Rather, the phenomenologist employs various types of analysis that are performed on the data that her descriptive accounts are about. Indeed, these accounts are often called “analyses” precisely because of the work of analysis that they required for producing and verifying them. The foregoing chapters have shown that such analyses are not personally impressionistic manifestations, but rather the results of dispassionate efforts to produce knowledge that can later be examined, confirmed, corrected, and extended by the same investigator as well as by others.

Prominent in the foregoing chapters is a type of analysis that can be called “classificatory” or “taxonomic.” Analysis of this type seeks to bring out relations of similarity and difference in data observed, to make distinctions, and then to produce classifications and cross-classifications of various degrees of complexity that are often usefully summarized with charts. These classifications are based on distinctions and also on subsumptions in which narrower concepts are recognized to fall under broader ones. Through this approach, experiencing and its three species and six subspecies; positionality in its three types and three modalities in each; operation, habitual/traditional, and automatic intensive processes; fictive and serious; encountering, objects as encountered, and I’s; intrinsic and extrinsic uses, values, and, perhaps, belief characters that are each in turn positive, negative, and neutral; and some other things as well, have all been distinguished, related, and classified.

These classifications are not blindly constructed or speculatively hypothesized; they are based on observation of phenomena. Apt concrete examples are of great value for such analysis,

and also help to establish clear terminology. Descriptions (and therefore explanations) presuppose taxonomic concepts and expressions. Finally, one can, merely on the basis of classificatory analysis, oppose a number of erroneous tendencies in research, such as physicalism, representationalism, and lingualism, as has also been shown. Taxonomic analysis is employed in many disciplines; when the resulting accounts are produced and can be examined, confirmed, corrected, and extended through reflective observation, they are phenomenological.

The present chapter will say little more about taxonomic analysis. Instead, it will focus on three other types of analysis, which are called “intentional analysis,” “motivational analysis,” and “eidetic analysis.” As usual, examples have been chosen that are trivial enough in themselves that they will not distract the student from what the examples are exemplifying. Because each topic treated here is a type of analysis, they are grouped together to make a chapter, but the three sections can be comprehended separately. The exercises can also be of three sorts.

Section 1.—**Intentional Analysis**

“Intentional analysis” is Husserl’s name for a procedure that can be employed as a part of the reflective approach. It is so named because it is guided by the way intensitive processes or encounterings are intensitive. The emphasis in the present exposition has been on various species of experiencing and positing as intensitive to objects that are not only, when concretely considered, cultural objects, but also outwardly transcendent of individual and collective streams of intentiveness. This emphasis will be joined here with the additional consideration of how intensitive processes are intensitive to one another within streams, i.e., immanently, which has been touched on in the analysis of reflection as well as that of remembering and expecting and their objects.

There is immanent intentiveness not only within but between individual intensive streams. In the latter respect, individuals within a group of animals (and within and between subgroups) experience, believe in, value, and will one another in positive, negative, and neutral intrinsic and extrinsic ways unilaterally and reciprocally, and on automatic, habitual/traditional, and engaged or operational levels. They can also do so successively, i.e., retrospectively, and prospectively, as well as simultaneously. Thus if a person writes a will, she is volitionally intensive to people who, in the future beyond her death, will be affected by her decisions. Thus again, a historian, an archaeologist, or indeed, any person hearing a legend or seeing ruins will become more or less vaguely aware of and in various ways posit collective intentiveness in the past. And we have considered the case of the parent pleased at the child's delight with a toy, which becomes reciprocal when the child notices the parent's emotional process or feeling.

The same holds within an individual stream and especially in an automatic rather than a habitual or operational way. Each and every intensive process within an intensive stream is always intensive to the processes that come before and after it, and this is so regardless of what else it might be intensive to. In the former respect, we can speak of the intensive process as "retrointensive" and in the latter respect we can speak of it as "prointensive." This intentiveness always takes at least automatic form, but it is also regularly habitual or traditional in humans, and is even occasionally engaged in, e.g., when we engage in reflection in memory. What the earlier and later processes (and, by virtue of their intentiveness, their objects) are retrointended and prointended to "as" is always complex and often subtle, but can be reflectively analyzed.

a.—*Surprise Haircut and the Blind/Intuitive Distinction*

Suppose we are expecting a friend to visit, hear a knock at the door, open it, and encounter her with a dramatically different haircut than we expected. If we then reflect upon our

cultural and social encountering of the friend, we can discern how this somewhat surprised encountering is retrotentive to an expecting of her to look rather like she did the last time we saw her. Our expectation is fulfilled to a large extent, as it would not have been if a stranger was there on our doorstep. To some extent, however, our expectation is also frustrated.

Our surprise is protentive as well. An anticipation immediately begins that some explanation could be heard about the changed hairstyle. Not to get such an explanation or, beyond that, to get a denial that there has been such a change would be even more surprising, but is also protended to and at least believed possible. In addition, anticipations of many other sorts set in, beginning with the one whereby if we leave the room and then return, or even if we meet our friend tomorrow or next week, she will still have her hair in this new cut.

This is a simple analysis to show how there is retrotentiveness and protentiveness within an intentive stream and how, by means of reflective observation that focuses on immanent intentiveness, intentive processes can be analyzed and described in a way that is not merely taxonomic, although it does presuppose some classification. This example of the arriving visitor can be used to add an extremely important distinction to the analysis of experiencing in the previous chapter. Phenomenologists often refer to the distinction as between “empty” and “filled” intentions, but it seems more effective to express it between “blind experiencing” and “sighted” or, better, “intuitive experiencing” (here, of course, using “intuitive” in a technical signification, with none of its everyday connotations implied).

Not all experiencing has its object as it presents itself given, so to speak, in flesh and blood. Much and indeed most of our experiencing is empty or blind. The initial expecting of the friend was blind, as is all expecting when it is serious, i.e., not an expectational feigning—which is, curiously, a fictive experiencing of the expected “as if” it were perceived or remembered.

When we open the door, the blind expecting is replaced by an experiencing that is intuitive. We perceive our friend in the emphatic signification of the verb “to perceive.” For real objects, perceiving is the most original form of intuiting. Recollective intuition is derivative but often useful. We can also blindly grope into the past until we “see” what we were trying to remember. In that case, when we remember clearly, the object remembered may not be as we blindly expected it would be, just as the person at the door might not be the friend whom we expected, rather than her with either the same or a different haircut. Then there is frustration rather than fulfillment, or a combination of frustration in some respects and fulfillment in others.

In support of the suggestion just made that “most” of our experiencing is blind—which cannot actually be proven quantitatively, because intensive processes cannot be counted—the student may consider indirect experiencing of the three species described in the previous chapter. It is plainly possible to compare an object as indicated with it itself as perceived, e.g., we see whether the colleague is in her office as the light under her door indicates. Similarly, when there is a pictorial experiencing of a serious object that is still actual—i.e., it is not a depiction of a fictitious or historical object—we can judge its likeness to its object, if this object is available to us for perception. In these cases, we can go on reflectively to observe how the object is blindly intended to in the superstrata of the indirect indicational and pictorial experiencings in contrast with the intuitedness of it in direct experiencing. It needs to be clearly recognized that the founded object of indirect experiencing, i.e., the representatum, is itself blindly intended to in that experiencing. The depicted person, for example, ought not to be considered to be perceived, although the photograph in one’s hand is perceived, and the fact that we regularly feign and also believe in the represented object in indirect experiencing does not signify that the superstratum of that experiencing is not blind.

The situation of linguistically representative experiencing is especially important for knowledge. The vast bulk of propositions or knowledge claims, as they are also sometimes called—signify, refer to, or are about objects that are blindly experienced at the time. But one can attempt to make many such objects intuited, to “see” them; if they then present themselves in person, intuiting them is the foundation and justification for believing in them and for the knowledge claim being accepted as true. This process is called “verification.” The student has been called upon to perform it on practically every page of this text. It is something she has done before she began refining her phenomenological skills, but perhaps she now understands better what she has been doing in this respect.

The emphasis in this text may seem to have been upon intuited objects, immanent as well as transcendent, and even on their patent determinations. Such an emphasis might have had value here because intuited objects are more readily observed and hence more suitable for learners to practice on. No doubt, however, the student frequently did not take the trouble actually to perceive cases seriously (e.g., the encountering of the meal analyzed in Chapter 1) but rather merely feigned them. Fictive objects are superior to the blindly intended to when the interest is in knowledge of what is possible. Some of the cognitive value of feigning will become clearer in Section 3 below.

b.—*Blank Walls and Continuous Life*

While taxonomic analysis could lead one to believe, erroneously, that intensive processes are separate and distinct from one another, intentional analysis shows how they are necessarily interrelated within each intensive stream and can be related between groups, between subgroups, and between individual group members. In the latter respect—namely, the intensiveness between individuals within a group—the reader might reflect upon how much of her life presents itself to


her as fulfilling or frustrating the expectations of others such as parents, children, spouses, friends, and enemies, and what, if anything, she might be without those expectations from others. The question then is whether an individual is independent of society and history any more than her body is independent of physical nature.

It ought not to be difficult to see that entire lives are immanently unified by the retrotentiveness and protentiveness of the processes making them up. But this remark must be supplemented in several respects. (1) Retro- and protending can be mediated as well as immediate, and thus each process at least vaguely retrotends and protends all that has gone before and all that is yet to come. (2) It is certainly the case that there is vast indefiniteness regarding the past as well as the future of immanent intentiveness. There is nevertheless always ultimately at least something that went before and something or other that will come later. (3) Intentive processes make up intentive streams (which extend at least from birth to death) by virtue of protentiveness and retrotentiveness—and indeed, do so to such an extent that it is nothing like a putting together of previously independent parts; they are always already mutually interlaced, and the problem for reflective analysis is to differentiate them. In other words, reflection does not disclose a sequence of separate and externally linked events, but an internally interrelated flow that presents itself, prior to analysis, as rather continuous. The continuity as well as the temporality, its flowing character, makes the “stream” metaphor apt. However, the differentiation of processes within this stream is somewhat arbitrary, perhaps more like differentiating areas within a visually appearing, uniformly colored, flat surface, e.g., a blank wall. Let us follow this comparison further.

We can “mentally” separate the visually perceived blank wall into thirds first horizontally and second vertically, and then fairly precisely differentiate the central ninth of the surface (See

Figure 6.1). No marks are made on the wall, and the areas are not demarcated exactly, but we can still get approximately the central ninth. Analogously, in reflectively observing the stretch of the intensive stream that involves looking at and analyzing the surface in the wall was just sketched, we can distinguish the “temporally” first phase, the middle phase, and the last phase of it. This stretch of immanence as analyzed is no more purely homogeneous than the wall is, for the top and bottom and the two sides of the wall are around the outside, as the central ninth is not, and

(Figure 6.1)



the first temporal phase begins at the start and the last phase stops at the end of the whole operation of analyzing the wall into arbitrary parts, while the temporally middle phase does neither. In both cases, there is subtle structuration. Moreover, in contrast with the seen wall, which itself changes so slowly that it seems not to change at all, the immanent stream manifestly flows away constantly. And if we continue to focus on the same intensive process, our reflecting in perception quickly gives way to a reflecting in memory as that intensive process's perceivedness is replaced by recollectedness.

But that which is reflected upon here is intensive, and noticing that which is intended to is also often useful in differentiating intensive processes. Thus the start of the whole operation of looking at the wall is fairly clearly differentiable from what went on previously, which might

have been listening to music or looking out the window. The same can be said about the end of the operation, when we leave off wall-regarding and recommence, perhaps, looking out the window. In such situations, we can more easily differentiate intensive processes when their objects are different. Nevertheless, there is no sharp cutoff point between intensive processes within an intensive stream; there are no units and thus no possibility of exact counting or other quantitative treatment. The stream of intensiveness cannot be reduced to a number of bucketsful as a stream of water can be.

Let us now reflect on the entire process of looking at the wall and differentiating the central ninth from the rest of the wall. This operation might have three stages (see Figure 6.1 again). There is (1) the stage when we divided the wall into top, middle, and bottom thirds; (2) the stage when we divided it into the left, middle, and right thirds; and (3) the stage in which the center ninth came to stand out from the rest of the surface. Here we could not only reflectively differentiate three stages to the intensive operation, but might even differentiate some substages within those stages of the whole looking whose object is the wall—an event that in its turn is a rather brief part of our whole intensive streams flowing from birth to death. This is done by reflectively focusing on what the three stages (and substages) are each outwardly intensive to.

Turning reflectively from the intensive process as intensive to the wall, which we have just analyzed, to its object as it presents itself, we can reflect on the intended object as encountered and observe that it is the same wall that appears subtly differently in at least three phases or stages. Returning reflectively to the intensive process once more, we can go further and observe, on the one hand, that each of the three stages “protends” the subsequent and “retrotends” the previous phases, including the phases before and after the three-stage wall

regarding, and, on the other hand, the same object—namely, the wall—is continually intended to while our analytic efforts alter how it presents itself to us.

The above comparison was made to show that the intensive stream can be relatively homogeneous like a wall can be, that both can be somewhat artificially divided into parts, and that parts of the stream can be differentiated from one another in terms of the objects as intended to in them as well as in terms of their place in the temporal sequence. It is often easier, however, to differentiate phases within the stream, i.e., intensive processes or encounterings according to their inner compositions. For example, one of them may be predominantly valuational and another predominantly volitional or, again, one is predominantly perceptual and another is predominantly expectational or recollectional, and so on. As mentioned earlier, it is on this basis that concrete intensive processes are not only differentiated from one another, but also called, according to what predominates within them, valuings, willings, believings, perceivings, expectings, and rememberings. This naming involves some idealization. It is often difficult to observe precisely when an expecting gives way to a perceiving or a valuing gives way to a willing. There is a great deal in the way of transitions that is obscured by our naming of what might seem to be distinct processes.

c.—Shall We Shut the Door?


The forgoing analysis concerned our own visual experiencing of a part (the surface) of either a physical object or of a cultural object (which is what the wall is—namely—something that keeps something or certain things in and/or out of a place). If we were now to analyze cases where reflection on others rather than self-observation was used; where the object focally intended to in the stream thus reflectively observed was also animate; and where the stream is collective and nonhuman, then the range of intentional analysis just illustrated could be better

appreciated. Another tack, however, will now be taken, using self-observation on human cultural intentiveness and introducing yet more terminology. Suppose that the readers and author are students and teacher in a classroom with the door open for better ventilation. Some other students slowly pass by in a boisterous way and distract us momentarily. By and by, the same or another group comes by talking and laughing, but this time lingers in the hall near the open door.

If we reflect on our current intentiveness to the door, we can observe that we not only see that the door is open, but also that we (or at least the teacher as the one in charge) have been keeping or at least leaving it open. In the first respect, we reflectively observe a perceiving of the door that is primarily visual. This is what can be said to be “actualized” in the way of experiencing. This actualized experiencing of something outwardly transcendent is, however, immanently intente to other experiencings that are “inactual;” to begin with, they are either previously actualized or not previously actualized, but in either case they are actualizable in the future. Either a previously actualized experiencing or a not actualized experiencing, or both of these, could include “predominantly auditory” perceivings (remembered or feigned, respectively) of the door creaking and clicking, or slamming open against the door stop or shut against the door frame, or being knocked on or bumped into, and so on; “predominantly tactual” perceivings (again, remembered or feigned) in which for some reason we were not so much seeing or hearing (including hearing the silence of the door) as touching (pressing) it (as when, for example, we hold it open with one shoulder while conversing with somebody); or even, in principle, “predominantly olfactory” or “predominantly gustatory” perceivings for which the smell or taste of the door is prominent (although it is not clear whether doors have—for humans, in contrast to, say, dogs—as distinctive a smell and taste as do, e.g., oranges).

Reflecting on the door-seeing, we can experience not only future actualizable successors to the now actualized encountering that is protentive to these future actualizations, but also various previously actualizable but not actualized perceivings, as well as previously actualized perceivings retrotended to by the currently actualized encountering. Figure 6.2 sorts and names these variations in the status of the intentive processes immanently intended to in our reflection. But there is still more to cultural intentiveness than the experiencing components, which have just been emphasized.

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 (Figure 6.2)



In the second respect, were we to pause and reflect theoretically and to consider more than experiencing, we could observe not only that we had been keeping or at least leaving the door open for the purpose of having better circulation of air, but also that the thus actualized volitional component or “willing” of the encountering is immanently intentive to past actualized and past inactual volitional components in which we could have closed the door, but instead left it open—i.e., the current willing is immanently intentive to the choice that was made. Along with that willing component, we can discern the “evaluational preferring” of the door open and the extrinsic value it has with respect to intrinsically valued fresh air, as well as the foundation for this evaluating, i.e., believing in the open door as conducive to the circulation of air. And we find the volitional process component to be blindly or fictively protentive to future inactual but

actualizable processes in which we might (a) continue as we have in hopes that the distracting students will move away, (b) seek to persuade them to leave, (c) shut the door, or (d) some combination of these possible actions.

The past actualized and the past inactual and, now, inactualizable intensitive processes and the future inactual but actualizable intensitive process—both of which are in the background, so to speak, of the actualized process reflected upon—can be made clearer through “feigning.” Thus we can feign what we might have done even if we did not do it, just as we can feign what we might do in the future. Such feigning will help our intentional analysis reach all or at least most of the relevant aspects of the intensitive process we are reflecting on. There is much more to these than merely that which is actualized in the way of experiencing and positing.

Turning our reflective gaze again to the object as it presents itself, it is clear that it can never present itself “patently” at one time in all the ways that are possible for it, but only in the way correlated with what is currently actualized in the intensitive process, e.g., as predominantly seen and left open or predominantly touched during the action of shutting it. Nevertheless, at the same time that the door presents itself in one patent way, it also presents itself latently, i.e., as able to present itself patently in other ways. Thus the predominantly seen door is seen as actualizably audible, tangible, etc., under specifiable circumstances; similarly, the door is volitionally intended to as closeable in future.

d.—*Lump of Stuff Again*

While a door and a wall, classroom, hall, students, etc., are cultural objects, we can abstract from the cultural characteristics of objects as they are encountered and correlatively abstract from the positional components within the encountering, so that what remains is and have a predominantly visual intensitive to a lump of stuff of one sort or another. Reflecting on

such a case, we can observe that what is actualized is the seeing of the lump from or through a given aspect or side, the side facing our body. This experiencing is intensitive to the lump as a whole, although much of this whole as it presents itself to us may be rather vague (E.g., is it solid or not?). Retrotended to in this actualized phase are earlier phases of the intensitive stream that were or were not actualized intendings to the same lump of stuff. To simplify this case further, let us suppose that this is the first time we laid eyes on the lump and that we were not looking for it. But it was not a total surprise to see it, for seeing something that is at least visible when we come to a new place or look in a different direction is always expected.

At least as interesting is what the current seeing phase is protended to. For one thing, there is the future inactuality that might be actualized of continuing to see the lump just as we are seeing it now, i.e., just more ongoing seeing from this angle, at this distance, in this illumination, etc. Second, there is quite a variety of ways in which the seeing might change in accordance with changes in the distance and angle of vision and the illumination of the object as we come closer to it or withdraw further from it, move about it or watch it rotate before us, break it open and look inside, etc. There are a great many actualizable inactualities protended to as different from the now actualized intensitive. Third, seeing the lump of stuff could simply cease because the object was destroyed, because something came between our eyes and it, because we turned our head, because we disengaged from perceiving and engaged in remembering something in the past, and so on. In this last case, automatic and habitual seeing might well continue, but the actualized seeing would not continue as an operation, i.e., as a seeing engaged in.

To what has been said about these three sorts of actualizable futures subsequent to the current, engaged-in actualized seeing, it may be added that all future intensitive to the lump or, indeed, to anything else, is protended to as retrotentive to what has and will have gone on before

it. Thus if we were first seeing the lump from afar and were later to see it from nearby, the two phases would combine into a whole synthesis that might simply be called “looking more closely at the lump.” An object can present itself in a vast multitude of ways that can be disclosed not only by actually exploring the object, but also through reflecting on the earlier and the later actualized and inactual intensitive processes retrotended and protended to in the current phase. The intensively interrelated phases form what phenomenologists call an “intentional” or “intensive” synthesis or just “synthesis.” The object is, for all the different ways in which it presents itself, the same object for this intensive synthesis.

How intensive syntheses work may become clearer if we consider a case where the lump ceases to appear and then is actually perceived again. Suppose we observe it for a while one day, go home, pay it no mind while we are away, come back, and see it again. When we return, we might say, “There it is again,” but whether or not any linguistic representation occurs, we perceive the same object a second time. Why is today’s lump not one thing and yesterday’s lump another? In one word, the answer to this question is “synthesis,” but one word is not sufficient. Through intentional analysis we can reflectively discern what yesterday’s seeing was protentive to with regard to the possibility of seeing the same object again in the future and in today’s seeing we can discern the retrotentiveness to the earlier seeing whose protentiveness it fulfills.

The difference between such a synthesis and one in which the object is continually seen, as when we stare at it, is the gap in time during which we were away. Immanent intentiveness bridges that gap, so that the same object appears again. Plainly, however, the object as it is seen later must be highly similar with itself as it appeared earlier, although some change can occur, which the example above of the friend with the new haircut already showed.

Between interrupted and uninterrupted “identifying synthesis,” as it may specifically be called, there occurs simultaneously a “differentiating synthesis” whereby the lump of stuff is differentiated from other objects it presents itself with. Hence it would be the same as itself and different from everything else that was encountered not only if it moved about while we perceive it, but also if we saw it again on a later occasion in a different setting, as was the case, again, of the friend at the door with whom we were familiar from before.

There are many types of intensive synthesis. Just to mention two more, there is a “unifying synthesis” in which an object is intended to as unitary (which is not the same as identical, for a group can be a unit as well as being the same group today as yesterday). Then again, we are already familiar with “verificational synthesis” in which that which was blindly represented linguistically comes to be intuited; a synthesis is also involved when a proposition is found to be false. Synthesis occurs constantly in the automatic, habitual/traditional, and engaged-in strata of intensiveness. A full account would require several volumes much larger than this little text. Already, however, the student may wonder whether an intentional analysis can be made of these very procedures of taxonomic analysis, intentional analysis, and motivational and eidetic analysis (yet to be discussed). And the answer is yes: they can be analyzed because analytic experiencing is itself synthetic.

Section 2.—**Motivational Analysis**

The following sketch of an account of “motivational analysis” has been prepared for in Chapter 2 when explanations were contrasted with descriptions. It is most easily illustrated with humans, where its importance for the cultural sciences is enormous, but it would clearly hold for non-human intensiveness in many if not all species.

Motivational analysis produces “explanations,” which are accounts in which it is asserted “why” something happens. In explanation the factor or explanans is called a “motive” when it is an intensitive process that is used to explain other intensitive processes. Motives are of two sorts: those that occur earlier in the stream than the encountering that is explained by them (the explanandum), which are called “causes”; and those that occur later if they occur at all (i.e., they may never be actualized, which does not preclude their being protended to), which are called “purposes,” “ends,” “aims,” or “goals.” Motivational analysis is thus either “aitiological” or “teleological” depending on whether it is concerned with causes or purposes. Given the way in which intentiveness is unified via protentiveness and retrotentiveness, it ought to come as no surprise to the student that causes and purposes are, as motives, often related within and between intensitive streams. Thus, for example, the intentiveness to purposes can in turn be a causal motive for us, and conversely, our present intensitive processes can be explained in terms of intensitive processes in our pasts that volitionally posit ends and means, whether fulfilled or not.

We can reflectively observe purposive processes directly or indirectly, in ourselves and in others individually and in our own group or in another group collectively. These are predominantly volitional processes, and the cultural objects they are intensitive to, i.e., the means as well as the ends, are in their futures. We can ask fellow humans what their purposes are; should we suspect divergence between their words and deeds due to error, mendacity, or self-deception, all of which can be collective as well as individual, we can wait to see how satisfied they are with the outcomes. As for ourselves, we can readily observe reflectively the purposes that are protended to in our own individual streams, and thereby we can reliably answer questions about what we ourselves are trying to do.

On the assumption that enough has just been said to guide the student to a closer analysis of the motives called purposes, of how means would relate to them, of how propositions about what the purposes are (or have been) can be verified, etc., we can now turn to motives of the causal sort. Due, perhaps, to anti-physicalism, there may be some reluctance among phenomenologists to use the term “causes” for intensive processes that are in the past of the process to be explained by them. If there were a convenient alternative available, it could be used. Sometimes calling them “motives” and letting the context or the qualifier “aitiological” distinguish them from teleological purposes will help defeat the effect of thinking that only physical objects can be causally related.

An example of reflecting on how to learn to use a throwing stick or “atlatl,” as the Aztec called them, will help clarify what a causal motive is. All of us have seen at least film portrayals of people throwing spears, and many of us have as children tried to use sticks, or perhaps broom handles as spears, i.e., thrown them at targets of one sort or another. An atlatl is a device used to throw a spear: it is a shaft with a hook at one end, while the butt of the spear has a hole into which the hook is inserted. One holds the atlatl or spear thrower and spear in a parallel way with the spear on top, using one’s first finger and thumb to keep them together, and then one flings the spear, releasing the spear from one’s fingers at the crucial moment. The atlatl extends the arm and thus enables the application of strength for a longer period of time in order to accelerate the spear to a greater speed, throwing distance, and impact on the target. The spear thrower was eventually replaced in most societies by the bow and arrow. But using an atlatl requires more skill than using a bow and arrow or throwing a spear without an atlatl. How is this skill acquired?

If we have observed a person seeking to learn to throw spears using a spear thrower, we could explain the actions teleologically, i.e., in terms of her purposes. How might an atlatl

learner become more proficient? We can observe our subject watching other people use the throwing stick, studying how the atlatl and spear fit together, figuring out where and how to place the throwing hand and fingers, and going through the complex motion slowly and carefully. Then we can reflect on how she practices, including how she identifies and corrects errors in holding, aiming, and throwing. And we can observe whether different learning techniques lead to changes for the better or worse, or to no change in the skill at all. Thus we can use reflection on others to recognize what “causes” the skill to develop and, ultimately, makes our observee a skillful atlatl user.

Besides its novelty for most readers, the example of skill acquisition with the throwing stick has been selected for several reasons. For one, there is little place for speech in it. It is true that one could be told how to do it orally, or even through instructions printed in a book, and could be coached verbally by others; it is also true that spoken or subvocal expressions by the learner may help the learning process along. But these are not major factors and, in any case, the substance of the learning process lies in holding and moving the atlatl and spear with hand, arm, shoulder, and indeed the entire body. For another, we can readily reflect upon this process in others. And just in case one cannot look out the window and observe someone learning to use the atlatl, it is, third, readily feigned.

But it is a case involving humans, the person in question is learning deliberately; and she is an individual. A case contrasting with this in these three respects would be of a nonhuman group that is caused to behave differently and against its intentions. Could not a flock of sheep intent on grazing be motivated to fear and flee classical music if we played it to them along with their being chased by a ferocious bear a few times? Would not the new purpose of getting away from the bear be among the things aitiologically explained by causal motives in this case?

Motivational analysis is thus possible and interesting. Indeed, the student was probably more familiar with and interested in it originally than in the taxonomic analysis that it presupposes and that has therefore dominated most of this text. When analysis of this sort is employed, intensive processes are observed in terms of the roles they play as purposes and causes in individual and collective and human and non-human intensive streams. In contrast, physicalism—which is the denial of intentiveness and the cultural character of objects—would eliminate ends and means and also valuing and willing, and allow merely aitiological explanation of physical objects by other physical objects, e.g., a reddening of the cheeks caused by capillary dilation allowing increased blood flow.

Section 3.—**Eidetic Analysis**

An account of eidetic analysis has not been provided earlier because, unlike reflective observation, it is something that the student not only already does spontaneously, but also has been trained in at least tacitly during prior schooling—which is not to say, however, that it has previously been analyzed for her. Nevertheless, eidetic analysis cannot be left undiscussed in even the briefest account of phenomenological method, particularly since it has been relied on in practically all of the foregoing exposition and it would be irresponsible were one to fail to describe so significant a tool in the investigator's kit.

Eidetic analysis involves a differentiation between “particular fact” and “universal essence” or “eidos” (“eide” is the plural, “eidetic” the adjective). When it was asserted earlier that all evaluating is positive, negative, or neutral, this was not a claim about a few predominantly evaluative encounterings in one person's stream during a particular afternoon. To be sure, one could report being happy, sad, or apathetic late in a given day, but this would be an empirical or, preferably, a “factual” claim. The universal or “eidetic” claim is that all intensive

processes of valuing that not only are and have been, but also could or can be, anywhere, anytime, and for anyone are either positive, negative, or neutral. Science as well as philosophy is quite interested in such claims. And we make them very often in everyday life as well.

While we may not be conscious of it, we “eideate” a great deal, which is not to imply that we do so correctly or that all of our eidetic claims are true, for much of the time we eideate in a sloppy way. Indeed, the great difficulty in the factual parts of science, i.e., those concerned with what actually is or has been, is learning to describe just what we actually observe. Not all sciences include empirical or factual parts. Some are purely eidetic, e.g., logic and mathematics. Universal truths are often preferred to particular ones.

To eideate is to become aware of an *eidos* or, typically, a set of *eide*. It is done sloppily when we do not clearly and distinctly experience the *eide* directly, which can happen as easily as it does with real objects. And the believing in the *eide* that the eidetic experiencing might justify varies in its justification with the quality of that experiencing. If it is the case that we usually eideate sloppily, how can we do so more reliably? There are two techniques that help improve eideation. One is “eidetic refraining” and the other is “fictive variation.” Let us try to answer the question, “What is a chair?” As usual, a trivial example will distract us minimally. The question of what a chair is, however, is not a question about the determinations of the particular chair that is placed there across the room from us as we read these lines, which is a factual or “*de facto*” chair. It is rather a question of what anything that is a chair is, i.e., the properties and relations such that, something is a chair if and only if something has these determinations.

There are chairs in the cultural world of our society. We are familiar with them. Moreover, we always already have a vague experiencing of the *eidos* chairness or Chair (but we cannot pronounce capital letters) of which the chairs we encounter are “instances” or, better,

“examples.” For every eidos (the plural, eide, is pronounced “eye-day”), at least fictive examples can be produced. A given particular object can exemplify many eide. For example, a chair can, by virtue of its particular color, exemplify Brown or brownness or, if it is multi-colored, it exemplifies several colors and also a pattern—say, plaid. Eidetic investigation involves alternately considering eide themselves and examples of eide. The one makes the other more intelligible and the other makes the one clearer. This is why examples are so often used in eidetic disciplines and in this text.

In order to answer the question of what a chair is, which we now comprehend as a question about chairness, we need first of all to alter our believing in any actual chairs we are considering. More precisely put, we need to refrain from believing in them as actual, as facts. Then they become merely possibilities for us. Secondly, we need to feign various other possible chairs. Eidetic procedure is purposive (and hence subject to motivational analysis), the goal being the optimal experiencing of what is essential to a chair and what is not. In the latter respect, few if any would hold that something must be soft in order to be a chair.

We might begin from a “de facto” chair, i.e., one we believe actually (or probably) exists, e.g., the one we are sitting on. We will now provisionally consider it merely a possible chair. Or we could, of course, begin with a feigned chair, again taking it merely as a possible chair. If we feign another chair, we easily notice that the formerly “de facto” chair was not believed in merely as an actuality in its own right, but was believed to exist actually in some place and some time, somewhere and somewhen—i.e., also believed to exist within a nexus of actual relations. But the spatial and temporal relations (and also the causal relation between the chair and the chair maker and her equipment in the chair factory) can also be considered merely possible. The

question of whether, for something to be a chair, it must be in nature or, beyond that, in a cultural world will be considered presently.

When what we are sitting on is considered to be but one possible chair among others, we can more easily grasp that which a serious or fictive example is an example of—namely, chairness. But our experiencing of this *eidos* is probably still vague. To make the eidetic object, the *eidos* itself, clearer and more distinct, we can now engage in “fictive variation.” What we call “thinking something over” often consists of such fictive variation. Fictive variation leads to changes in a particular possible object that we are feigning. For example, we can readily feign the chair to be green rather than brown. It seems that with regard to color, what we wish to feign is utterly up to us, that it is free or optional. Not only can we feign the chair green, but we can feign it blue, yellow, pink, plaid, striped, spotted, etc.

Interestingly, in this fictive variation of the color we can come to the recognition that the chair remains a chair no matter what its color is or is changed to. For a chair, the color is then “inessential” or “accidental.” Something does not need to be brown in order to be a chair. It will need to have some color or other, including the allegedly transparent objects we can still see, e.g., those made of glass; this too will be considered later.

Let us now work on shape, beginning with the arms. We can feign a chair with two arms, with one arm (on either side), and with no arms at all. In this respect, we can recognize three subspecies of chair: armless, one-armed, and two-armed, the one-armed being subspecifiable as either left-armed or right-armed. Clearly, however, for something to be a chair it is not necessary that it have any arms at all. Only if armlessness is a type of armedness in the same way as stillness is a type of motion must something have arms to be a chair. Arms are inessential.

Progress is being made in clarifying the eidos of chairness that we were already at least vaguely aware of when we began this inquiry.

What about legs? The “de facto” chair across the room from the present writer at the time of writing has four legs, but it could have only one, or three, or nineteen, or any number, provided only that the legs somehow connected up with the part of the chair called the “seat,” were strong enough to support the weight of a sitter, and did not interfere with the person sitting on the chair. Suppose the chair was suspended from above. If flexible means such as chains or ropes were used, then we might say we were considering a swing, but if rigid means are used, then we can say that it is a chair, as it would also be if it were supported by a piece of steel protruding from the wall behind it. Indeed, if the seat were held above the floor at a suitable height by magnetism or an anti-gravity device thus far only discussed in science fiction stories, it would still be a chair.

What seems essential are (a) that the seat is suspended and (b) that it is suspended somewhat stably. The qualification “somewhat” is needed in the previous sentence because a rocking chair would seem to be a chair while a swing is not, although this comes down to how we decide to use words. The same would go for a wheelchair, which is fairly rigid when it comes to how the body is supported while the chair itself easily moves about, as do other sorts of wheeled chairs; this might invite specification of chairs into mobile and immobile, with subspecifications being possible in both respects. Clearly, we could use the expression “chair” in a broad signification that included species that are still and moving, the former being stable where the seat was concerned while the latter included swings as well as rocking chairs, office chairs that roll, etc. This would not be merely a play with words if these expressions were clarified through experiencing the objects they might be established as signifying. Just which

sound or mark to use to convey a signification is arbitrary or conventional; what matters is whether a matter (in this case the *eidos* or *eide*) is as the signification signifies it.

In case this exercise seems merely arbitrarily deciding how to use some words—which includes, subtly, how others previously arbitrarily decided how to use words in ways that we inherited in learning to speak our native language—another case might be discussed briefly at this point. Suppose we live on an island where three and only three types of trees grow, (1) a tree that is conical in shape with thin leaves called needles that grow all year around; (2) a tree with flat leaves the size of the palm of one’s hand that dry up and drop off each Fall and are replaced in the Spring; and (3) a tree with a long bare trunk and a shallow spread of what might be considered very large leaves called fronds growing only at the very top. But since our people have been marooned on this island for seven generations and have forgotten how to read and write (no books, pens, or paper survived the shipwreck), we now call trees of type #1 “maples,” those of type #2 “palms,” and #3 “pines.”

On the one hand, this illustrates how the expressions used to designate matters are arbitrary and conventional; we could be as comfortable using these three names this way as any other. On the other hand, that the genus Tree has at least three species with the shapes and behaviors described is not up to us. Trees of one sort have one combination of determinations and the others have other ones. This is a matter of observing cases and grasping the universal essences that they exemplify. If we have made an error, it is correctable through further observation. We can indeed make mistakes, and how to use words is indeed conventional. But when we attempt to experience what a word refers to, what we experience is as it is. When confronted with an alleged description, then, we can attempt to experience what is described, and this includes factual descriptions as well as eidetic descriptions.

Returning to the case of chairness, what about the seat? In this respect, if we were to feign an object that was all back (assuming that there can be a back without a seat)—i.e., just a vertical surface against which one can lean one’s back and with nothing to prevent a sitter from sliding to the floor—then we would not be feigning a chair. Having a seat is “essential” for something to be a chair. Indeed, we may call the genus to which seats immediately belong “seats”; seats are sat upon by sitters. That is their use, and the predominance of the use component in them as intended to puts them in the practical species of cultural objects. There remain questions about the size and shape of the seat (questions that will be addressed presently), but it can, within limits, be perforated or solid, hard or soft, and more or less flat and still be a seat. If having a seat is essential, as opposed to specifications of color, arms, and legs, then it can be asked whether having this feature is sufficient for something to be a chair.

Must a chair hold the sitter off the ground, floor, or deck? We can feign an object that merely has a back that the sitter can lean on, and even “arms” that the sitter’s arms could rest on while the sitter sits on the ground, and this would be a seat. But it seems reasonable to reserve the word “chair” for the sort or species of Seat that holds the sitter at least a short distance off the surface on which people walk, in which case what might be called a “back rest” would not be a chair. In the other direction, a chair could be rather high, e.g., on top of a flagpole, and still be a chair.

What about a back, i.e., something for the sitter to lean back against or, equivalently, something that holds her torso erect or at some angle? We can easily feign seats with and without backs, so both are possible. In English, seats without backs are “stools” and “benches,” but there can also be benches with backs. The word “chair” can be reserved for objects that have seats and backs and that only one person typically sits in. In contrast, benches or couches can seat more

than one person simultaneously. This raises the question whether the seats in a theater that form rows with armrests to separate individual places are chairs or not, but not all questions need to be answered here. Another question arises when one thinks of the seat on a horse or a bicycle, which seems best called a saddle and brings out that the typical mode of sitting in or on a chair has the legs in front of the torso of the sitter rather than straddling that which is sat upon. Yet another question arises now, for it is also possible to straddle a chair, to stand on a chair, to lie on several chairs placed side by side, to pile books and papers on a chair, and otherwise to use a chair improperly. Thus one can recognize that what a chair is requires the question of proper use to be addressed, something that would seem relevant for all cultural objects of the practical sort.

What about size? Ignoring doll furniture and prototypes used in the design process, which at least indirectly relate to normal or proper chairs, we can recognize types of chair that are for children and for adults. (This refers to chairs for humans; chairs for animals of other species can be feigned, e.g., for bears or elephants in the circus, but also do not need to be pursued further.) The former are not only smaller in size but often either lower or higher than chairs for adults. “Adult size” relates to the human body parts that contact the chair, but there is still variation whereby there can be high-backed and low-backed chairs.

As something appropriate to the size of the sitter, with a back to lean against as well as a seat that supports the sitter off the walking surface with her legs in front of her torso, a chair needs to be made of material strong and rigid enough for the pressure. Moreover, a chair should also not be so hot or so cold as to hurt a person, although an electric chair and chairs used in torture would seem to be chairs too. Similarly, a chair ought not to smell so bad that sitters are invariably deterred from even using it, nor should it be so sticky that whoever sits on it has considerable difficulty getting up. Feigning such variants may seem far-fetched, but they do

bring out features normally taken for granted. Whether the objects we are concerned with are called “chairs” or “clouds” or have no conventional name yet, the essence of something has now been described. This essence or *eidos* is not something merely thought up hypothetically prior to a search for actual cases, but rather is reached by (a) beginning from a fictive case or a serious case that is transformed into a possibility through neutralizing belief in it so that it presents itself as merely possible, and then (b) proceeding through fictive variations in which a species of experiencing is employed in order to distinguish the essential from the inessential.

And the analysis can go still further. Is an extraterrestrial non-human animal with behavior as well as anatomy not seen on earth that allows one to sit on it and lean back off the ground with one’s legs in front a chair? That is, must a chair be inanimate? Could a plant be grown so that it has the form and function of a chair? The question whether a chair is a naturalistic object or a cultural object has at least been answered. But must a chair be artificial, or could there be a rock formation utterly unshaped by human action that is nevertheless a chair because it naturally has a shape whereby people can sit on it in the proper way and lean back? The student may think of more questions. It seems sufficient, however, to stop here.

The description reached in the above analysis, which can be called “eidetic,” has several interesting features. It is not about this or that or any other particular chair, or even about what is common to a set of particulars, such as a day’s production at the chair factory. It is about any chair whatever and does not depend on any chairs actually existing. If all chairs in the world ceased to exist, there would still be chairness. Moreover, chairness is not the signification of a word, although the word “chairness” does convey a signification. Rather, what “chairness” refers to or signifies is the sort of ideal object that is said to be eidetic. Now it can be mentioned that the classifications developed in taxonomic analysis are eidetic. An “eidetic claim” is about eide

or an eidos, and the claim is true if and only if the eidetic matter referred to is as alleged in the claim.

The student may ponder what it signifies to say that eide are ideal objects, i.e., objects that are not in space, time, and causation, but nevertheless directly experienced in intentive processes or encounterings. Similarly, she might ponder how such ideal objects differ from concepts or significations expressed in words. There is much more to the description of ideal objects than is offered in the present analysis.

For example, the student may have heard of a position discussed in philosophy under the title of “Platonism.” Platonism is the position that ideal objects, especially eide, which do not exist in reality—i.e., not temporal—have a species of existence that is not only independent of anything else, but also more fundamental than everything real. The presently sketched analysis does not support Platonism because a necessary precondition for experiencing eide is an experiencing of serious or fictive particulars, so that the experiencing of eide is stratified like an indirect experiencing, although the particular becomes an example and not a representation, and eidetic experiencing is direct rather than indirect. And perhaps eide are no more independent of intentiveness than anything else is—which is not to say that we create them rather than merely focusing on them in operations or even habitually.

It bears repetition that like any object as encountered with the encountering of it, the eideated and the eideating can themselves be reflectively analyzed further, for the former is an object as it presents itself and the latter is an intentive process. Moreover, eideating can be subject not only to taxonomic, but also to intentional, motivational, and other types of analysis hardly touched upon in this text, because it an intentive process. Contrariwise, except when serious or fictive examples have been considered, the statements in this text are directly eidetic,

while the statements about examples are indirectly eidetic, i.e., for the sake of eideation. As mentioned, eideation is practiced in many spheres and is phenomenological only when used reflectively. Thus the above analysis of chairness is not specifically phenomenological, although the analysis of eideating and chairness as eideated is.

If the student has the sense that eideating simply makes clearer and more distinct something that was previously intended to but vaguely, her impression is correct. And the investigations in this text are of things—i.e., encounterings and objects as encountered—may be recognized as being as familiar as chairs, but have not previously been reflected upon systematically and analyzed, with their properties and relations carefully named—a task that has been central to the purpose of this text.

Exercises

The student has had enough practice responding to questions that she ought now to be able to compose at least a dozen of them, some relating to preparations in earlier chapters and some going beyond anything explicit in this chapter and thus requiring the student to engage in reflective analysis.

Chapter 7

Examining

The aims of phenomenology might be obvious to specialists in philosophy and other cultural disciplines in which there are phenomenological tendencies, but such understanding cannot be assumed in a textbook. To culminate this text it can be shown, at least in general, what reason or justification is. The phenomenology of reason will be sketched or, since “reason” too often connotes merely logic and knowledge today, “justification” and associated expressions will be preferred. Simply put, we have attitudes toward various things and, should the need arise, we can justify or, in other words, give reasons for these. Often the word “opinion” is used in this way, but “attitude” is better because within an attitude there is more that might be justified than its component of believing, and tendencies to restrict “attitude” to belief or opinion can be resisted.

Another word that could have been used in this connection, if it had not already been ruined, is “rationalization.” Since the psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, this word often refers to positions taken up from unconscious motives and then “rationalized” with whatever “reasons” can be thought up afterward. Any attempt at justification is now open to the challenge that it is merely a rationalization, and the real reason is not being given. This implies, however, that there is a genuine reason that can indeed be known in order to denounce the spurious reason. Certainly rationalizations in individuals occur and ideologies, which were analogously denounced by the philosopher Karl Marx, occur in groups. What is needed in general is a way to be sure of genuine as opposed to spurious reasons. More specifically, can the justification of attitudes be done phenomenologically, i.e., through reflective analysis?

Section 1.—**Cultural Identities and Attitudes**

As already indicated above, what may or may not prove to be, or to be able, to be justified are best called “attitudes.” When one reflects, one finds that the stream of intensive processes includes an enormous number of attitudes. Some attitudes are toward the future; some are toward the past; some are toward things in the now; some are cognitive, some are valuational, and some are volitional; some are toward ourselves and some toward others; some are toward groups we belong to and some are toward other groups; some are serious and others fictive; and so on. Upon analysis we find that attitudes in general are patterns of intensive processes or encounterings.

Since we fundamentally live in cultural situations with others, this is a good place to begin inquiry. We humans tend to focus on others who are also humans, and it seems that dogs, for example, tend to focus on other dogs; the same may also hold in other species of non-human animals. In our various species, we are sometimes individuals and sometimes groups in one way or another. That we are individually and collectively others for each other makes the cultural world a social world as well. It is a cultural world because individuals and groups—along with the inanimate things around them, such as clothes, tools, and toys—have values and uses of various sorts in relation to or “for” individuals and groups of almost all sorts (naturalistic scientists, when in their specialized attitudes, are one exception because then they abstract from the cultural characteristics of things). Chimpanzees, for example, also appear to live in rudimentary cultural situations in ways that are learned and even traditional, but humans will be focused on this chapter.

Within a sociocultural world, we humans have what are often called “identities,” although “cultural identities” appears to be a more adequate expression. The question, what are

we? can be asked and answered in many ways. To take a relatively simple but not insignificant type of identity, it can be asked if one is left-handed or right-handed. Perhaps 90% of humans are right-handed; handedness appears to come in degrees, and perfectly ambidextrous people are rare. “Lefties” and “righties,” as they might be called for short, are groups at least in the signification of categories into which individuals can be sorted. Lefties in seem especially quick to notice each other, but there do not seem to be clubs based on being left-handed such as there are for short or bald people.

There has been considerable history of nasty attitudes of righties against lefties, but—at least in wealthy countries—handedness today is at most a very subtle basis for selecting a mate or political candidate; probably hair color is more important in these respects, blondes in the West having, allegedly, more fun. In part for technological reasons, less effort is now made than it once was to teach lefties to write with their right hands; left-handed writing is less messy with ballpoint pens and quick-drying ink. Nevertheless, much equipment, e.g., bolt-action rifles, often work in a way to the disadvantage of lefties, who are quick to recognize it. On the other hand, left-handed baseball pitchers are often considered to have an advantage, although they are often also stereotyped as being quirky or crazy.

Finally, there may well be neurological causes for handedness, for these traits appear early, seem impossible to change through training, and have the same frequency in cultural groups of all sorts. But attitudes toward lefties and righties are learned, whether we notice them in ourselves or one another or not, and, correlatively, people—ourselves included—are valued and willed by us in different ways according to whether they are left handed or right handed. Thus they have “handedness identities.” Because such identities are constituted in habitual or traditional believing, valuing, and willing, they are cultural. The handedness one has is one thing,

how it is routinely believed in, valued, and willed is another thing, i.e., a question of acquired attitudes.

Our handedness is by no means all of what we are, but it is one of the identities that we all have. There are other identities or, better, dimensions of identity besides handedness. These include (a) social class, e.g., lower middle; (b) sexual orientation, e.g., bisexuality; (c) region of origin within a nation, e.g., the South; (d) life-stage, e.g., adolescence; (e) disability status, e.g., deaf; and (f) generation, e.g., American “Baby Boomers” born between World War II and the Vietnam War.

Then again, there is “political” or, better “civic” identity; the latter expression is to be preferred insofar as “political” connotes political parties and partisanship (e.g., conservative, middle of the road, and progressive), which is another type of identity, while “civic” can connote what holds for all members of a body politic such as a nation—e.g., voting laws, taxes, and other obligations such as jury duty. There are narrower provincial and local civic identities as well as national and perhaps international civic identities, e.g., as an “East Asian” or as a “human being,” with human rights declared by the United Nations. Toward national civic identities—e.g., American, Brazilian, Chinese—we find we have attitudes composed of habitual and traditional believings, valuings, and willings. This is not to contend that our civic attitudes are often clear, distinct, or justified, but only to suggest that they exist and hence can be examined.

Gender, ethnicity, and environment will be taken up below, but attitudes toward the other cultural identities just mentioned can be examined similarly. Since environmental identity might not seem immediately plausible, it may be said now that there is encountering of animals (including humans), plants, fungi, etc.; that there can be a variety of attitudes toward pollution, overpopulation, preservation of species and habitat, and conservation of natural resources; and

that we can all be said to have identities by virtue of our attitudes toward the environment, even if (perhaps like our attitudes toward handedness) these attitudes are subtle and unrecognized, not to speak of unjustified or justified.

Besides often going unrecognized, our attitudes are often so deeply established that we do not ask where they come from. A mark of intellectual maturity is, however, the recognition that we have many attitudes, the vast majority of which come from others, e.g., parents, peers, the authors of writings, etc., rather than being established through our own experiencing and being then relatively easy to justify. Three stages seem to occur. First, an attitude somehow becomes an issue. There are many ways in which this happens, and it does not seem easy to reduce them to a few types, although encountering other persons and groups with different attitudes toward the same things is probably the most common beginning. Second, we can reflectively observe and analyze our attitude in order to ascertain its source as well as its components.

Finally, we can consider how, if at all, a given attitude can be justified. The traditional philosophical name for that is, since the philosopher Immanuel Kant, “critique,” but this word and the inelegant verbal form recently made from it—i.e., “critiquing”—have acquired chiefly negative connotations, while positive results are also possible. “Examining” appears to be a better expression, since the verbal form is not a problem and “examined” and “unexamined” have long been used as alternatives to “critical” and “naïve.” Moreover, as students know well, an examination is not simply passed or failed but admits of degrees of performance being recognized. This is important because perfect justification is an ideal. (“Evaluation” is often used to express the same signification, but it is too close to “valuation,” which has already been reserved strictly to signify valuing and values.)

Attitudes can be examined with respect to how they might be justified. When some alleged justifications do not hold up under reflectively analytical scrutiny, they may be rejected as rationalizations, ideologies, or simply errors, and other justifications can be considered. And when justifications cannot be found for an attitude, new and justified or at least better justified attitudes can be developed. The attitudes of others are just as open to examination as one's own attitudes are, and indeed, there appears to be a somewhat unreflective tendency to examine those of others more than one's own. But, for the sake of social harmony, it would seem wiser to examine one's own attitudes first. Of course, we can concoct a spurious rationalization for any attitude, but genuine justification must be ascertained through reflective evidencing, i.e., through "seeing" that which justifies the justified, i.e., the real reason.

As mentioned, what are here called "attitudes" are sometimes called "opinions." This is presumably when the believing component predominates within the attitude. An advantage of speaking of attitudes is that beliefs or opinions can be more strictly called "cognitive attitudes," and we can then speak analogously of valuational and volitional attitudes according to whether the valuing component or the willing component rather than the believing component predominates in the pattern of encounterings that is the attitude. If one can avoid the tendency to think of spatial place in using it, the word "position" can be a useful synonym for "attitude"; it emphasizes the positings over the experiencing component within the concrete intensitive process or encountering of a thing, and this does not seem harmful, although it is nevertheless experiencing in a certain form that ultimately justifies.

It needs to be mentioned that there can be cases in which no justification can be found. For example, there are nations in which driving is done on the right side of the road and where people also tend to walk on the right of sidewalks and staircases. One might think that this is

related to right-handedness, but then one should consider that there are major countries such as Great Britain, India, and Japan in which people tend to walk as well as drive on the left. In this case, the “traveling side” appears arbitrary, conventional, and purely traditional, so that best that one can say is, “We do it this way because we have always done it this way.” There seems to be no deeper justification for the traveling side, although the costs of changing would be so high that they provide a reason for continuing what is traditional. That some positions cannot be justified does not imply that none can be justified.

Finally, it needs to be acknowledged in general that perfect justification is an ideal formed on the basis of recognizing better and worse justifications. And it should also be recognized that this ideal is often approximated, but rarely--if ever--attained. This is because of the inexactness of tentative processes and the components within them. Nevertheless, it is possible and more justifiable to pursue justification than not to do so.

Section 2.—**Towards Examining Some Attitudes**

While this is not the occasion for a thorough examination of any attitude, perhaps a way in which to proceed can be demonstrated. There is considerable variety in our attitudes toward the things involved in gender, ethnicity, and environment, but most of them may be captured with pairs of contrasting types, one group concerned with “supremacy” and the other acknowledging differences but aiming at “equality.” This can be described on the basis of reflective analysis.

Four general questions easily understood on the basis of the previous chapters of this text can open the issues of what a given attitude is, and then more specific questions can be asked. These questions are listed in such a fashion that the first question is at the bottom in Figure 7.1. These questions relate to the four kinds of components found within all concrete encounterings

and, correlatively, in objects as they present themselves or as they are encountered. Answers to these questions will be relevant for describing attitudes because attitudes are patterns of encounterings.

(Figure 7.1)

4. How is one disposed to will or act in this attitude?
 3. What is valued positively or negatively and absolutely or comparatively?
 2. In this attitude, what is the believing and what is believed or believed in?
 1. What types of experiencing and objects as experienced pertain to this attitude?
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It also deserves mention at this point that what have been called “identities” above are correlative to attitudes. Attitudes are traditional for communities and habitual for individuals, which is another way of saying not only that they are deeply learned and thus cultural but also that they can be changed if examination shows their justification to be wanting. To change attitudes and thus individual habits and collective traditions is seldom easy, but it is always possible in principle.

Another general point is pertinent. Our many attitudes are usually inactual. In other words, they are only actualized when we are seriously encountering the pertinent things, and typically only one attitude is actualized at a time. Moreover, not all of the situations in which an attitude arises are readily repeated seriously. We can, however, analyze attitudes reflectively through remembering and feigning, and this is also often easier. We have acquired many attitudes toward objects we have not yet seriously encountered. For example, what is one’s attitude toward stray dogs? Probably one has an attitude even if one has never encountered such a thing. Does one need seriously to encounter a stray dog in order to become aware of one’s

attitude or would remembering or feigning such a thing suffice to make our already-established attitude available for reflective analysis?

Suppose one encounters a gaunt and dirty dog walking about near one's house in a strange way. The experiencing here might be primarily olfactory and valuational because of the smell of such a dog, but probably one would not let a stray dog get close enough to be smelled. In any case, the experiencing in such an encountering is actually indirect inasmuch as we focus on the dog's psyche. What is this other of a different species doing? What might she do? Is she dangerous? Visual perceiving predominates in the infrastratum of such an other-experiencing, but audition might have played this role if we had first perceived someone oddly whining behind us.

When we reflect further on our attitude in such a case, we may find that we immediately believe that such a dog is behaving in a way that is dangerous. She might bite us. She might be rabid. (Such believing may have come from our own past experiencing, but more likely comes from what others have communicated to us.) Furthermore, effects such as bites and disease that we believe that the dog might have on us (or others) we firmly value negatively (and intrinsically); hence we also value the potential cause of them—i.e., the stray dog—negatively (and extrinsically). She is bad because dog bites, disease, and illness are bad. Finally, on this basis, we can find that we are inclined to avoid the dog by retreating into the house, chasing her away, or contacting pertinent authorities, which are types of preventive if not destructive willing.

But also suppose that while one is cautiously retreating from the oddly behaving dog and is about to call the police, a neighbor emerges from a nearby house and joyously welcomes home the pet who had been lost. Then our experiencing focuses on the friendly interaction of neighbor and dog; the believing fades into the past; the valuing component changes from negative to

positive, i.e., we delight in what we see, and we are no longer inclined to intervene in the course of events concerning this dog.

If the reader returns at this point to Figure 7.1, she will recognize that the questions there have just been applied to a particular case and answered. Beyond that, one can reflectively recognize at least motivational relations between what can best be called “components” discernable within an attitude, perhaps most clearly when the attitude changes into or is replaced by a different attitude. We were going to call the police *because* we disvalued the effects of dogs who are rabid, which we believed the dog probably was *because* of seeing (and hearing) the way she behaved and *because* of previous learning about canine behavior.

We may wonder, however, if the “because” just emphasized are merely motives or also introduce “reasons” that successively justify the believing, valuing, and willing involved. What people have told us may be merely a motive for believing that dogs behaving in such a strange fashion are probably rabid. Yet seeing a dog move and whine in an odd way is not merely a motivating factor off in one’s past, but currently also founds believing the dog to be dangerous. When an object is experienced in the way that is optimal for a object of its sort, the experiencing of it is best called “evidencing.” And when the evidencing component in a concrete encountering directly founds as well as motivates (and thereby indirectly founds and motivates valuing and willing), then justification can be spoken of. “Evidencing” is a form that helps us remember that an intensitive process is in question, while “evidence” and also “self-evidence” unfortunately refer in traditional language to objects and objects as they may present themselves, although “evidentness” is better in the latter respect.

The point of this example is that we can reflectively observe, analyze, and describe an inactual attitude of encountering and, correlatively, the inactual but possibly actualized object

feigned as oddly behaving, probably dangerous, bad in more than a merely aesthetic way, and willed against. Even when we are not actually encountering a dog in this manner, we are still disposed or prepared to do so. This usual condition of inactual disposedness is part of what it is to have an attitude.

Let us now take up another example in order to examine the justification of attitudes in general. Suppose that when given the choice of chocolate, strawberry, and vanilla ice cream, we habitually select chocolate. If asked, we can relate this choosing, which is volitional, to our habitual preference for the taste of chocolate, which is valuational and refers in its turn to our gustatory experiencing when ice cream of this flavor is in our mouth. If asked about one's habitual believing, probably one would answer in part that ice cream, regardless of flavor, is edible, and that if various flavors are harmful at all, e.g., fattening, all of them have the same drawback to the same degree. Beyond that, one just likes the taste of chocolate.

Suppose next, however, that the news comes through reasonably reliable sources that chocolate has been scientifically established as a minor but very definite cause of some type of cancer. (This is utterly hypothetical; the present writer has not heard any such thing about chocolate!). On this basis, which is reducible to the evidencing at the foundation of all scientific results even though it is different from our mere tasting, our believing with respect to chocolate ice cream and, on that basis, our valuing and willing would probably change immediately—or at least we would begin the effort to change our attitude. If we trust the authority of scientific medical research, we no longer believe chocolate ice cream to be at worst slightly harmful like all ice cream, but instead believe it to be more harmful than other flavors. The naturalistic-scientific evidencing outweighs and replaces the commonsense one.

Harmful things have extrinsic negative values in relation to intrinsically valuable things, such as health. We disvalue what we believe is conducive to illness. Believing chocolate causes cancer justifies disvaluing it and that justified disvaluing justifies positively choosing another flavor and willing against the continued availability of chocolate. While believings, valuings, and willings in their actual or dispositional forms can be habits and traditions established through various influences (e.g., product advertising), influence or motivation is only part of justification. Also necessary to justification are foundational relations in which the things are founded upon one another in the order enumerated in Figure 7.1. And this can be evidenced in reflective and analytic evidencing, and in that way warranted.

If chocolate did cause cancer, the unjustifiedness of routinely choosing it lies not in the preference but in the initial believing, which as it turns out was not as well justified as it could have been. When a positing is founded upon as well as motivated either by evidencing or by a justified positing of the correspondingly lower sort, and thus ultimately by evidencing, it is justified. Then when asked to justify a willing, one can refer to the valuing, the believing, and/or the evidencing that it is founded upon and motivated by. And—to return to our former example—if the stray dog on the street is welcomed by a neighbor as a lost dog who has found her way home and one witnesses this joyful reunion, this evidencing may in addition alter one's attitude in various respects.

It is possible to change an attitude deliberately, abandoning a less justified attitude in favor of a more justified one. This may be accomplished through learning to focus on different aspects of things, e.g., brains rather than brawn or beauty; through altering habitual believing, perhaps through finding stronger evidencing to found and motivate it; and through changing our values and purposes by changing their foundations and motives. If one reflects on what one

would value if one believed this rather than that, one might even watch the old habit weaken and the new one gain strength.

Yet the arrangement of the interrelated components presented in Figure 7.1 is rarely found in attitudes. Typically, only one or perhaps two components stand out or predominate, and then we characterize the attitude as a whole in terms of what is most important about the objects of the attitudes, e.g., “Stray dogs are dangerous.” But reflective analysis can find components of all four sorts, and the relations of foundation and motivation can also be sought when we are concerned with justification. That this is difficult to do when we are frightened does not imply that we cannot do it when safe and calm.

Section 3—**Three Attitudes and Identities**

Taste in ice cream, attitudes toward stray dogs, and handedness identities have been investigated separately in order to illustrate various points above. Now three more cases can briefly be analyzed in a comparative way.

a.—*Gender*

There are societies in which there are three and even four genders, but most have only two. Bi-gendered sociocultural worlds will be our concern here. This is not a question of sexual orientation; interestingly, however, there are masculine and feminine homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. In addition, gender can be distinguished from sex, the latter being something anatomical and the former being something cultural. Thus feminine males and masculine females occur. Whether or not these cultural terms of “feminine” and “masculine” apply to non-human animals with culture, e.g., chimpanzees, seems likely, but is not known to the present writer. The present theme is confined, then, to human gender. Complicating the case, gender appears to vary

with social class, ethnic group, regional identity, life-stage, generation, society, historical period, etc. But it can also be distinguished as an independent dimension.

Most people in a bi-gendered society find it significant and familiar to speak of “men” and “women” as well as “boys” and “girls” and of “the feminine” and “femininity,” “the masculine” and “masculinity,” etc. These are, again, cultural and not biological terms. One is not born but learns to be a man or woman. Such terms are used descriptively and include reference to ideal standards by which people and other things are judged, which includes people judging themselves. And gender is inculcated, manifested, and reinforced by hairstyles, clothing types, ways of speaking, typical postures, and movement styles, as well as by the attitudes of those toward whom we have our attitudes.

Once differences between the masculine and the feminine are recognized, even somewhat vaguely (the reader will notice that no definitions are ventured here, which would encourage argumentation), we can ask about attitudes toward the gender identities that humans have. There are many such attitudes, but present purposes will be sufficiently served if two broad types are compared and contrasted. One type of gender attitude involves supremacy. Some hold that women are or ought to be superior to men, but far more common is the attitude in which men are encountered as typically dominant over women. Then it might be argued that men are superior due to biological factors such as upper body strength and more powerful testosterone surges. Sometimes “male supremacy” is spoken of, but if the distinction between gender is cultural and sex as biological is accepted, then despite the emphasis on biological factors in the argument just mentioned, it would be better to speak in this connection of “masculine supremacy.”

Physical strength and aggressive behavior can be valued over their opposites, which opposites may then be considered feminine; furthermore, it can be that the somatic is valued over

the psychic. Against this attitude, it might be contended that upper body strength, testosterone, etc., play an ever declining role in so-called advanced societies where even war is increasingly done through equipment, i.e., by watching what is depicted on screens and pushing buttons. It might also be contended that psychic skills that tend to be considered feminine, such as conciliation, always have been and are increasingly of greater influence in most spheres of life. And then there is the consideration of how women actually fight more psychologically than physically, but that would go beyond the needs of this exposition.

In contrast with masculine superiority, there is a type of attitude toward gendered things—i.e., toward gendered persons, groups, objects, and situations, and thus gender identities—that denies past practices no more than it does recent changes, and acknowledges somatic and perhaps even psychic differences between the genders, but nevertheless seeks a society in which men and women do not have different rights, responsibilities, and opportunities, especially under the law. And to begin to analyze this “gender egalitarian attitude,” one can first ask about experiencing. Perhaps this attitude includes focusing more on psychic than on somatic traits, on peacetime rather than wartime situations, and on social relations other than status hierarchy. Is a successful career ultimately better than a well-raised child?

Next one can ask what we are disposed to believe in if we are gender egalitarians rather than gender supremacists, and then not only what objects thus believed in are valued not only higher and lower, but also what objects are valued equally in the two types of attitude. Finally, one can ask how one is disposed to will for and against people, oneself included, with different gender identities. Has the reader encountered attitudes that can be classified as gender supremacist and gender egalitarian? Can they be analyzed in terms of how things are experienced in the experiencing stratum and in terms of what is believed in, what is valued, and what is

willed, including dispositions that are accessible to reflective analysis assisted by recollection and feigning?

b.—*Ethnicity*

Ethnicity is also a complex cultural thing. To understand an individual's ethnic identity at all well, one must learn about her family and its activities, past as well as present, as well as studying relevant history and social science. But without doing this for any particular case, we can first of all recognize that we regularly encounter many people, perhaps ourselves as well as others, as belonging more or less definitely to this or that ethnic group. We make mistakes in this regard, but we also recognize and correct them.

Many ethnic groups are identified and differentiated by language and/or religion, but at least in the United States currently, where there may be as many as a thousand ethnic groups, what is called "race" appears to be the most frequent major basis for ethnic identification. But what is race? There can be no doubt that eye shape, hair texture, and skin color are biologically inherited. Some hold that psychic traits are also biologically inherited, but this remains unproven. Could race be something cultural founded on such somatic determinations somewhat as gender is founded to some extent on anatomical differences? This question may not be as easy to understand from a naturalistic point of view as it is from the standpoints of common sense and cultural science.

One type of attitude toward ethnic things that one might find in oneself and in others can be called "racial supremacy." Such an attitude may be considered by some who enjoy it to be a biology-based position, but even if the biological differences were more than superficial, there is still a valuing of one set of traits over others, as well as helping and hindering, i.e., willing, of individuals and groups. Furthermore, it is typically not the inherited somatic traits that are

valued, disvalued, etc. Rather, a group and members of it may be recognized by racial traits, but the racial group member and associated things are preferred, fostered, etc., because of who is believed to be the cleaner or the more honest, industrious, law-abiding, thrifty, truthful, erotically self-controlled, etc., all of which may indicate more about those with the supremacist attitude than about those toward whom this attitude is directed.

Race is then a matter of culture, not only in how behaviors are habitual and traditional, but also in how these are intended to in habitual experiencing, believing, valuing, and willing, for the person behaving thus and so as well as for the other persons encountered within the habitual and traditional attitude in play. People have identities in correlation with ethnic attitudes, including those of the type that can be called ethnic supremacy. Moreover, it deserves mention that while contrasting cultural traits appear easier to recognize, members of the same group share traits and thus encounter in their fellow group members the same attitudes that they can find in themselves. And what has just been said about race-based ethnicity, as it might best be called, can be paralleled with characterizations of religion-based and language-based ethnicity and, indeed, these three major bases are always involved, as are others concerning food, dance, music, costume, myths, culture heroes, etc.

If one were to seek an attitude contrasting to ethnic supremacy, one in which a variety of ethnic cultures and identities were recognized but not valued preferentially, at least as wholes, one's goal would be something analogous to gender egalitarianism that might be termed "ethnic egalitarianism." Here again the foundation for the believing, valuing, and willing is experiencing. Supremacist beliefs can be challenged on the basis of evidencing, and egalitarian positions supported with evidencing of comparable performances in all spheres of life, when educational and similar advantages and disadvantages are allowed for. Identities can be at once different and

yet equal in value and use. Crucial for all questions of cultural identity is then the recognition that identities can be different from one another, but individual persons and also groups, e.g., religious groups, are to be treated in the same way in law and ethics.

The question immediately arises concerning how to relate to individuals and groups who insist on their supremacy. This is not a simple issue; a great deal of reflective analysis is required to sort things out, but the place to begin is with the attitudes one finds that one already has. After finding that one has an attitude, one can attempt to examine it, i.e., to see whether it is justified or at least closer to being perfectly justified than other attitudes one can feign, then one is prepared to defend it by giving reasons that ultimately come down to what is experienced. If one cannot find justification, or if stronger justifications for other attitudes toward the thing at issue can be feigned, then one can seek to change one's current attitude into a new attitude in which the disposition to will can be justified with reference to valuing, valuing justified with reference to believing, and believing justified with reference to the type of experiencing that can be called evidencing.

Evidencing is the experiencing in which the object is intended to in the most clear, distinct, and original way for an object of its kind. Ultimately, it is this "seeing" that is the goal of efforts to justify an attitude, be it cognitive, valuational, or volitional. The means to this end are reflective analysis and the explanatory as well as descriptive accounts that can be developed, confirmed, corrected, and extended on its basis, which is what the previous six chapters of this book have tried to show.

c.—Environment

The environment is yet another cultural thing, i.e., a matter of how organisms and ecosystems are encountered and, more precisely, of human attitudes as patterns of encountering

correlative to the environment as encountered. Are there supremacy and egalitarianism in this connection as well?

(7.2)	Gender	Ethnicity	Environment
Supremacy			
Egalitarianism			

Rather than speaking of individuals and groups of humans with gender and ethnicity among other things, one can speak instead of specimens and species (including now non-human as well as human animals) and also habitats and ecosystems. A widespread attitude in this connection can be called “human supremacy.” In this attitude, humans are encountered as superior in various ways to non-humans or “sub”-humans. The alternative of “environmental egalitarianism” does not deny differences among species, but holds all species to be of equal value, and is volitionally disposed against species going extinct due to human activity, against the destruction of ecosystems that humans do not need, etc. Human supremacy has a long history and is often related to religion, but there seem to be egalitarian tendencies in Asian thought and also among some Western philosophers. This is, again, not the place for more than some initial and superficial examination of attitudes of this type. But human supremacists can be required to justify their attitudes toward environmental things. Do humans have a greater moral right to exist than tigers or chimpanzees? If that is our position, what reasons, if any, can we give to support it?

Perhaps this short discussion will suffice to make plausible the contention that reflective analysis can be used in the examination of attitudes. Reaching a final position in which all of one’s attitudes are justified would be more than the task of one or a few lifetimes. It would be best to be selective about the attitudes one examines. On the one hand, to examine one’s attitudes

is to live a life in which one's attitudes at all come from others and to have rationalizations rather than justifications. But the deeper question this raises is whether or not it is justified to justify attitudes, be they one's own or another's, or even shared by groups—and to act accordingly.

Closing Comments

The effort of this text has been to introduce phenomenology in general as an approach in which scholarship on texts is subordinate to investigation of things; in which one observes reflectively rather than speculates; and in which one produces analyses rather than arguments. In the last respect, it deserves the further comment that the result of an analysis is not a set of claims or theses along with combinations for or against them, as it is in argumentation, but rather an articulated group of distinctions clarified with examples so that afterward there is deeper insight into the thing in question. The hope is then that this is what has happened for the student with respect to phenomenology itself.

Phenomenology is an approach that can most concisely be described as reflective analysis. This approach can be taken in many disciplines. It cannot be taken in formal disciplines, such as mathematics, or in the naturalistic sciences, such as chemistry, although it can be taken in subsequent efforts to understand what is done in such disciplines. Where it can indeed be taken, however, is in disciplines in which aspects of the sociocultural world are thematized. How a world is cultural by virtue of valuing and willing, and how it can be social in having non-human and human others within it, has been shown above in terms of distinctions and procedures of concern to the phenomenological tradition investigated. Nevertheless, the approach that is called reflective analysis—and that has been itself reflectively analyzed here—can already be found to be at work in many of the social sciences and also science-based practical disciplines such as nursing and psychiatry, even when it is not explicitly called “phenomenological.”

What of philosophy? Phenomenology has of course been chiefly cultivated thus far within this discipline and, because that is the discipline of the present writer, there is no doubt some inclination toward taking the approach of reflective analysis in philosophical directions within this text. Readers prepared in philosophy will have recognized uses of reflective analysis in ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and so on. Perhaps the chief implication this text holds for philosophy, however, is that the general characterization of the approach not only invites the question of what philosophy itself, but also the recognition that there has been more than one answer to this question in the past. (Analogously, there is the task of determining how the general approach of reflective analysis can be specified for non-philosophical disciplines thematizing aspects of the sociocultural world.)

The reflective analysis examining the justification of attitudes—an analysis that could only be sketched in the present chapter—has considerable affinity with modern philosophy and can be seen to lead to what might be called “critical phenomenology.” By contrast, an interest in metaphysical questions—beginning with those about being qua being, which goes back at least to Aristotle—has also played a large role in the phenomenological tradition. One can ask if metaphysics can be approached through reflective analysis. Then again, much of phenomenology has been concerned with human existence. Is it possible to justify choosing one notion of phenomenological philosophy over others by taking the approach of reflective analysis? The present writer believes so, but even to clarify this question adequately lies beyond the scope of this introductory text, which has been written for students; whose main goal has been to provide them resources for pursuing phenomenological investigations for themselves; and to encourage them to do so. If the surface has been analyzed sufficiently, deeper digging can proceed.

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